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Recent criticism on the Renaissance has drawn
attention to an interest in the rhetorical methods of
argumentation which were used to support, and lend
legitimation to, new positions or ideas. Such methods of
'proof', which were designed to create belief, replaced
the logical methods of argumentation of the medieval
scholastics, which were designed instead to discover the
true principles of a particular line of enquiry. I
explore a different and complementary method for the
creation of credibility, a method which derives from the
same Roman rhetorical tradition, and which was promoted
by Renaissance writers, including Philip Sidney. This
method originates with Marcus Tullius Cicero, although
Cicero himself suggests that he is inspired by the
Socrates of Plato's dialogues. The claim of Plato's
Socrates not to know the rhetorical techniques for
producing eloquence, a claim which is meant to indicate
that his speech is prompted by a genuine knowledge of
true principles, is interpreted by Cicero himself as a
rhetorical strategy for creating an ironic persona which
conceals the studied nature of his expression and which
thus gains him the credence, and trust, of his audience.
In his rhetorical manuals Cicero imitates, and thus
demonstrates, this supposed ironic strategy, for two
seemingly contradictory reasons: on the one hand, he
wishes to elevate the status of the art of rhetoric - the
art held in contempt by Plato - showing that it is a
legitimate and fundamental tool for intellectual enquiry;
on the other hand, he wants to conceal the studied nature
of his own eloquence so that his audience believe that he
speaks as nature or truth prompts him. In the
Renaissance Cicero's ironic method is imitated by
Desiderius Erasmus and Baldassare Castiglione for these
respective reasons: while Erasmus sets out to establish
rhetoric as a proper instrument for the discovery of
truth, Castiglione arms his courtier with a rhetorical
strategy that will allow him to create the impression
that his actions and words reflect his innately noble
character. Cicero's ironic strategy, mediated through
the writings of Erasmus and Castiglione, is explored by
Philip Sidney in his own writings. In A Defence of
Poetry, Astrophil and Stella, and the old Arcadia, Sidney
explores the rhetorical techniques which help to create
credible and persuasive personae; while in the early
books of the revised Arcadia Sidney explores, in the
characters of his two heroes, methods for the creation of
a reputation for virtue. In these respects, Sidney
appears to follow the example of Castiglione, who adapts
Ciceronian irony to the rhetorical and political needs of
the courtier; and yet, Sidney will also attribute to the
rhetorical art a more Erasmian role: in the trial scene
in the final book of the Arcadia, in which the heroes are
forced to defend themselves against false allegations of
criminal behaviour, Sidney makes an eloquent defence of
the legitimacy of rhetorical techniques in the









Creating and Unmasking Credible Fictions in 1
the Renaissance
Chapter One
Imitation at Two Removes: Plato, Cicero and 9
the Renaissance
la.The Ambiguity of Images: Creating and Reflecting 14
Reality
i. Plato's idealism 14
ii. Quintilian's scepticism 27
iii. Cicero's sceptical idealism 35




Sir Philip Sidney's Defence of Poetry: The Art
of Being Persuaded 130
2a. Protestant Interest in The Book of the Courtier 130
2b. A Defence of Poetry 139
i. Freedom from nature 139
ii. The affective text 142
iii. What is good poetry? 146
iv. What is fittest to nature 153
v. Riding Pugliano's horse 167
vi. Poetry and history: Sidney and Amiot 172
2c. Rhetoric and Protestant History 180
Chapter Three
Sidney's 'Fiery Speeches': The Art of Being in Love 207
3a. Creating Credible Personae 208
i. Astrophil 208
ii. Pyrocles 227
3b. Philip Sidney's 'fiery speeches' to the Queen 259
Chapter Four
The Revised Arcadia and the Trial Scene: Sidney's
Praise of Folly 280
4a. The revised Arcadia: Icon-making and
Iconoclasm 285
i. Books I and II: 'lofty images' in a reformed
IV
text 285
ii. The characters of Pyrocles and Musidorus
reconsidered 298
iii. Iconoclasm, iconography: idealism and
scepticism in Book III 310
4b. Rhetoric Recovered: Emotion and The Art
of Judgement 318
i. The old Arcadia: Books III/ IV and V 318





The writing of this thesis was supported financially
by a British Academy Major Studentship and, in its later
stages, with grants from the British Federation of Women
Graduates. Support, however, came in many forms. I
would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Jonquil Bevan, for
her careful guidance and exacting standards over the
years, and the readers who contributed to the shaping of
individual chapters, Prof. R.D.S. Jack, Prof. Ian
Donaldson, and Dr. Sarah Carpenter. I would like to give
special thanks, however, to my family for their patience
and encouragement, and to my friends and colleagues,
Ariel Meirav and Heather Johnson, who supported me
through the ups and downs of Ph.D. research, and whose
probing questions and uncompromising comments have kept
me fighting to the end. But my greatest thanks go to
Paul Suttie, who has been my most demanding and most
unstinting reader, as well as a source of inspiration on
many occasions, and whose friendship has made this
project not only a rewarding but a much lighter task.
1
INTRODUCTION
Creating and Unmasking Fictions
in the Renaissance
One of the characteristics of the new humanist
learning of the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries is its commitment to the revival of classical
rhetoric as the basis of a method of intellectual enquiry
which is intended to correct the errors of medieval
scholarship. Lorenzo Valla's famous declamation in 1440
on the Donation of Constantine, the eighth-century
forgery of a fourth-century grant, which attempts to
legitimate the claim of the Roman Catholic Church to the
Western Empire, is just one example of how the new
method, with its attention to 'fact and phrasing', could
be used to uncover the forgeries of the past.1
The Renaissance, however, is not just a period of
recovery. The 'flood of new texts and information',
Anthony Grafton remarks in his study of forgery in
Western Scholarship, was accompanied by 'streams of
fraudulent matter', although the nature of the forgeries
changed.2 While in the Middle Ages forgeries frequently
took the form of 'faked documents', attempts, as in the
case of the Donation of Constantine, to 'equip a person
or an institution with a basis for possession of lands or
privileges', in the Renaissance forgeries were often in
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the form of literary texts.3 Even Erasmus, revered by
modern critics 'as one of the great exposers of error and
mendacity', is not innocent of such tricks.4 In his 1530
edition of the works of St. Cyprian, Erasmus included a
supplementary treatise, the 'De duplici martyrio', which
he claimed '"was discovered in an ancient library"'.
However, not only, as Grafton observes, is its style
reminiscent of Erasmus's own treatises, but it 'takes a
position highly sympathetic to Erasmus'.5 Thomas More
also dabbled in forging literary texts. Appended to his
life of Pico della Mirandola is a text which purports to
be written by Pico and translated by himself, The XII
Propertees or Condicyons of a Lover, but which is in fact
his own work (it presents not an account of Neoplatonic
love, as one would expect from Pico, but an allegorical
Christian interpretation of the precepts of courtly
love).
Why the need for such forgeries? In many cases the
forgeries are the result of 'nostalgia', and a desire to
create a version of the past 'to the taste of modern
readers'.6 In other cases, though, forgery may be
prompted by a perceived need to create intellectual
legitimation for a particular tradition, individual or
group of individuals, as Lisa Jardine argues in her
recent study of Erasmus's letters. For, what the reader
finds in these letters, according to Jardine, is not the
expected evidence of a school of humanist thought at
Louvain, the centre for theological study, led by
prominent humanists such as Juan Luis Vives, but a
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'publicity campaign, designed to bring Louvain and Vives
(amongst others) together to the attention of a larger
reading public'.7 These letters constitute a
conspiratorial use of print by Erasmus and his 'friends'
to replace one educational tradition with another,
namely, the formal logic of the scholastics, based on
'fixed patterns of argumentation which guarantee that
from any true premiss whatsoever one can only infer a
true conclusion', with 'humanistic logic', that is, the
topics-logic of classical rhetoric, based on a method of
argumentation 'which can be counted on to win in
debate'.8
As the example of Valla's declamation on the Donation
of Constantine has shown, the humanists were concerned
with the 'unmasking' of credible, and up to then
credited, fictions/ but, as Jardine's and Grafton's
accounts of Erasmus's activities also suggest, prominent
humanists were interested as well in the creation of
credible fictions with a view to legitimating their own
scholarly methods. In a recent article, Lorna Hutson
suggests that sixteenth-century English humanists were
interested in Valla's declamation not only because it
offered them 'a rudimentary form of historical analysis'
by proving the probability of its position, but because
it reveals the techniques by means of which it
establishes its own probability, namely rhetorical
methods of argumentation which are designed 'to produce
belief'.9 Thus, the same methods of argument which were
used to reveal the false claims of medieval scholarship
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could also be used (and indeed were used) by Renaissance
scholars to fashion claims of their own which were not so
much more truthful than those of their medieval
predecessors which they debunked, as more credible.
As the title of my thesis suggests, I am interested
in techniques used for the creation of credible fictions;
however, I shall explore a strategy distinct from the
methods of argumentation discussed above, a strategy
which was used by sixteenth-century educationalists such
as Erasmus and Castiglione, and which, I will argue, was
actively promoted by Sidney in his writings in the 1580s.
The strategy evolves from Cicero's sceptical reading of
the eloquence of Plato's Socrates. Socrates's
explanation for his eloquence in the Phaedrus, namely,
that he is inspired by his knowledge of the intelligible
forms rather than by skill in the art of rhetoric, is
interpreted by Cicero as a rhetorical move itself which
conceals Socrates's actual knowledge of this art from his
audience. In his dialogue De Oratore Cicero both exposes
and imitates this rhetorical move on the part of Plato's
Socrates. On the one hand, his character Crassus insists
on the spurious nature of the division made by Socrates
between rhetoric and philosophy, and argues that Socrates
was himself a consummate orator; on the other hand,
Cicero's character Antonius claims, in imitation of
Plato's Socrates, not to know the art of rhetoric,
although, unlike Socrates, he eventually reveals that his
ignorance is a pretence, a mask which conceals his actual
rhetorical skill. Crassus unmasks Socrates because he
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wishes to establish oratory as an art essential to the
philosopher as well as to the lawyer, while Antonius
imitates Socrates because he aspires to a reputation for
spontaneous and inspired eloquence. In the Renaissance,
Erasmus and Castiglione are among the imitators of
Cicero; like Cicero, they both claim to be disciples of
Plato even though they actually owe an equal, if not a
greater, debt to the rhetorical tradition disparaged by
Plato. However, Erasmus and Castiglione represent,
respectively, the different concerns of Cicero's two
characters Crassus and Antonius: Erasmus claims Plato as
the father of his ideas because, like Crassus in De
Oratore, he wishes to establish the art of rhetoric as a
tool essential to philosophical enquiry, while
Castiglione expresses an allegiance to Plato, (and, for
that matter, to a supposedly Platonist Cicero), as the
source for his ideas because, in a similar fashion to
Antonius in De Oratore, he wishes to suggest that the
artificial expression of the courtier is the spontaneous
product of his innately noble nature.
In chapters two and three I shall explore Sidney's
debt to Ciceronian rhetoric in the light of Castiglione's
Courtier and in chapter four, I shall explore his debt in
the light of Erasmus's writings: for Sidney the art of
rhetoric is a tool for the creation of credible fictions
and, ultimately, for the representation and defence of
truth itself. In his Defence of Poetry, Sidney
articulates a method which is derived from the rhetorical
tradition for making artificial and fictional characters
6
seem natural and genuine: the vivid imagining of
situations, otherwise known as 'enargeia', which involves
a poet's or orator's actually striving to experience the
emotions he wishes to convey to his audience. At the
same time he partially conceals the rhetorical nature of
the poetic art by suggesting that the poet should write
as nature, or his knowledge of divine matters, prompts
him.
In my study of Sidney's fiction I shall explore how he
uses erotic narrative to dramatise the literary theory of
the Defence. Not only is the relationship between lover
and beloved in the old Arcadia and Astrophil and Stella
analogous to the relationship between reader and text
outlined in the Defence, but the protagonists of these
narratives, Pyrocles and Astrophil, demonstrate the
effectiveness of the rhetorical technique of enargeia
promoted in this treatise. However, Sidney's sensitivity
to the fact that there is no necessary connection between
genuinely virtuous character and the rhetorical skill of
giving a convincingly virtuous self-portrayal makes him
heedful of the need for those of virtuous character to
acquire seemingly duplicitous or manipulative rhetorical
skills. In the much longer, revised Arcadia Sidney
explores in the characters Pyrocles and Musidorus both
the techniques used to create a heroic reputation, and
the important role they ultimately play in the defence of
virtue itself. The revisions he makes to the Arcadia
suggest that Sidney was keen to impress on his readership
not so much the importance of being virtuous as the
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importance of effectively communicating one's
virtuousness, a concern which is influenced by Sidney's
Protestant sympathies: Sidney's desire to promote the
rhetorical art coincides with his desire to champion and
defend his own 'true' cause with the best rhetorical
tools available for that task.
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CHAPTER ONE
Imitation at Two Removes: Plato, Cicero
and the Renaissance
A defining feature both of the Italian Renaissance in
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and of the
Northern European Renaissance in the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries is the recovery, and imitation, of
ancient texts. It has been claimed that, in the Italian
Renaissance, the interest in classical literature had two
distinct phases: in the early part of the fifteenth
century the humanists derived from Roman rhetoric an
educational interest in creating capable citizens, men
who were astute politicians and skilled rhetoricians able
to plan according to the immediate needs of the state,
while in the later part of the century, there was a
revived interest in Plato's dialogues as read through the
Neoplatonic commentary tradition of the third to sixth
centuries A.D., which contributed to a renewed interest
in the study of metaphysical reality. Thus, there was,
in effect, a shift from a pragmatic or sceptical to an
idealist intellectual paradigm, from a tradition which
held that human knowledge is contingent, to a tradition
which believed that universal and transcendent truths
could be apprehended by the human mind.1 Such a shift,
while prompted by the increased availability of
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Neoplatonic treatises, and the greater linguistic
proficiency of the later humanists (Petrarch, for
example, did not know Greek), can be shown to be related,
also, to political developments.2 Thus, Eugenio Garin
argues that the Neoplatonic revival in the later part of
the fifteenth century reflects the developing autocracy
of Italian princes which replaced the republicanism of
earlier in the century. 'The new [Italian] prince', he
remarks, 'forced everybody from active political life and
transformed culture into an elegant decoration of his
court or into a desperate flight from the world', and he
cites the example of Cosimo de Medici, the 'tyrant of the
Italian Athens' who promoted 'a renaissance of the school
of Plato' at the Florentine court for the very reason
that he wished to consolidate his political power.3
But this conception of the separate influence of these
two classical traditions in the fifteenth century, while
it undoubtedly does parallel the shifting tastes and
political and intellectual fashions of this period, also
threatens to oversimplify the reception of classical
learning in the period. For not only did the two
traditions - sceptical and idealist - coexist in some
form throughout the Middle Ages and the early Renaissance
but particular writers would often subscribe not just to
one but to both traditions. As William Bouwsma argues in
his analysis of the Renaissance debt to classical
learning, we can find in the writers of the Italian
Renaissance a rather confused set of allegiances,
springing from a strained synthesis of the two
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antithetical traditions. The early Italian humanists, he
writes, 'uneasily blended' the idealist and sceptical
traditions, represented for him by Stoicism and
Augustinianism respectively, which 'it neither
distinguished clearly, nor, in many cases, was capable of
identifying with their sources'.4 A similar kind of
confusion can be discovered in educational treatises
which belong to a later period, for example, The
Education of the Christian Prince by the Northern
European humanist Desiderius Erasmus and The Book of the
Courtier by the Italian courtier Baldessare Castiglione,
both of which belong to the early sixteenth century. For
Erasmus and Castiglione subscribe explicitly to Platonic
idealism in their respective treatises and yet they are
also clearly inspired intellectually by the scepticism of
the Roman rhetorical tradition. However, rather than
concluding that the admixture of classical influences in
the works of these two writers is 'uneasily blended', I
will argue instead that it is not only intentional, but
that it is derived itself from one of their classical
models, namely Marcus Tullius Cicero.
Although one of Erasmus's intellectual aims, namely,
his intention to replace the Aristotelian logic of the
scholastics with the sceptical tradition of classical
rhetoric, seems quite different from Castiglione's main
concern, which, as I shall argue, is to present the
sceptical rhetorical skills of the courtier as natural
talents, both educationalists derive their ironic method
of exposition from Cicero. In the rhetorical treatise De
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Oratore Cicero attempts to give intellectual legitimacy
to the rhetorical art, and he does so in part by
responding to Plato's attacks on oratory in the Phaedrus
and The Republic. Plato's hostility to rhetoric is most
pronounced in The Republic, for it is here that he offers
a method of philosophical enquiry which is meant to
expose the fraudulence of mimetic arts such as rhetoric -
arts which, according to him, confuse the important
distinction between images and their originals. Cicero
answers Plato's attack in his dialogue De Oratore in two
ways: while his character Crassus argues that rhetoric is
an art essential to the philosopher's study, and
criticises Socrates for having divided the two
disciplines, the character Antonius offers a method
whereby the images created by rhetoric can be made to
appear to be inspired by a knowledge of the truth,
whether they genuinely are inspired or not, a method
which Cicero implies is authorised by Plato's Socrates
himself. Thus, while Socrates sets out to expose the
illusions created by the rhetoricians, Cicero sets out,
in contrast, to expose the rhetorical nature of
Socrates's attempt to convey philosophical truths. But
Cicero does not just unmask Socrates as a skilled orator;
as the character Antonius reveals he also imitates
Socrates's ironic method with the intention of making his
own eloquence appear to be genuinely inspired rather than
the product of technique and practice.
In this first chapter I will explore the ironic style
of exposition of two representatives of the intellectual
culture of the sixteenth century, Erasmus and
Castiglione. In his Praise of Folly Erasmus's persona
Folly is both ignorant in the way that Socrates claims t
be, namely, ignorant in the foolish eyes of mortals
(though genuinely wise as a result of his knowledge of
transcendent truths), and in the way of Antonius, namely
self-consciously 'ignorant' in an attempt to gain the
trust of her audience/ while in The Book of the Courtier
Castiglione offers a method which is also borrowed from
Cicero's Antonius, whereby the courtier creates the
impression that he speaks and acts without premeditation
Moreover, both Erasmus and Castiglione will use their
ironic method of exposition to reveal the rhetorical
nature of their own fictions and, indeed, those of their
opponents or superiors, whether scholars or rulers. It
is important to recognise, however, that while Erasmus
and Castiglione both draw their inspiration from Cicero,
they do so for different reasons: for Erasmus the art of
rhetoric is, as Cicero's Crassus insists, ultimately a
tool for discovering probable truths, although its
methods may initially appear to lead us away from the
truth, while for Castiglione, in contrast, it is a tool
for creating the appearance of truths, regardless of
whether it actually leads to the truth or not.
Sidney's own considerable debt to, and interest in,
Cicero's conception of the art of rhetoric is mediated
through the influence of Erasmus and Castiglione/ in
chapters two and three I shall consider his interest in
Ciceronian rhetoric in the light of Castiglione, while,
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in chapter four, I shall consider Sidney's interest in
Roman rhetoric in general in the light of Erasmus. In
the present chapter, however, I will offer readings of
Erasmus's The Praise of Folly and The Instruction of a
Christian Prince and Castiglione's The Book of the
Courtier which make clear their particular interests in
Cicero. Since it is difficult to understand the aims and
methods of Erasmus and Castiglione without first
understanding Cicero's interpretation, and imitation, of
the Socratic style, and, thus, the supposed Socratic
style itself, I propose first to consider the attitude
to, and practice of, the art of rhetoric by Plato and
Cicero; I shall also consider the aims of another
influential Roman rhetorician, Cicero's self-styled pupil
Quintilian, in order to give a clear sense of the actual
aims of the Roman rhetorical art, which are presented
rather esoterically by Cicero.
la. The Ambiguity of Images: Creating and Reflecting
Reality
(i) Plato's Idealism
In Plato's Phaedrus the character Socrates draws
attention to the ambiguous nature of words. Instead of
opposing sets of terms, such as 'love' and 'hate', to one
another, Socrates discovers that a single term such as
'love' can have two very different meanings. After
listening to Phaedrus's relation of the speech of the
famous orator Lysias, who condemns love as an irrational
passion, Socrates, Plato's protagonist, offers two other
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speeches, the one exploring the harmful, the other, the
profitable, effects of seemingly irrational love.
Although in his second speech Socrates praises the
madness of lovers, and thus argues against Lysias, so
that an oppositional relationship is established between
the two characters, it is important to recognise that
their positions are not simply antagonistic. As Socrates
reveals in his two speeches there are two types of
lovers: the first type limits himself to the love of
physical beauty, and can be said thus to be in the
possession of a harmful passion (238d ff) ; the second
type, in contrast, is inspired by the love of physical
beauty to an appreciation of its source, the idea of
beauty, which induces in him a kind of 'heaven-sent'
madness (244a ff) .5 Recognising this distinction between
the two types of love allows us to see that it is not
simply the case that Lysias is wrong and that Socrates is
right but, rather, that Lysias is partially right, and
that it is only his lack of knowledge which prevents him
from seeing that he is speaking about one type of love,
and not about love generally. This recognition is
important on two accounts: first, because it indicates
that an individual already possesses some kind of
unconscious knowledge of truth (as I will shortly
explain), and, secondly, because it suggests that the
process of discovering truth depends on an act of making
distinctions in which the attention of an individual is
'turned away' from one possible meaning of a word to
another.
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But ambiguity is not simply a problematic theme
explored in this particular dialogue; it is also a
problem encountered by the reader who wishes to discover
a coherent position throughout Plato's works. In the
later parts of the Phaedrus Socrates explains that the
method of division is called dialectic, and that the
individuals who practice it are called 'dialecticians'
(266c). He also argues that it is this method which is
essential to the production of persuasive speech,
enabling an individual to speak knowingly and, therefore,
eloquently. Just as there are two types of love, so, it
turns out, there are two types of rhetoric, or, rather,
two types of eloquence. The first, practised by Lysias,
is dependent for its persuasive power on mechanical
proficiency in the art of speech-making. The second
kind, practised by Socrates, is, in contrast, dependent
on a knowledge of the thing being discussed, and is thus
a branch of the art of philosophy. However, Socrates's
interest in rhetoric in the Phaedrus seems problematic in
view of another of Plato's treatises, the Republic, in
which the character Socrates offers not only a different
view of dialectic (here it is a method of abstract
philosophical enquiry) , but also a tendency to dismiss
all the arts of representation, including rhetoric, as
being unworthy of the consideration of a philosopher.
But even in the Republic Socrates betrays an interest in
rhetoric: for Plato famously exiles poets and painters
from his model city-state on account of the fact that
they create images (for Socrates words create images),
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only to prove in the writing of the Republic itself that
he is himself an expert creator of such images.6 This
divided allegiance is also present in a different form in
the Phaedrus. For although Socrates insists in the
Phaedrus that he 1lay[s] no claim to any oratorical
skill' (262d), suggesting instead that he is inspired by
a knowledge of the forms (234d), it is difficult
superficially to distinguish the inspired eloquence of
Socrates from the 'ecstasy' of Phaedrus, an 'ecstasy'
which is allegedly produced in the case of the latter by
mechanical techniques. Is Socrates being disingenuous
when he claims in the Phaedrus to have no skill in the
art of oratory, and hypocritical in the Republic when he
dismisses the art of the poets, painters and
rhetoricians? In order to make sense of Socrates's
apparently contradictory attitude to rhetoric we will
need to understand further the distinction Plato makes
between kinds of images.
Although at the heart of Platonic psychology there
lies a belief in the innate capacity of human beings to
apprehend the intelligible forms, Plato is simultaneously
acutely conscious of the impressionability of the human
mind, and this awareness determines his attitude to the
role of the arts in the education of his ideal citizens
outlined in the Republic. Because of his awareness of
the potential influence of the poetic and dramatic arts
on the developing moral character (psuche) of an
individual,7 Socrates urges mothers and nurses to select
fastidiously the kind of stories that they read to the
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young guardians, the future leaders of his ideal
republic, since childhood is a time in life when an
individual's character 'is best molded and takes the
impression that one wishes to stamp upon it' (377b).
(Socrates is particularly anxious to see the Homeric epic
poems removed from the curriculum, sensitive as he is to
the, in his view, untruthful and immoral representation
of divine action contained in them (378d ff) .) But
Socrates sees the formation of moral character not only
as a process of acting upon or 'stamping' an individual,
but as a process in which the individual acts, and
thereby produces, his character. This view helps to
explain Socrates's anxiety not only about the content of
literary texts but about the mode of story-telling. He
argues that a story can be told in one of two ways:
either by narrating in the third person the actions of a
particular character, in which case the story teller does
not assume a fictional voice but remains true to himself,
or by dramatising, that is, acting out himself, another
person's actions (393c). Socrates is nervous about
dramatic representation, one of the reasons being that he
fears that, in the act of imitating, the qualities of the
model will be actually assimilated by the actor,
irreversibly affecting his own 'character'. 'Have you
not observed', Socrates asks his interlocutors, 'that
imitations, if continued from youth far into life, settle
down into habits [ethe] and second nature [phusin] in the
body, the speech, and the thought?' (395c-d). Plato
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fears that what is assimilated by, or made to seem
natural to, an individual may change him.
However, Plato does not want to prohibit all imitative
practice in his ideal city-state/ indeed, not only does
he consider it to be an important part of the early
formation of good character but part of the process of
intellectual training. Plato contrasts those blind men,
who have "no vivid pattern [enarges ... paradeigma] in
their souls' with the guardians who, in the same way that
'painters look to their models, fix their eyes on the
absolute truth, and always with reference to that ideal
and in the exactest possible contemplation of it
establish in this world also the laws of the beautiful,
the just, and the good' (484d). What is different, then,
about the guardians is not that they are not imitators,
but that they imitate an abstract entity known as the
form of the Good rather than the objects of the physical
world. The tool which they use to circumvent the
physical world and to apprehend the form of the Good is
'dialectic': with the aid of reason the guardians treat
'assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as
hypotheses', which enables them to move upward to 'that
which requires no assumption', before they 'proceed
downward to the conclusion'. As Socrates makes clear,
the guardians make 'no use whatever of any object of
sense' in this process, but only 'of pure ideas, moving
on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas' (511b-
c), the end of their education being to liberate
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themselves from their dependence on 'images', that is,
the objects of the visible world.
The category of 'images' (eikones) includes for Plato
not only the painted images and stories created by the
painter and the playwright respectively but the objects
of the visible world. For Plato there are two types of
images, the status of which is determined by their
different relation to the form of the Good. The lowest
kind of image, that is, those which are furthest from the
form of the Good, include 'first, shadows [skias], and
then reflections [phantasmata] in water and on surfaces
of dense, smooth and bright texture', while the other
kind of image includes those things of which the former
kind of image is a 'likeness', 'that is, the animals
about us and all plants and the whole class of objects
made by man' (510a). Although this second kind of image
is, as Plato suggests, an object of the visible world,
and, therefore, is substantial in a way that its
reflection is not, its status as an image is derived from
the fact that it is not an original but a reflection of
an idea.
It is important to recognise that the status of
images, whether they are primary or secondary, is
determined by their relation to the forms. It becomes
clear in the discussion of art in Book X that the images
produced by artists belong to the first category because
they are copies of visible objects rather than of the
forms. A painter who paints an image of a bed is copying
not the form or idea of a bed, as a carpenter can
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be said to do, but the image of this idea, that is, an
actual bed; the result is that he produces a product at
'three removes from nature' (597e). Among the creators
of this secondary kind of image Plato also seems to
include rhetoricians or sophists, as Glaucon's
description of the man who can produce these images as a
'most marvelous Sophist [sophisten]' suggests (the
connection is explored more fully in The Sophist (234b-
c)). Not all depicted images, however, are at 'three
removes from nature'. For example, the diagrams used by
geometers, the 'very things which they mold and draw'
(510d) , are identical in status to the objects of the
visible world. There are two things which distinguish
the geometer from the painter: first, the images he uses
represent ideas, not the objects of the visible world,
and, secondly, he is fully conscious of the status of
these images as images. The geometer uses 'visible
forms', that is, geometrical diagrams, knowing that they
are but a means to an end, so that he follows a course of
inquiry 'for the sake of the square as such and the
diagonal as such, and not for the sake of the image of it
which they draw' (510d). The diagrams are used by the
geometers to 'get sight of those realities [idein] which
can be seen only by the mind' (510e). The same applies
to the words used by the geometers to discuss their
subject. 'Their language is most ludicrous*, Socrates
explains, 'for they speak as if they were doing something
and as if all their words were directed towards action',
when 'in fact the real object of the entire study is pure
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knowledge' (527a). The language they use, like the
images they draw, suggests that when they are working
with phenomena they are actually thinking about invisible
entities.
Since Plato uses the same word 1eikon' for both kinds
of images it is necessary to be sensitive to the nature
of their difference, since this can help explain his
apparently contradictory attitude to images. It has
already been pointed out that Plato is not hostile to all
forms of imitation. Indeed, he can even be said to be an
imitator, a creator of images. Plato's cave narrative,
in which he asks us to imagine the journey of a man from
a shadowy existence in the depths of a cave to
enlightened freedom at its entrance, is itself called by
him an 'image' ('eikona') (517a). Plato's 'image',
however, is to be treated in the same way that the
geometers treat their diagrams - as images of ideas.8
Thus, for example, he explains that the subterranean cave
world is to be likened to 'the region revealed through
sight', and that the light of the fire is to be taken for
'the power of the sun', while the light of the sun is to
be identified 'with the intelligibility cast by the form
of the good on the objects of that world (517b).9 In
other words, Plato's commentary makes clear the
relationship between the images presented in the
narrative and the originals they represent. By pointing
out the analogical relations between the idea and its
image, in short, by drawing attention to the fact that
the image is a symbol, he avoids repeating the mistake
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made by the dramatic audiences in Books III and X and the
cave prisoners in Book VII, who believe that the images
they see have real being. At the same time, he makes it
clear that the image which represents the goal of
philosophical education signifies an idea (for example,
the fictional 'sun' signifies the idea of the Good).
The image of the sun in the cave narrative has the
same status, then, as the physical sun because, like it,
it represents the intelligible form of the Good.10 The
status shared by these images with the objects of the
visible world can be made clearer if we take into
consideration the advice Socrates gives to lovers in the
Phaedrus and the Symposium. In the Republic Plato
describes the process of ascent as a process of inquiry
and conceptual study, while in the Phaedrus and the
Symposium it is the experience of love, prompted by the
sight of physical beauty, which leads the individual to a
knowledge of the forms. Socrates's account of
intellectual training in the Phaedrus and the Symposium
could not seem further from his description in the
Republic, and yet, the advice given to the guardian in
this last treatise is applicable also to the lover
depicted in the other two: Plato expects the lover to
behave towards the object of desire in the same way that
he expects the reader to respond to the images of the
cave narrative. For the lover is to treat the physical
'beauty' of his beloved as an image of the form of Beauty
in the same way that the reader of the cave narrative is
to treat the fictional 'sun' as an image of the form of
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the Good. As Socrates explains in the Symposium, the
lover is attracted first to particular signs of beauty,
for example the 'bodily beauty' of his beloved; from
'bodily beauty' he moves to 'the beauty of institutions,
from institutions to learning, and from learning in
general to the special lore that pertains to nothing but
the beautiful itself - until at last he comes to know
what beauty is' (211c) .11 The lover's progress is
comparable to that of the geometer, the freed cave
prisoner, and the reader of the cave narrative: he moves
from a knowledge of 'visible forms' to hypotheses and,
finally, to the forms themselves.
In Book X of the Republic Plato gives an account of
the reincarnation of the human soul, its passing through
the river of Forgetfulness before its rebirth in material
form and descent into the world (614b ff) , an account
which reappears in a modified form in the Phaedrus (248c
ff) . Because of its pre-existence the soul already has
'knowledge' of the forms. Consequently, the end of the
educational process is to help the individual recollect
this knowledge, not to instil in him new knowledge. One
of the advantages of discussing the educational process
in the language of love is that it places more emphasis
on the emotional, that is, the non-cognitive, nature of
the discovery, making credible Plato's belief in an
individual's intuitive knowledge of the forms. Plato
achieves a similar effect in his description of the more
cerebral educational process in Book VII, however, with
the use of visual imagery. The analogy between seeing
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and knowing, an analogy present in the Greek word oida (I
have seen/I know), enables Socrates to disprove the
educational theory of the rhetoricians and present his
own account of the creation of 'character'. 'Education
is not in reality what some people proclaim it to be in
their professions', he explains. 'What they aver is that
they can put true knowledge into a soul that does not
possess it, as if they were inserting vision into blind
eyes' (518b). Plato's educational theory, in contrast,
does not attempt to instil knowledge in an individual
(which he suggests is as futile as trying to give sight
to a blind man), but to enable the individual to discover
by himself what is true by 'turning' him, with the help
of philosophical study or 'dialectic', towards the
intelligible forms, the capacity to apprehend which he
innately possesses.12
At the beginning of this discussion I considered
whether Plato's character Socrates is guilty of being
disingenuous when he 'lay[s] no claim to the oratorical
art' in the Phaedrus, and of being hypocritical when he
dismisses the artists in Book X of the Republic. The
distinction made in the Republic between rhetorical and
allegorical images, that is, between images which are
taken to have some kind of reality in themselves and
images which are taken to reflect an intelligible
reality, helps us to see that there are, as far as Plato
is concerned, two types of eloquence, the one rhetorical,
the other philosophical. Socrates's own images, such as
the cave allegory in the Republic, are designed not to
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entertain an audience but, like his dialectical method in
general, his elenchic questioning, to turn our attention
away from the world of visible things to the intelligible
world and its forms. In this respect Socrates's
eloquence is philosophical rather than rhetorical. But
how does Socrates produce a fictional narrative such as
the cave story if not as a rhetorician? In the Phaedrus
Socrates suggests that his eloquence, instead of being
produced with knowledge of the rhetorical art, is
inspired by the transcendent form of Goodness which he
recognises as the source of Phaedrus1s physical beauty.
Thus, Socrates is not the author of his own words or
images; they are authored by the forms themselves. He is
'well aware', he declares, that his eloquence does not
originate in him 'for I know my own ignorance': 'I
suppose that it can only be that it has been poured into
me, through my ears, as into a vessel, from some external
source, though in my stupid fashion I have actually
forgotten how, and from whom, I heard it' (235c-d).
Socrates's foolishness is the wisdom of one informed
unconsciously by knowledge of the forms.
Socrates's claim not to know the source of his own
eloquence appears to be a kind of wise naivety, however,
only so long as we are willing to believe that it is
possible for humans to apprehend the forms themselves,
and, thus, that it is possible to be inspired by them.
If we were to be sceptical of this capacity of the human
mind then we would need to read Socrates's claim to be
'ignorant' differently. For although Socrates may claim
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that his images represent metaphysical truths, we would
no longer be able to accept that they were authored by
those forms. When Socrates claims that his images
reflect metaphysical truths we would have to recognise
this as a matter of opinion, not knowledge, and,
moreover, that the images themselves were authored by
Socrates himself. For later critics of Plato, such as
the rhetorician Cicero, what Socrates demonstrates in the
Phaedrus is not his intuitive knowledge of the forms but
a rhetorical strategy, a pretended simplicity, which
conceals his knowledge of the art of speaking well.
Before looking at Cicero's interpretation and
imitation of Plato's Socrates, I will first examine the
rhetorical theory of Cicero's self-styled pupil
Quintilian. My reason for this is that I wish to draw
attention both to the sharp distinction between the arts
of rhetoric and philosophy, a distinction which is
intentionally obscured in Cicero's rhetorical treatises,
and to Cicero's ironic pedagogic method, the method which
he claims to have inherited from Plato.
(ii) Quintilian's scepticism
What is immediately evident in Institutio Oratoria is
that Quintilian is keen to find a place in the education
of the orator for the study of philosophy, and, indeed,
to insist on the compatibility of the two disciplines.
For example, at the beginning of Institutio he explains
that he will 'make use of certain of the principles laid
down in philosophical textbooks' and adds, in defence,
'that such principles have a just claim to form part of
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the subject-matter of this work and do actually belong to
the art of oratory' (I Pr. 11) .13 Furthermore, he offers
the young student of oratory a curriculum which includes
the study of a number of subjects, such as geometry, as
if, like Plato, he were preparing the orator for the
study of universals. However, for Quintilian geometry
serves, rather than informs, the art of rhetoric, its
study helping to make the orator more persuasive, not
more truthful (I x 34-49). (In the same way comic acting
is studied because it gives the orator proficiency in the
art of delivery (I xi 1-3).) Moreover, Quintilian is not
interested in the study of universals; at the end of
Institutio he has little patience for those who indulge
in the study of abstract ideas in the search for true
principles, and considers 'dialectic' to be of little
help to the orator, 'since the orator's duty is not
merely to instruct, but also to move and delight an
audience' (XII ii ll).14 The orator, he argues, should be
a '"wise man" in the Roman sense', that is, someone who
is committed to political action, to 'the actual practice
and experience of life', and not to speculative study
(XII ii 7). The task of the orator, as Quintilian
defines it in his discussion of artificial demonstrative
proofs in Book V, is to discover not what is true per se
but 'matters specially adapted to produce belief [ad
faciendam fidem]' (italics mine) (V viii 1) , and such a
task allows him to use methods of persuasion which are
denied the philosopher, such as techniques for the
manipulation of the emotions of his audience. Indeed, in
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Book VI Quintilian argues that it is the manipulation of
the emotions which is the 'peculiar task of the orator'
(VI ii 5), where the 'life and soul of oratory is to be
found' (VI ii 7), and he goes on to offer a defence of
its use. In the Athenian law court the orator was
expressly forbidden to rouse pity or anger in his
audience at the end of his speech, Quintilian explains,
since the Athenians, influenced by their philosophical
tradition, 'regard susceptibility to emotion as a vice,
and think it immoral that the judge should be distracted
from the truth by an appeal to his emotions' (VI i 7).
For him, however, 'appeals to emotion are necessary if
there are no other means for securing the victory of
truth, justice and the public interest' (VI i 7).
One of the tenets which Quintilian inherits from
Plato's contemporary antagonist, the Greek rhetorician
Isocrates, is a belief in the existence in humans of an
innate capacity for speech, and it is this capacity which
his educational programme sets out to develop.15 Although
Quintilian toys with the Platonic notion of innate
knowledge of truth, he does so in terms that express
distance from rather than an affiliation with this
doctrine; his claim that 'our minds are endowed by nature
with such activity and sagacity that the soul is believed
(creditur) to proceed from heaven' (I i 1), suggests his
lack of commitment to such an idea since the verb is kept
in the passive voice. Thus, when Quintilian urges the
young student of oratory to follow nature he is
encouraging him to develop his talent for particular
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styles of speaking. However, Quintilian is not only
interested in developing in a student talents which he
innately possesses; much of his educational programme is
devoted to techniques of imitation which help form him
into a skilled speaker. Thus, for example, Quintilian
encourages young pupils to learn the works of model
writers by heart so they 'will carry their models with
them and unconsciously reproduce the style of the speech
which has been impressed upon the memory' (II vii 3).
Quintilian does not direct the student to discover his
inherent knowledge here but encourages him to internalise
new knowledge which, through the activity of memory,
becomes his knowledge. The student is expected to be
able to reproduce his models unconsciously; they blend
with his own speech so that the distinction between copy
and model is lost. Furthermore, Quintilian is less
concerned to promote the idea of the inherent
'naturalness' of the acquisition; the impressions made on
the memory of a youth are like the 'flavour first
absorbed by vessels when new' or 'dyes to the primitive
whiteness of wool' (I i 5). The 'colours' or tropes of
rhetoric are permanently acquired by the orator: they
become second nature to him.
The description of memory as a process of assimilating
materials reappears in Book X, the book which deals with
a more advanced stage of the orator's education. At the
beginning of this book Quintilian argues that the orator
should not try simply to master the 'rules of style' but
acquire a facility ('facilitas') - his translation of the
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Greek word 'hexis' (habit) - in his use of these rules (X
i 1). For Quintilian the words 'hexis' and 1facilitas'
denote a state in which the orator has his skills (and
materials) at his immediate command/ so that he is able
to give extempore speeches if the occasion arises. The
student acquires 1facilitas1 or 'hexis' by practising his
various skills in reading, writing, and speaking/ by
repeating these actions rhetorical skills become habitual
to him. The technique recalls the creation of moral
virtue described by Aristotle in Book II of the Ethics;
moral virtue {ethos), Aristotle explains, is the result
of habit (ethos), 'whence also its name is one that is
formed by a slight variation from the word "habit"
[ethos]1.16 In the Republic Plato feared that the
guardian who acts the part of another character will
become like that character, while Aristotle, in contrast,
urges the individual to perform the kind of actions that
will create an appropriate character for him, because
'states [hexeis] arise out of like activities'.17 The
process of 'becoming' outlined in the Ethics involves the
assimilation of actions perceived to be appropriate to
the future conduct of the good man; thus, the student
aspiring to be virtuous repeatedly performs 'good'
actions until they become instinctive. Quintilian's
orator acquires 'facilitas1 or 'hexis' as a result of his
practice in much the same way that the Aristotelian good
man acquired 'hexis' through the repetition of particular
actions. Quintilian describes this process of
assimilation as follows:
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We must return to what we have read and
reconsider it with care, while, just as we do
not swallow our food till we have chewed it and
reduced it almost to a state of liquefaction to
assist the process of digestion, so what we
read must not be committed to the memory for
subsequent imitation while it is still in a
crude state, but must be softened and, if I may
use the phrase, reduced to a pulp by frequent
re-perusal (X i 19).
Through frequent re-reading the orator is able to consume
his models so that they become a part of him.
Quintilian's oratorical facility means that the orator
does not need to 'hunt' for his 'weapons'; they are
immediately available 'as though they were born [innata]
with him and not derived from the instruction of others'
(italics mine) (VII x 14). Quintilian seems to show
affinity to Aristotle: like him he places more emphasis
on the repetition of certain actions for the development
of his particular virtue. Yet this comparison is
limited, for while Aristotle suggests that it is practice
that forms the nature of an individual, Quintilian
reveals that it is practice which naturalises the skills
to the orator whereby he can portray realistically
fictional characters. Quintilian is creatively using the
same process propagated by Aristotle in the Ethics as a
means of moulding an individual's nature; the difference
is that Quintilian's creation is not intent on reaching
any final form but on naturalising the skills which will
allow him to convince his audience of the veracity of his
portrayal.
Quintilian's interest in the process of naturalisation
is importantly reflected in his discussion of the term
'imitation'. When Quintilian uses the terms 'imitatio'
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and 'mimesis' he is usually referring to the concept of
1prosopopoeia' or impersonation, for which they act as
synonyms. As he explains in Book VI, the term
'prosopopoeia* applies to 'fictitious speeches supposed
to be uttered, such as an advocate puts into the mouth of
his client' (VI i 25). Quintilian's attitude to this
kind of technique is ambivalent: 'prosopopoeia' is both a
practice which he considers essential to the early
development of the orator and a practice which, in later
books, he actually rejects. In Book III, for example, he
considers 'prosopopoeia' a 'most useful exercise' for it
teaches an orator how to adapt speeches to suit his
speaking character (III viii 49), and he praises Lysias
for attaining 'extraordinary realism' in this field of
expertise (III viii 51). Yet, in a later book,
Quintilian argues that such imitation is actually of
limited value to the orator for it produces an inferior
copy of an original model. And, as he reasons, 'whatever
is like another object, must necessarily be inferior to
the object of its imitation, just as the shadow is
inferior to the substance, the portrait to the features
which it portrays, and the acting of the player to the
feeling which he endeavours to reproduce' (X ii 11).
Consequently, he offers an alternative imitative method.
Rather than producing a derivative copy of his client's
emotions Quintilian suggests that the orator should aim
to experience those emotions himself and thus express
them sincerely: 'if we wish to give our words the
appearance of sincerity, we must assimilate [simus ...
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similes (let us be like)] ourselves to the emotions of
those who are genuinely so affected' (VI ii 27). As
Quintilian explains, 'there are certain experiences [...]
whereby things absent are presented to our imagination
with such extreme vividness that they seem actually to be
before our very eyes', and he goes on to add, that it is
the orator who is 'really sensitive to such impressions
who will have the greatest power over the emotions' (VI
ii 29-30). It is from these imaginings, he explains,
that an orator acquires the enargeia, or vividness, which
makes us
not so much to narrate as to exhibit the actual
scene, while our emotions will be no less actively
stirred than if we were present at the actual
occurrence (VI ii 32) .18
The orator is expected to assimilate to himself the
emotions of his client, not produce a copy of them. It
thus appears that Quintilian has advised the orator
against copying a character with pseudo-Platonic
arguments only then to suggest that he 'realise' his
character by making himself like his client. Rather like
the poets and painters depicted disparagingly in Plato's
Republic, Quintilian wants to create images that will be
taken for the real thing. And the activity which he
advises the orator to follow to achieve this effect
parodies the imitative process of Plato's guardians: like
the guardians in the Republic Quintilian's orator copies
a 'vivid pattern [enarges ... paradeigma]' (484d), only
in his case the pattern has an imagined, rather than a
metaphysical, reality.
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Since Institutio Oratoria is a rhetorical manual
Quintilian is keen to display the techniques which he has
used to produce his own seemingly natural eloquence: 'I
have thought it necessary', he concludes his discussion
of emotion in Book VI, 'not to conceal these
considerations from my reader, since they have
contributed to the acquisition of such reputation as I
possess', and he adds somewhat proudly that such
techniques have enabled him to show when necessary 'all
the symptoms of genuine grief' (VI ii 36). Not
suprisingly, Quintilian submits his master Cicero to a
rigorous, rhetorical analysis, exposing to view his own
methods of rhetorical excellence. Thus, Quintilian
explains in Book X how Cicero's audiences often thought
'that some god had inspired [Cicero]' (X vii 14), when,
in fact, 'the reason is obvious. For profound emotion
and vivid imagination sweep on with an unbroken force' (X
vii 14). For Quintilian Cicero is one of the masters of
the technique of enargeia, although, as we shall shortly
see, Cicero never explicitly acknowledges such expertise,
(iii) Cicero's Sceptical Idealism
Quintilian may have attempted the assimilation of
rhetoric and philosophy in Book I of Institutio on the
prompting of Cicero, who is more successful in attaining,
and more convinced by the importance of, such an aim. It
is in De Oratore, a text to which Quintilian often
refers, that Cicero attempts his own synthesis of the two
disciplines. It becomes apparent that Cicero is
responding in his treatise to the prejudice of two
36
audiences: on the one hand, to the Roman people's
distrust of the Greek philosophical tradition, and on the
other hand, to the contempt in which the art of rhetoric
is held by ancient Greek authorities such as Plato.
Although it is Cicero's express purpose, as he declares
in his preface to his brother Quintus, only to 'dispel
that notion, which had always prevailed' that the great
Roman rhetorician Crassus had 'no great learning' and
that his fellow Antonius had 'none at all' (II ii 7),19 it
becomes clear from the position taken by the character
'Crassus' in this dialogue that Cicero is simultaneously
concerned to effect a reconciliation between the two
disciplines of rhetoric and philosophy, and that, as
regards this reconciliation, Cicero is self-consciously
imitating Plato's Phaedrus. Indeed, the character
Scaevola asks Crassus at the beginning of De Oratore if
they can 'imitate Socrates as he appears in the Phaedrus
of Plato', explaining that the plane tree standing in
Crassus's garden has reminded him of the tree 'whose
shelter Socrates sought' in this dialogue (I vii 28).
Crassus agrees to his request, only adding comfort to the
philosophically conducive environment with the
contribution of cushions (I vii 29). But though Cicero
self-consciously cultivates a comparison with Plato's
treatise, it is important to recognise, first, that
Cicero's dialectical method is one of synthesis, not
division, and, secondly, that De Oratore is meant to
correct the erroneous argument of the Phaedrus: for, as
Crassus argues,
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it is nearer the truth to say that neither can
anyone be eloquent upon a subject unknown to him,
nor, if he knows it perfectly and yet does not know
how to shape and polish his style, can he speak
fluently even upon that which he does know (I
xiv 63).
Crassus's penchant for 'synthesis' is evident from the
very beginning of his speech in Book III, where he
laments the fact that he and Antonius have divided the
labour of rhetorical exposition, the one treating the
divisions of invention, arrangement, and memory, and the
other, the 'proper method of embellishment' (style and
delivery); for in so doing, he complains, they have
'separated from one another things that cannot really
stand apart' (III v 19). Not only does Crassus insist on
the interdependence of 'matter' and 'words' in an
oratorical speech, but he claims support for this view by
drawing upon the example of the universe, 'held together
by a single force and harmony of nature' (III v 20). A
few lines later and we find that Crassus has advanced his
argument to include 'the whole of the content of the
liberal and humane sciences' in 'a single bond of union'
(III vi 21), preparing us for the claim that oratory and
philosophy are one and the same subject. Crassus reminds
his audience that initially rhetoric and philosophy
shared 'a single title, the whole study and practice of
the liberal sciences being entitled philosophy', until
'Socrates robbed them of this general designation',
leading to the 'unprofitable and reprehensible severance
between the tongue and the brain' (III xvi 60-1) . What
he offers in the next few pages is an historical survey
of the 'post-Socratic' philosophical traditions which
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underlines the erroneous nature of the Socratic division
(III xvii 62-73 ). Even though he rejects the Stoic
philosophers, the inheritors of Platonic idealism,
because of their 'bald, unfamiliar, jarring' style of
discourse (III xvii 66), preferring the style of
discourse and thought of the sceptical Peripatetics and
Academics, he makes it clear that all of these
conflicting philosophical schools derive ultimately from
one source, namely Socrates. He tells us that one of the
founders of the sceptical Academic school, Arcesilas,
began by selecting 'from the various writings of Plato
and the Socratic dialogues the dogma that nothing can be
apprehended with certainty either by the senses or by the
mind', and he also 'initiated the practice - an entirely
Socratic one it is true - of not stating his own opinion
but arguing against the opinions put forward by everyone
else' (III xviii 67). But Socrates is described by
Crassus not only as a Sceptic but as a rhetorician/ at
the beginning of the discussion in Book I Crassus admits
to having read Plato's Gorqias 'with close attention' at
Athens, and claims that 'what impressed me most deeply
about Plato in that book was, that it was when making fun
of orators that he himself seemed to me to be the
consummate orator' (I xi 47). By emphasising Socrates's
scepticism, and his rhetorical skill, Crassus effects a
reconciliation between the two disciplines of rhetoric
and philosophy, albeit not the one that Plato's Socrates
intended; at the same time, as his emphasis on the
existence of a universal harmony suggests, Crassus is
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also keen to present an idealist notion of the art of
rhetoric, making the rules which underpin the art of
discourse reflect the law of nature.
The character Crassus is an appropriate mouthpiece for
a writer and thinker who is torn between the professions
of philosophy and rhetoric, and who is usually
represented by his critics as belonging to one or other
of the two camps.20 Thanks to Macrobius's commentary on
Cicero's Dream of Scipio, Cicero's Platonic inheritance
was recognised in the Middle Ages,21 and it was not until
Petrarch's discovery of his Letters to Atticus in 1345
that the extent of his actual political involvement in
the Roman republic was revealed, and his philosophical
reputation damaged.22 Although for Petrarch Cicero's
participation in the political intrigues of the Roman
republic belies his philosophical commitments, his two
adopted roles of philosopher and rhetorician need not be
seen to conflict with one another, especially when, as in
the case of De Oratore, the kind of philosophy he
considers suitable for the orator is drawn from the
sceptical tradition. However, in many of his
philosophical works Cicero embraces a more Stoic system
of thought, which derives many of its tenets from
Platonism, and thus compromises the scepticism of his
rhetorical treatises. In De Legibus, for example, Cicero
departs from the sceptical conception of law as custom
('Law' is 'not a product of human thought, nor is it an
enactment of peoples'), and suggests instead that it is
'something eternal which rules the whole universe by its
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wisdom in command and prohibition'.23 Such an attitude
leads Cicero to offer a different version of the
rhetorical myth of the creation of civilisation in his De
Re Publica, suggesting that humans came to live in
societies not merely for convenience but because 'nature
has implanted in man' a desire for company.24 This
idealist inheritance is not completely lost in his
rhetorical treatises, and can be found to coexist with
his more sceptical interests. In De Oratore, for
example, in support of his argument that 'the things
possessing most utility also have the greatest amount of
dignity' the speaker Crassus directs the attention of his
audience first to the 'whole ordered world of nature',
constituted in order to guarantee the safety of the
universe, then to the forms of human beings, trees and
ships, created so that no part is 'superfluous', and,
finally, to the 'divisions' of a speech which, informed
by the same rules of utility, 'produce charm of style'
(III xlv 178-181). For him there is a rule of proportion
which inhabits, and thus unites, each part of the
universe, and which informs even human discourse. A
similar conception of rhetoric is present in the
Stoically-influenced De Re Publica; Scipio's argument
that just as there is 'melody' in music and 'spoken
discourse' so there should be among individuals in a
republic, must be read in the light of his claim that
'harmony' is the expression of universal laws.25 Cicero
also adopts the Stoic notion of man as innately in
possession of a knowledge of the laws of Nature, a notion
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which is itself an adaptation of the Platonic theory of
recollected knowledge, which he explores in the Tusculan
Disputations.26 Cicero's claim in this treatise that an
individual is endowed from birth with 'seeds of virtue'
reveals his debt to Plato's theory of recollected
knowledge as explored in dialogues such as the Phaedrus.
This idea is carried over into one of Cicero's rhetorical
treatises, Orator. Cicero's description of the perfect
artist in Orator, the sculptor of Minerva or Jupiter who,
instead of imitating a physical model, discovered that
'in his own mind there dwelt a surpassing vision of
beauty', is clearly indebted to Platonic theory, which he
indeed acknowledges: just as the sculptor or painter
possesses 'an intellectual ideal', and is enabled to
create something that does not 'appear to the eye', so
the orator conceives 'the ideal of perfect eloquence',
the 'copy' (effigiem) of which can only be caught 'with
our ears'. Such 'patterns of things are called ideal or
ideas by Plato', he continues, and 'exist forever',
depending for their apprehension on 'intellect and
reason' .27
The conflict between the idealist and sceptical
positions which Cicero seems to espouse in his various
works is not, however, easily resolved. Even though
Cicero claims in Orator that there is an 'ideal of
perfect eloquence' toward which the attention of the
orator should be directed, he is simultaneously acutely
conscious of the transience of linguistic customs which
also claim the orator's attention.28 Thus, Cicero appears
42
to be inspired in two ways: first, by his knowledge of
the 'ideal of perfect eloquence', and, secondly, by
contemporary, sometimes erroneous, customs of speech.
Cicero's sensitivity to the demands of custom, and to the
tastes of his audience, reminds us forcefully that he is
a rhetorician, and, thus, that he is ultimately
interested in producing belief rather than discovering
truth. With this knowledge in mind we may be tempted to
read Cicero's description of his eloquence in Orator, and
particularly his account of his emotional susceptibility,
with a different emphasis. Cicero explains that his
ability to express emotion at the height of a speech is
'no great intellectual gift, but a vigorous spirit which
inflames me to such an extent that I am beside myself'.29
In contrast to Quintilian, who also recognises the
efficacy of such personal expression, Cicero offers no
description of the techniques which he uses to reach this
state, claiming only that he possesses a 'genuine
sympathy'.30 His self-portrayal may recall Socrates's
'inspiration' in the Phaedrus. But is he a philosopher-
rhetorician in the style of Socrates? It may be worth
recalling here Quintilian's ironic representation of
Cicero in Book X of Institutio Oratoria as one who seems
to be inspired by 'some god', a representation which he
soon deflates with his subsequent account of Cicero's
oratorical method. In order to understand the nature of
Cicero's art, that is, his ironic method, we need to
return to De Oratore and consider the contribution made
in the debate by Crassus's disputant, Antonius.
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At first sight the character Antonius could not be
further removed from the position of Crassus. In
contrast to Crassus, Antonius believes that the study of
philosophy has nothing to offer the orator: the man who
has merely acquired 'such power as to be able to sway at
his pleasure the minds of hearers invested with authority
to determine some issue concerning the State' will,
Antonius observes, 'on any other oratorical topic
whatever be no more at a loss for words than famous
Polyclitus', the painter who could depict subjects which
'he had never been taught to fashion' (II xvi 70). In
his claim that the orator can speak persuasively on any
topic, Antonius appears to draw inspiration from the very
rhetorical tradition scorned by Plato. While Crassus
attempts in his speech to address some of the concerns of
Plato, Antonius seems, in contrast, to fly in the face of
Plato's objections. Indeed, Antonius dismisses the Greek
philosophical tradition and embraces instead the
teachings of his rhetorical predecessors, insisting with
Isocrates that oratorical virtuosity depends only on a
combination of natural talent, imitation and practice.
This he demonstrates with the example of Sulpicius, one
of the characters present at the debate and a follower of
Crassus. Sulpicius, he claims, would have never achieved
such a level of oratorical skill had he not set about
diligently to imitate Crassus: although 'Nature herself
was leading him into the grand and glorious style of
Crassus', Antonius explains, he developed his potential
by cultivating a 'habit of speaking with every thought
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and his soul fixed in contemplation of Crassus' (II xxi
89). Thus, to all appearances Antonius is profoundly
anti-Platonic, even advising the orator to leave the
reading of Plato's unhelpfully idealistic dialogues 'for
a restful holiday [ . . . ] so as not to borrow from Plato,
if ever he has to speak of justice and righteousness' (I
li 224) .
It is important to notice, however, that while
Antonius follows Isocrates in insisting on a combination
of natural talent, imitation and practice for the
perfection of oratorical skills, he simultaneously
describes the process of acquisition esoterically, giving
an account of the effects rather than of the techniques
of the rhetorical art. One of the reasons why Antonius
fails to offer practical guidance is because he himself
has apparently never followed the kind of practice he
advises for young orators. 'I am not going to speak of
an art which I never learned, but of my own practice
[consuetudine] ' (I xlviii 208), he insists at the very
beginning of the debate. Even though he recognises the
importance of imitation, as his example of Sulpicius's
education suggests, he qualifies his discussion by adding
that 'there are [also] many who copy no man, but gain
their objects by natural aptitude, without resembling any
model' (II xxiii 98). The extent to which Antonius
himself is dependent merely on natural talent is never
fully established however. As the character Catulus
perceptively remarks, Antonius's discussion of the use of
oratorical skill in history writing reveals the breadth
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of his classical reading, and thus indicates that he is,
after all, a student of the Greek intellectual tradition.
In response Antonius admits that he has indeed read Greek
treatises, but he simultaneously claims to have simply
acquired a 'habit' of reading such works during moments
of 'leisure' at Misenum. Any benefit he has derived as
an orator from the reading of these texts has been, he
explains, unconscious, being acquired in much the same
way that the human skin tans through the action of the
sun:
just as, when walking in the sunshine, though
perhaps taking the stroll for a different
reason, the natural result is that I get
sunburnt, even so, after perusing those books rather
closely at Misenum [...], I find that under their
influence my discourse takes on what I may call a
new complexion (II xiv 60).
Antonius suggests that the style or 'complexion' of Greek
treatises has rubbed off on him without requiring any
effort on his part; he has become eloquent effortlessly,
or naturally. Mere contact with these books has been
enough in itself to influence his own mode of expression.
By promoting this notion of unconscious assimilation, at
the expense of the practice of the careful study of Greek
authors, he supports his original claim to have acquired
his skills and knowledge without study.
Although Antonius's educational advice differs little
from that of Isocrates in Against the Sophists, he
departs from this Greek rhetorical master by insisting on
the effortlessness of his own acquisition of oratorical
skills. This new twist brings him closer, I suggest, to
the character of Socrates in Plato's dialogues. Indeed,
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Antonius chooses to illustrate the effect of these books
on his oratorical skill with a simile borrowed from
Plato. In the Republic Plato proposes an analogy between
the sun and the form of the Good, which, he claims, is
perceptible to man when he actively turns toward it, that
is, when he engages in the study of philosophy; Antonius,
however, imagines a sun which acts on the individual who
merely happens to be standing within its light. Although
Antonius's re-reading of the sun simile suppresses the
intellectual activity promoted by Plato, and thus leaves
him susceptible to the same accusation levelled at the
poets and actors in Book III of the Republic that they
create without a true knowledge of the source of images,
his account makes sense if we read it in the light of
Plato's Phaedrus, where Socrates suggests that he is
inspired by the beauty of Phaedrus (in which he
recognises the form of Beauty) to speak eloquently. For
what Antonius is describing is a process of education in
which philosophical texts are used unconsciously to
discover what is already known, to deliver the a priori
knowledge (the 'ideal of perfect eloquence') lying inert
in the soul of man.
Antonius's imitation of Socrates, however, is not
unconscious, as his reference to the Phaedrus in his
discussion of the expression of emotions suggests.
Antonius notes that it is impossible to rouse in an
audience emotions such as indignation or hatred, or stir
them to pity, unless the orator himself is 'visibly
stamped or rather branded' by these emotions. At the
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same time he insists that the emotions expressed by the
orator should not be 'counterfeit1 but genuinely
experienced, and he offers his own practice as an example
of what he means: 'I give you my word that I never tried,
by means of a speech, to arouse either indignation or
compassion, either ill-will or hatred, in the minds of a
tribunal, without being really stirred myself' (II xlv
189). Although he recognises that emotional states are
partly produced by the 'quality of the diction' used by
the orator, Antonius does not offer to explain how this
state of self-persuasion comes about (as Quintilian will
do) (II xlvi 191). Indeed, not only does he not reveal
any technique for its production, but he defers to the
authority of Plato and Democritus, who have 'left on
record' that 'no man can be a good poet who is not on
fire with passion, and inspired by something very like
frenzy' (II xlvi 194). Whereas the expression of emotion
is for Quintilian a technique that can be deployed, for
Cicero's Antonius, in contrast, it is an inspired act.
Although Antonius initially represents the orator as
being exactly the kind of sophist condemned by Plato, his
conception of the orator is influenced by Plato in more
positive ways, so that, though he never claims that the
orator has knowledge of the forms of virtue, he comes
close to endorsing the view held by Cicero in the Orator
that there is an 'ideal of perfect eloquence' innately
known to the orator. Antonius appears to have arrived at
this idealist position 'unconsciously', and thus to
demonstrate the validity of the synthesis proved
analytically by Crassus: that rhetoric and philosophy are
the same. It is important to bear in mind, however, that
Antonius1s 'unconsciousness' is more studied than he
would like to own, as Cicero indicates at the beginning
of Book II (II ii 7). Indeed, Antonius is acutely
conscious of the expectations, and prejudices, of his
audience. When Catulus notes Antonius's learning, and
asks him 'whether it be that through some likeness to
that godlike genius [Aristotle] you fall into the same
track, or, as seems far more probable, you too have
perused and learned those very maxims', the commonplaces
of the rhetorical argument, Antonius admits to some
study: he claims that he has always known 'that a speaker
would be more pleasing and acceptable to a nation like
ours if he were to show, first, as little trace as
possible of any artifice, and secondly none whatever of
things Greek' (II xxxvi 152-153). A few sentences later
Antonius repeats this advice, explaining that he does not
'disapprove' of the study of philosophy,
if kept within limits, though I hold that a
reputation for such pursuits, or any suggestion of
artifice, is likely to prejudice an orator with the
judiciary: for it weakens at once the credibility of
the orator and the cogency of his oratory (II xxxvii
156) .
Although Antonius never actually claims to have concealed
his own studies we may remember that he began his speech
by arguing that he gained his speaking skills from
practice rather than the study of 'art' (I xlviii) 208),
only to compromise this position in his speech itself
with the variety of his learned allusions. Crassus does
not fail to notice this: 'I am delighted', he interjects
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at the end of Antonius's speech, 'to see you at last
known as a master of the theory, finally unmasked and
stripped of the veil of your pretended ignorance' (II
lxxxvi 350). Antonius's learned allusions should prompt
us to think twice about accepting his earlier claim to be
a naturally gifted orator. When Antonius describes the
effect of reading Greek treatises as being like the
tanning effects of the sun on skin, he is describing not
so much what actually happens but an impression at which
he thinks the orator should aim if he wishes to gain the
credence of his audience. (This is how he is interpreted
by Quintilian, and, much later, by Erasmus.31) What
Antonius could be said to acquire from his 'superficial'
study of philosophical texts is not so much forgotten
knowledge of the form of 'perfect eloquence' but a method
for making his rhetorical discourse seem to be prompted
by a knowledge of the truth: he imitates not the creative
process supposedly followed by Socrates but the mask of
Socrates, the mask which supposedly conceals the
artfulness of his eloquence.
lb. The Imitation of Cicero in the Renaissance
The popularity of Cicero in the Renaissance in
general, and particularly among the Italian humanists, is
well known. Equally well known is the influence of
Cicero's De Oratore and Orator on Castiglione1s The Book
of the Courtier, where they are styled idealist
treatises. Castiglione's interest in these texts is
prompted not simply by the elegance of Ciceronian style
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(as it was for many of his compatriots), but, I will
argue, by Cicero's ironic appropriation of idealist
discourse. Castiglione has his own political reasons for
imitating Cicero; before exploring these reasons in any
detail I will first consider the debt owed to Cicero by a
very different Renaissance educationalist, Desiderius
Erasmus, the individual credited with introducing
intellectual reform in Northern Europe, and a thinker who
shares with Castiglione the privilege of having been a
counsellor to Charles V.32
When considering the imitators of Cicero, Erasmus's is
not a name which immediately springs to mind. In the
Ciceronianus, for example, Erasmus attacks the follies of
Cicero's foolish acolytes who, he claims, refuse to use
any Latin word unless it can be found in one of the
treatises of their venerable master. In contrast to
these blind copyists Erasmus prefers to use a variety of
sources, that is, to use any writer that will serve his
end, which is the glorification of Christ.33 Moreover,
the interlocutors of the Ciceronianus, Nosoponus,
Bulephorus and Hypologus, are fictional figures, which
suggests that Erasmus takes as his model for the dialogue
form not Cicero (whose figures, like Plato's, are
historical) but Lucian.34 An even more important
consideration, however, is the fact that in texts such as
The Education of a Christian Prince Erasmus names Plato
as the source for his own educational theory. But
Erasmus's classical inheritance is more complex than it
might superficially seem. Indeed, Erasmus's educational
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theory is as much inspired by sceptical educationalists
such as Quintilian as it is by the idealism of Plato: in
contrast to Plato's Socrates, whose supposed ignorance
masks his knowledge of universal truths, Erasmus's mask
of folly is literally just that, a dark glass through
which he peers at Christian truths. Erasmus's scepticism
concerning human knowledge makes him critical of the
logical methods of the medieval scholastics, which are
designed to reach a 'true conclusion', and keen instead
to promote rhetorical methods of argumentation such as
those laid out in Book V of Quintilian's Institutio
Oratoria, which are designed, in contrast, to reach a
probable conclusion.35 What is interesting about
Erasmus's attempt to reinstate rhetorical argumentation,
however, is that he does so not simply by arguing his
case, by inventing and arranging his proofs in the way of
a rhetorician, but with the aid of a different, non-
discursive rhetorical strategy. In The Praise of Folly
Erasmus's ironic character Folly appears to imitate the
irony of Socrates, concealing beneath her assumed naivety
a knowledge of divine truths, when in fact she also
imitates the irony of Cicero's Antonius, using the
techniques of the rhetorical art to create a mask which
will gain her the credence of her audience. But while
Erasmus appears to approve of the duplicitous methods of
Cicero's Antonius, he shares with Cicero's Crassus a
conception of the art of rhetoric as a philosophical
tool, a tool which leads us, he believes, to a
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comprehension of the Christian truths as they are written
in the Bible.
(i) Erasmus
The debate between rhetoric and philosophy which was
initiated by Plato is revived in the Renaissance because
it offers a framework for a contemporary conflict between
the new rhetorical learning and the Aristotelian logic of
the scholastics. The vigour of the debate is nowhere
better illustrated than in the correspondence of the
Neoplatonist Pico della Mirandola with the humanist
Ermolao Barbaro. In response to Barbaro's criticism of
the poor Latinity of the scholastics, and his
contemptuous description of them as 'dull, rude,
uncultured barbarians',36 Pico argues that they are like
'the ancients who by their riddles and by the masks of
their fables made uninitiates shun the mysteries'/37 he
reminds Barbaro of the episode in Plato's Symposium in
which Alcibiades compares Socrates's character and
language to the Sileni figures, the grotesque statues
which contain within themselves a deity, and applies it
to the crude language of the scholastics,38 thereby
indicating that their supposedly barbaric expression
masks a knowledge of divine mysteries. It seems that
Erasmus read this correspondence. In the Adages Erasmus
tells us that Alcibiades's parable is used 'either of
some thing which, though on the surface [...] looks
worthless and absurd, is yet admirable on a nearer and
less superficial view, or of some man whose face and
bearing promise far less than what he hides in his
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heart'.39 The image appears also in Erasmus's early
spiritual treatise, the Enchiridion Militis Christiani
(or The Handbook of the Christian Soldier), in which he
argues the value of material transcendence and of
allegorical exegesis. In this treatise Erasmus
encourages his readers to leave behind the enticements of
this world with the 'crowd' in 'Plato's cave, who,
chained by their own passions, marvel at the empty images
of things as if they were true reality',40 and to
recognise that the language of the Scriptures is like the
Sileni of Alcibiades which 'enclose unadulterated
divinity under a lowly and almost ludicrous external
appearance'.41 As such examples suggest, Erasmus appears
to have sympathised with Pico in his debate with Barbaro,
despite the fact that Erasmus's interests as a humanist
would lead us to expect him to take Barbaro's side.
The Sileni adage can aid our reading of the Handbook,
helping us to understand its complex voice as a kind of
Socratic irony which directs our attention away from the
image itself to what it represents, and thus from earthly
folly to spiritual wisdom. In his letter to Martin Dorp,
written in 1515 in defence of the Encomium Moriae (or
Praise of Folly), Erasmus claims that the Handbook offers
an interpretative key to this complex and elusive text:
'in Folly I expressed the same ideas as those in the
Enchiridion, but in the form of a joke' (215) .4Z The
Praise does indeed seem to be constructed with the
Handbook in mind. Commenting in the Handbook on the
apostle Paul's words in his first letter to the
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Corinthians ('"If any among you appears wise in this
world, let him become a fool in order to be wise. For
the wisdom of this world is foolishness in the eyes of
God"' (1 Corinthians 1:19-20)), Erasmus concludes that
'there is no greater stupidity than earthly wisdom, which
one must unlearn if he truly wishes to be wise'.43 As a
proponent of earthly wisdom in the form of rational
scepticism, the character Folly vividly illustrates this
idea. One instance of her foolishness occurs when she
expresses admiration for those who use illusions in order
to sustain a kind of ignorant happiness, such as the man
who offers his wife fake jewels and pretends that they
are of 'unique and incalculable value' (136). The wife,
Folly notes, is made happy because she thinks her fake
jewels are real while the husband is also content because
he not only enjoys the satisfaction of having deceived
the woman but saves himself a fortune (137). Folly's
defence of such uses of fiction eventually makes it
difficult for her to distinguish between the respective
degrees of happiness:
between those in Plato's cave who can only marvel at
the shadows and images of various objects, provided
they are content and don't know what they miss, and
the philosopher who has emerged from the cave and
sees the real things (137).
If we read this in the light of Erasmus's views in the
Handbook, in which Erasmus offers a 'correct'
interpretation of the cave allegory, then we are forced
to separate the persona of Folly from the voice of
Erasmus, so that, in order to gather Erasmus's 'real'
meaning we must read into Folly's comments the opposite
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of what she intends. This technique of reading puts into
practice the advice given in the letter to Dorp, and in
the prefatory letter to Thomas More, and, indeed, in the
Handbook itself. Thus, in the Handbook Erasmus urges the
reader to approach the Bible as one approaches
Alcibiades's Sileni, recognising that behind its 'lowly'
and 'ludicrous' exterior there exists 'unadulterated
divinity', and in the 1508 letter to More, Erasmus
observes that 'my praise of folly has not been altogether
foolish', encouraging us to find wisdom behind a veil of
pretended ignorance (59), while in the 1515 letter to
Dorp, he calls our attention to the example of 'the
famous sages of antiquity who chose to present the most
salutary counsel for life in the form of amusing and
apparently childish fables' (216). To this extent, then,
Erasmus appears to be as good as his word: the Handbook
and the letters do make sense of the Praise, by
encouraging us to read it allegorically, that is, for an
'other' meaning.
If we apply to the Praise the instructions of the
letter to Dorp and the Handbook, reading into Folly's
commitment to the material world the spiritualism of
Erasmus, then we come close to the position actually
advanced by Erasmus in the Handbook. Indeed, we find
such a position straightforwardly advocated at the end of
the Praise, where Folly reinvokes, and correctly
reinterprets, the cave allegory, setting aside the ironic
voice of the earlier chapters. The influence on Folly's
thought is no longer rational scepticism but Christian
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Neoplatonism: when Christians depict the soul as being a
prisoner in the body, Folly observes, they 'come very
near to agreeing with the Platonists' (202). Folly uses
Plato's cave narrative to reinforce this connection: the
position of the soul in the body is 'not unlike that
[situation] in the myth in Plato, where those who were
chained in a cave marvelled at shadows', and she
contrasts such individuals who are attracted to the
material world with the properly transcendentally-minded,
those who have 'no thought for the body, despise wealth
and avoid it like trash', directing 'their entire
endeavour towards God' alone (202-3). By the end of the
Praise Folly has come close to the position held by
Erasmus in the Handbook, advocating a Christian
renunciation of both the material world and human
dependence on religious icons.
And yet the Praise shows a more complex set of
allegiances. For the treatise does not resolve itself as
easily as this survey might suggest: there is, in
Erasmus's text, a third kind of foolishness which leaves
the Christian wise man looking as foolish as the Platonic
cave dweller. In an early chapter Folly reveals her debt
to both Lucian and Plotinus when she borrows from them
the image of the theatrum mundi. Whereas Lucian's and
Plotinus's use of the theatrical image serves to reduce
the significance of the events in the material world,
when used by Folly it has the opposite effect, drawing
our attention not only to the 'materiality' of this
world, but to the need for us to recognise and abide by
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its rules.44 'If anyone tries to take the masks off the
actors when they're playing a scene on the stage and show
their true natural faces to the audience', Folly
explains, 'he'll certainly spoil the whole play and
deserve to be stoned and thrown out of the theatre for a
maniac' (104); in the same way, anyone who tries to
reject the use of illusions in the material world will be
failing to recognise that illusion is an essential
element of that world. Folly's common sense here allows
her to define a type of foolishness based on a refusal to
follow the rules of decorum, the foolishness of someone
who will not
adapt himself to things as they are, has no eye for
the main chance, won't even remember the convivial
maxim 'Drink or depart', and asks for the play to
stop being a play (105) .45
Although Folly recognises, like Plato, that the visible
world is not the real world, she reaches a different
conclusion concerning our relation to it; she does not,
like Plato, insist that we redirect our attention to the
greater reality of the intelligible world, but encourages
us to act in the visible world in accordance with its own
rules, however foolish they may seem. Rather like
Quintilian in Book VI of Institutio Oratoria Folly
pragmatically recognises that there is a need to
accommodate oneself to one's context. For Folly, it is
the seed of folly, not wisdom, which 'creates societies
and maintains empires, officialdom, religion, law courts
and councils' (102), and this makes evident to her the
usefulness of folly, or earthly wisdom, in the earthly
context. This could not be further from the position
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taken by Erasmus in the Handbook, and it would be
tempting indeed to dismiss this passage as another
instance of mere foolishness, were it not for the fact
that the character called 'Erasmus', Erasmus's ironic
self-portrait, enters the text several chapters later,
and makes a somewhat similar point: that illusions are
important to the art of communicating truths.
The notion that Erasmus might be calling attention to
the importance of superficial appearances rather than the
'spirit' would seem, in the light of the Handbook to be
wholly uncharacteristic. And yet this is the position
attributed to Erasmus by Folly when, in chapter sixty
three, she anticipates the objections of her author to
her foolish doctrine. It might appear unwise to take
seriously this characterisation of Erasmus's ideas,
considering that these ideas are ascribed to him by Folly
herself, and when we have been offered a clear guide to
interpretation by Erasmus in the 1515 letter to Dorp.
Yet, strangely enough, it is with Folly's depiction of
the 'foolish' Erasmus, the image of Erasmus at a third
remove from the author himself, that we come closest, I
suggest, to detecting, and understanding, the essential
doubleness of the Erasmian voice, the doubleness which
brings Erasmus closer to Cicero's, rather than to
Plato's, Socrates.
In an attempt to convince her audience of the wisdom
of her foolishness, Folly gives a list of names of the
wise men who embraced her way of life, among whom are
Solomon ('"I am the most foolish of men"' (Proverbs xxx,
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2)) and St. Paul ('"I speak as a fool, I am more"' (2
Corinthians xi, 23)) (190). It is at this point that
Erasmus, whose objections to Folly's interpretation of
these biblical passages she anticipates, is mentioned by
Folly, and is styled by her as one of her own foolish
acolytes: as one of the 'Greek pedants' 'bent on [...]
catching out the many theologians of today by blinding
them with the smoke-screen of their own commentaries'
(190). With the discussion of a similar passage in the
Handbook in mind we might expect Folly to portray
Erasmus's objection in similar terms: that is, that Paul
is only a fool in the eyes of 'worldlings'. However,
this is only part of the argument Folly attributes to
Erasmus in the Praise, for the character she depicts
gives an expanded explanation, offering not so much a
'smoke-screen', as Folly warns us he is wont to do, but
an argument in defence of the use of smoke-screens.
According to her, Erasmus would argue that Paul does not
claim to be more foolish than the other apostles but to
be both their 'equal [...] in his ministry for the
gospel' and their 'superior' (191). (The validity of
this interpretation becomes clear when the whole biblical
passage is given: 'Are they the ministers of Christ? (I
speak as a fool). I am more; in labours more abundant,
in stripes above measure, in passions more frequent, in
deaths oft' (Corinthians xi 23).) However, Paul calls
himself a fool, Folly suggests that Erasmus would argue,
because he
wanted this [claim] to carry conviction without his
words sounding arrogant and offensive, so he made
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folly his pretext to forestall objections, writing
'I speak as a fool' because it is the privilege of
fools to speak the truth without giving offence
(191) .
Erasmus would explain that Paul's foolishness is only a
pretence; it is an indulgent and shrewd response to the
limitations inherent in fallen human judgement. Paul,
Erasmus would suggest, is not so much a fool as a
diplomat, one who knows how to play the fool, that is,
one who pretends ignorance in a similar way to Antonius
in De Oratore, or - according to Cicero - Socrates in the
Platonic dialogues, thereby gaining the credence, and
trust, of his audience.
Considering that Erasmus insists in the 1515 letter on
the need for us to turn our attention away from the
literal to the symbolic signification of images, the
support attributed to Erasmus by Folly for 'illusions'
seems wholly out of character, and would suggest that
this passage is not to be taken seriously. However, the
argument put forward by Erasmus on behalf of Folly is
neither unusual nor at odds with the letter to Dorp. For
example, the representation of Paul as a 'rhetorician' or
actor comes from St. Augustine's De Doctrina Christiana,
in the fourth book of which Paul's confession of folly is
submitted to a rigorous rhetorical analysis.46 Moreover,
in the letter itself Erasmus gives several examples of
Paul's uncomplimentary appraisal of Christ in which he
stresses the human, rather than the divine, side of His
nature (Paul calls Christ '"sin"' and also '"a cursed
thing"' (234-5)), and draws our attention to the
paradoxical behaviour of Christ, who 'took to himself the
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synagogue of Moses, like the wife of Uriah, so that from
it could be born a peaceful people', and who drank 'the
sweet wine of charity' so that he could give 'himself
freely for us' (235). Thus, although Erasmus's
subsequent portrayal of Christ a few lines later as 'a
sort of Silenus' does seem to suggest that we are meant
to read His actions allegorically, recognising that
within the earthly form adopted by Christ there exists
the Son of God, he simultaneously reveals a respect for
the incarnation of Christ, and, correspondingly, I
suggest, for the literal level of the text: that is, for
its specifically rhetorical, as opposed to its
allegorical, function. There is good reason for this.
As the letter continues it becomes clear that it is being
used to defend not only the Praise but also Erasmus's
controversial translation of the Greek New Testament.
One of the more infamous details of Erasmus's New
Testament is his correction of St. Jerome's version of
the opening line of the Johannine Gospel ('En archi en ho
Logos') from 'In principio erat verbum' to 'In principio
erat sermo'.47 The extent of the backlash to this
decision is indicated in the letter Erasmus wrote to
Thomas Wolsey in 1520, in which he asks for Wolsey's
protection against his slanderers. Erasmus claims that
he has heard that a man discredited him in front of a
congregation, accusing him of trying to 'correct the
Gospel of St. John'. 'Could anything be more foolish?',
he asks. Not only was St. John writing in Greek, not
Latin, Erasmus observes, but the word 'sermo' is a
'better equivalent than verbum for the Greek logos'
(Erasmus gives a full account of his philological reasons
in the 'Apologia ... In principio erat sermo').48 Using
the methods of a grammarian Erasmus reveals where the
real folly lies, and he thus draws attention to the
importance of philology to the study of theology. It
could be argued that this is not a new position to take -
after all, in the De Doctrina Christiana, St. Augustine
drew attention to the rhetorical nature of biblical
language. But Erasmus's attitude to language is very
different from that of Augustine, as his choice of the
word 'sermo' and his use of irony suggest. Erasmus chose
the term 'sermo', which 'signifies a literary
conversation, discourse, disputation, or discussion', in
preference to the term ' verbum1, which signifies one
word, and as a result, Margaret O'Rourke Boyle argues, he
'emphasized the speaking activity of the Logos as the
father's revelation to the forum of Creation'.49 This
emphasis is reflected in Erasmus's ironic voice. When
Plato's Socrates uses language ironically, that is, when
he uses 'visible forms' to represent ideas, he directs
our attention away from the sign itself and to a more
abstract (intelligible) level of signification, as the
allegory of the cave in the Republic demonstrates.
Augustine adopts a similar theory of figurative language,
which he explores in Book I of the De Doctrina
Christiana, (and which appears to be followed by Erasmus
in the Handbook). Augustine warns the reader of the
Bible that,
63
we must beware of taking a figurative expression
literally. For the saying of the apostle applies in
this case too: 'The letter killeth, but the spirit
giveth life'. For when what is said figuratively is
taken as if it were said literally, it is understood
in a carnal manner [. . . ] he who follows the letter
takes figurative words as if they were proper,
and does not carry out what is indicated by a proper
word into its secondary signification'.50
Erasmus's irony helps both to direct our attention away
from the literal meaning of the text, and to remind us of
its importance. St. Paul's statement, 'I am a fool',
then, is to be taken, according to Erasmus, first, in an
opposite sense, as an indication of the spiritual rather
than pragmatic and earthly nature of Paul's wisdom, and,
secondly, in a rhetorical sense, as an indication of the
pragmatic nature of Paul's wisdom: his knowledge of the
art of speaking well.
In view of the contradictions which riddle the Praise
it is tempting to see this text as an expression of
Erasmus's awareness of the irony of his position: as
someone who is interested in the human as well as the
divine, and in the mimetic as well as the symbolic status
of words or images.51 At the same time, however, the
complexity of the text appears designed for a less self-
reflective purpose, that is, to make it difficult for the
reader to separate the strands of the different
traditions, and, thereby, to undermine our confidence in
our ability to recognise what is wise and what foolish.
Erasmus has good reason for wanting to make this
distinction a problematic one. His description of
himself in the letter to Dorp as a 'humble artisan'
suggests that he is conscious of the lowly status of the
art he uses to discover truth (248); at the same time it
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is his seemingly foolish skills which bring him closer to
the truth, he suggests, than do the techniques of the
scholastics, the masters of logical enquiry. For Erasmus
questions in the Praise itself the wisdom of the
generally accepted methods and aims of medieval
philosophy, finding that its practitioners are men who
'know nothing at all, yet [...] claim to know
everything', and whose 'total lack of certainty is
obvious enough from the endless contention amongst
themselves on every single point' (151). Rather like
Crassus in De Oratore, who insists that the art of
rhetoric is an essential tool for the study of
philosophy, Erasmus establishes this art as an essential
tool for the study of Christian truths, recognising that
it is this art, which sets out to prove the probability
rather than the certainty of a position, which will bring
humans closest to an understanding of the divine.52 But
this is not the only respect in which Erasmus is akin to
Cicero's Crassus. Like Crassus, Erasmus also considers
Socrates to be a skilled orator as well as a philosopher,
namely, one who creates for himself a seemingly foolish
persona in order to communicate the elusive and seemingly
incomprehensible truths of the intelligible forms, and it
is on this basis that he can thus claim him as a source
of inspiration.
Erasmus's sceptical use of idealism both to create
authority for his own position, and to challenge the
authority of positions generally accepted as wise, is not
restricted to the Praise but can be found in educational
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treatises such as the The Education of a Christian
Prince, a text which Erasmus contrasts encouragingly with
the Praise in the letter to Dorp, describing it as
offering 'plain advice' (215). Erasmus's desire to draw
attention to his commitment to Platonism is nowhere more
clearly displayed than in this educational treatise. In
some respects he could be said to move closer in this
text to Plato than he does in the ascetic Handbook (or,
indeed, than do the Florentine Neoplatonists themselves),
by virtue of the fact that he attempts here to base his
actions in the political world on an apprehension of
universal principles in much the same way that Plato does
in the Republic. In the dedicatory letter to Charles V
which prefaces this treatise Erasmus openly acclaims the
importance of the Platonic ideal of the philosopher-king
(203), and he also makes it clear early in the main text
that his notion of the 'Christian prince' is informed by
this prototype. 'A large section of the masses are [sic]
swayed by false opinions', Erasmus complains, 'just like
those people trussed up in Plato's cave, who regarded the
empty shadows of things as the things themselves' (212);
the good ruler, in contrast, is 'removed as far as
possible from [their] low concerns and sordid emotions'
(221). The Christian prince merits the title of
'philosopher' because he distances himself from ordinary
people, following the example of God, who is 'swayed by
no emotions', and ordering 'the world with the greatest
good judgement' (221), in much the same way that Plato's
guardian merits the title of 'philosopher' because he
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distances himself from the unstable physical world in
order to see, and imitate, the form of the Good. Erasmus
wants to create a king who reflects in his political
actions the organising principle of his divine author, in
the same way that Plato wants to create a king who
informs all of his actions with a knowledge of the source
of his own being, the form of the Good. Erasmus's
commitment to creating the character of the prince in
accordance with eternal principles is further indicated
by the theatrical metaphor he uses at the beginning of
this treatise: if the appearance of royalty rather than
the active possession of kingly virtues is all that is
needed to make a king, Erasmus demands, then what is
there 'to prevent the actors in a drama who come on the
stage decked with all the pomp of state from being
regarded real kings' (215)). Erasmus wants to create a
prince who is, rather than who simply seems to be,
kingly.
At the same time that Erasmus proclaims his allegiance
to Platonic doctrine, however, he also reveals his
sympathy with the humanist cause of the likes of Ermalao
Barbaro, for, like Barbaro, Erasmus launches a biting
attack on the investigative aims and methods of the
scholastics. In contrast to the scholastics, who direct
the prince to intellectual pursuits which are irrelevant
to his secular role, Erasmus encourages the assimilation
of the principles of 'right government' (203); the prince
who has been properly educated understands that his
virtue depends on his actions in this world, not on his
ability 'to argue about elements and primal matter and
motion and the infinite' (203). (Erasmus may appear here
to recall Machiavelli's rejection of Platonic political
idealism in IJL Principe.53) Yet, even as Erasmus directs
our attention to the need for a more secular education,
he maintains his link with Plato by encouraging us to
recognise that the prince acts with 'reference to the
eternal powers' (thus indicating the coalescence of the
Platonic Good with the Christian God), and by redefining
the ends of the philosopher in keeping with the general
intention attributed by Plato to his educational
programme: a philosopher, Erasmus tells us, is not
'someone who is clever at dialectics or science [read
Aristotelian logic] but someone who rejects illusory
appearance and undauntedly seeks out and follows what is
true and good' (214) .
There are times, however, when the synthesis of
idealism and pragmatism achieved in Erasmus's Education
appears to become a conscious compromise rather than an
actual reconciliation. Plato's educational theory
anticipates the creation of a ruler who understands the
idea of the Good and who can, as a result, create an
ideal human society based on this apprehension, whereas
Erasmus anticipates a ruler who legislates according to
the immediate needs of the existing state. In the sub¬
chapter in which he discusses the legislative power of
the prince, Erasmus reveals himself to be heavily
influenced by Plato, so that many of his statements begin
by claiming his authorial support: 'Plato too requires
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[...]', 'Plato's opinion here [...]', or 'Plato does not
allow [...]' (264-5). However, Erasmus's discussion is
permeated by an awareness of the practical needs of the
state, and by the fact that laws are, and must be,
subject to circumstantial change. It is 'necessary', he
writes, 'to adapt the law to the present circumstances of
the state, just as treatment is adapted to suit the
condition of the patient: some laws, appropriate enough
when enacted, are still more appropriately repealed'
(269). Instead of referring to an ultimate ideal,
Erasmus looks at particular laws enacted in the past, for
example, the law which 'was rightly introduced' in order
to allow the seizure of stolen property by the prince or
magistrate in an effort 'to prevent property going to the
wrong person by some trick' (270), and then he determines
its rightness or wrongness according to whether it works
in practice; in the case of this law Erasmus argues for
its repeal, recognising that it has been abused by
magistrates whose enthusiasm for seizing stolen property
has made them little better than the original thieves
(271) .
Erasmus's pragmatism can mean that he sometimes
accepts the continuation of a law or custom despite its
evident injustice, the most obvious example being the law
of primogeniture. At the beginning of the treatise,
while indicating his allegiance to the political ideal of
Plato's Republic, namely that the leaders of a state
should be drawn from among the most enlightened, Erasmus
simultaneously recognises the difficulty of fulfilling
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this requirement in the real world. Although, when we
are on 'board ship', Erasmus reminds us, loosely
borrowing an analogy from the Republic, 'we do not give
the helm to the one who has the noblest ancestry of the
company, the greatest wealth, or the best looks, but to
him who is most skilled in steering', in 'practice'
control of the state is usually given to a prince who is
'born to office, not elected' (206).54 Since this is a
contemporary custom, Erasmus concedes, and therefore
difficult to change, 'then the main hope of getting a
good prince hangs on his proper education' (206) . In
contrast to Plato, for whom philosophical education is
seen as a way of ensuring the institution of real
'Justice' in his ideal state, Erasmus sees education as a
way of alleviating, but not eradicating, bad social
policy. Thus, Erasmus ignores Plato's insistence that
society must be reorganised completely if the political
realisation of ideal principles is to be ensured.55 The
effects of this compromise can be seen in Erasmus's
educational programme. Even though he follows the early
educational programme of Plato, appropriating in his own
discussion Plato's agricultural imagery to describe the
educational progress (it is the task of the educator to
sow 'the seeds of morality [...] into the virgin soil of
[the prince's] infant soul' just as it is the role of the
'dialectician' in the Phaedrus to 'plant' and 'sow' 'his
words founded on knowledge' in the soul of his student
(276e)), the forcefulness of the language used by Erasmus
betrays his anxiety to turn an individual who is not
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necessarily suited by nature to princely office into a
proper prince. Maxims are not dictated to the prince
(since such a method does not ensure that they will be
well assimilated), but, rather, are 'carved on rings,
painted in pictures, inscribed on prizes, and presented
in any other way that a child of his age enjoys, so that
they are always before his mind even when he is doing
something else', ensuring that they are 'fixed in his
mind, pressed in, and rammed home' (210). In contrast to
the mentor of the Phaedrus, the Erasmian tutor does not
get to 'select', in the first place, 'a soul of the right
type' (276e).
Erasmus is not the only humanist to recognise the need
for the reformer to compromise his Platonic political
idealism. In the Utopia Thomas More's persona confronts
a Platonic extremist who preaches a philosophy of
contemplative withdrawal - recalling the position of
Neoplatonists like Pico. 'More' offers a sensible
corrective to Raphael's pessimistic insistence that
'there's no room at Court for philosophy'.56 Recognising
that Plato's notion of the philosopher-king is untenable
in contemporary politics, 'More' suggests instead that
philosophers should becomes princely advisers, and he
counters the Platonic philosophy of Raphael with one more
sensitive to the rules of social decorum: that is, 'a
more civilized form of philosophy which knows the
dramatic context so to speak, tries to fit in with it,
and plays an appropriate part in the current
performance'.57 However, it is the character 'More' who,
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sensitive to the 'dramatic context' in which he
functions, ends up looking like a fool in his final
refusal to challenge Raphael's stark vision of an ideal
society, for fear that he might appear a fool to
Raphael.58 What the character 'More' gives expression to,
I suggest, is Thomas More's own consciousness of the
limitations, and dangers, endemic to the compromise
between the humanist's idealist political vision and the
politician's recognition that he acts in a far from ideal
world. The fact that Book I of the Utopia, the so-called
'Dialogue of Counsel', was written shortly before More
accepted a position on the King's Council, would seem to
imply a personal element in its composition.59 Given
More's apparent enthusiasm for an ascetic lifestyle, his
depiction of the split between the political and
philosophical life as an acute and possibly
irreconcilable one, and the portrayal of the sycophancy
which surrounds political authority in Book I of the
Utopia, have a particular resonance, suggesting that his
career decision was very much a compromise.60 In
contrast, Erasmus's treatise, a treatise which actually
does offer counsel to kings, is more optimistic. Not
only does Erasmus refuse to polarise spiritualism and
pragmatism but he attempts to synthesize the two
traditions, as his use of Plato to authorise his
pragmatic educational and legal theories suggests.
One of the dangers implicit in Erasmus's appeal to
Platonism is that, in the process of supplanting one
previously unchallengeable authority (scholasticism) he
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creates another (the secular rule of the prince). This
is an accusation sometimes aimed at the humanists, and,
in particular, at the English humanist Sir Thomas Elyot,
who can serve here as an example of this danger. Clearly
influenced by Plato's Republic, and by the Christian
Neoplatonic reconceptualisation of Plato's cosmos, Elyot,
in The Book of the Governor, describes the ideal 'public
weal' as being headed by a single sovereign, whose
authority is determined by his representation of the
single heavenly author, God, and who is supported in his
duties of state administration by a class of men roughly
analogous to heaven's angels, namely the governors or
magistrates.61 The desire to create a new ruling elite
was also linked, John D. Cox suggests, to the revival of
Ciceronian rhetoric, which bases its conception of a
hierarchy of styles on social classifications.62
'Everything is order', writes Elyot, 'and without order
may be nothing permanent and stable; and it may not be
called order, except it do contain in it degrees, high
and base'.63 As Cox has argued, Elyot advances the
interests of a new ruling class of learned men to
displace the old nobility, and what he offers Henry VIII
in return for his acceptance of this new class of men is
the divine legitimation of his political power.64 But
does Erasmus, like Elyot, legitimate such a centre of
power? Though Erasmus may construct a prince in the
Education in terms of a Platonic ideal in the same way
that Elyot does, the powers of his prince are limited.
Not only is Erasmus's political ideal intended to remind
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the prince of his subordination to divine authority, but
the presence of Erasmus's scepticism in this treatise
means that the political compromise offered by Erasmus is
a forceful reminder of the limits of princely power. Not
only is the prince not a legislator in quite the same way
as the Platonic philosopher-king but the question raised
by Erasmus concerning his genealogical claim to power
leaves him dependent on the humanist for his
legitimation. 'The custom in the old days', Erasmus
observes, 'was to set up statues, arches, and plaques for
those who have served the state well. But none are more
worthy of such honours than those who have worked hard
and conscientiously at the task of properly educating the
prince' (207) . Whereas Elyot relies on his Platonic
allegiance, on his equation of virtue with intellectual
merit, to legitimate the authority of the humanist
governors, Erasmus, in contrast, elevates the political
status of the humanist educators by calling attention to
the split between the ideal and the actual, between the
end and the means. In this respect Erasmus comes
uncannily, and unexpectedly, close in intention and
method to his Italian contemporary, the courtier
Baldassare Castiglione - despite his different conception
of the ultimate purpose of the art of rhetoric,
(ii) Castiglione
In the letter to Lord Michael de Sylva, Bishop of
Viseo, which prefaces his treatise, Castiglione
anticipates that sceptical critics will find his
depiction of an ideal courtier 'superfluous' because the
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•real' world is peopled by individuals who neither are,
nor ever can be, perfect. Castiglione1s defence against
such a criticism is to place himself in a tradition of
idealist thinkers, including Plato, Xenophon and Cicero,
with whom, he facetiously explains, he is 'content to
err'. Although he prefers to 'leav[e] apart the
disputing of the intelligible world and of the Ideas or
imagined fourmes', he is sure that if an 'Idea' of the
'perfect commune weale', as well as the 'perfect king'
and 'perfect Oratour' exists 'in imagination', as Plato,
Xenophon and Cicero have in turn held, then there must be
a form of the 'perfect Courtier', at which the courtier
should aim (13) .65 It is in Book IV, in which
Castiglione's political vision is outlined, that his
idealism is most apparent. Castiglione's speaker, the
Lord Octavian, offers a justification of monarchy by
calling attention to the divine right of the prince.
Octavian explains to his audience that the combination of
natural virtue and a good education (provided by the
courtier), will not only enforce the rule of the prince,
making him like a 'demy-God' in his own kingdom, but will
actually make him like 'God'. Just as the heavens show
'in a glasse, a certain likenesse of God', so the
virtuous prince on earth reveals himself to be like the
Christian God, and therefore, appropriately enough, his
temporal representative (276). Octavian's recourse to
this kind of idealism, in which the structure of the
earthly realm is found to be analogous to the
organisation of the heavenly realm, is reinforced by
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Bembo's subsequent Pythagorean description of the
relations between the parts of the universe, translated
almost verbatim from Cicero's De Oratore (D.O.:III xlv.
178-81)) (309-10).
In some respects Castiglione's The Book of the
Courtier differs little from Thomas Elyot's The Book of
the Governor, first printed in 1531, which also begins
with a statement of its idealist intentions.66 Despite
such shared interests, critics are surprisingly unanimous
in emphasising the differences between the humanist
educationalists, which include Elyot, and the
professional courtiers such as Castiglione. One of the
first of contemporary critics to remark on these
differences is G.K. Hunter. 'Long before Elizabeth's
reign', Hunter observes with reference to the English
political scenario, 'the Humanist ideal had shrunk to
that of "the courtier" who was required, within a certain
elegant and disdainful playfulness of manner [...] to
have some knowledge of classical authors'. The classical
learning which received its political reinstatement at
the hands of the humanists, and which was used by men
like Elyot to carve for themselves an influential
position at court, according to Hunter, is put to more
frivolous use by a new class of men, the courtiers, being
used by them to create encomiums on 'tournaments',
'hunting', and 'amorous dalliance' instead of state
policy.67 For Daniel Javitch this assessment of the role
of Tudor courtiers is also true of the Urbino court, the
court depicted in Castiglione's treatise. He argues that
even when in Book IV the Lord Octavian 'tries to give a
didactic role to the courtier' he is simultaneously
forced to admit that the courtier needs the arts of
dissimulation for winning first the favour of his prince,
before he can set about fulfilling such a role.68 In
contrast is the definition Elyot gives of the role of the
governors or magistrates in the Governor: insisting on
the need in a public weal for 'one capital and sovereign
governor' Elyot simultaneously recognises that 'one
mortal man' cannot do all of the work of the state alone,
and that he needs a class of 'lesser governors' 'aiding
him in the distribution of justice', and thus becoming
'his eyes, ears and legs'.69 For Javitch, Castiglione's
treatise teaches court aspirants, dependent on the will
of a powerful monarch and denied the freedom to advise on
state policy, surreptitious ways of attaining their ends.
For Joan Kelly, however, Castiglione's treatise also
teaches court aspirants a form of self-deception: Bembo's
claim in Book IV that the courtier is dedicated to a more
spiritual quest, becomes, for her, little more than a
symbolic attempt on the part of the courtier to 'renounce
the power of self-determination that has in fact been
denied [him]': to renounce, in short, in favour of the
contemplative life the active life of political
involvement in which he no longer plays a part.70
The courtier is often held to differ from the humanist
in a second important respect. Not only has he been
politically disempowered but his social privileges are
under threat from the appearance of a new class of men,
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drawn from the lower gentry, who are keen to develop
their own social influence. Thomas Elyot's treatise on
the art of government nicely illustrates the interests of
the newly upwardly mobile: in the Governor he attempts to
undermine the traditional political power of the
nobility, replacing them with an elite of educated men.
In Castiglione's Courtier, in contrast, one of the first
requirements demanded by Count Lewis of the ideal
courtier is that he be a man of noble birth, the reasons
for this being, first, that 'custom' would have it so,
and, secondly, that 'both in armes and in all other
vertuous acts [...] the most famous men are Gentlemen'
(32). Count Lewis proceeds to explain this second
observation with the claim that 'nature in every thing
hath deepely sowed that privie seed, which giveth a
certaine force and propertie of her beginning, unto
whatsoever springeth of it, and maketh it like unto her
selfe' (32). Whereas Elyot insists that high social rank
should be based on the 'influence of understanding' which
is distributed by God's grace, and while Thomas Wilson
similarly questions, at the beginning of Arte of
Rhetorique, 'the origin of social structure',71
Castiglione's speakers insist instead on the importance
of inherited privilege, reinforcing the feudal equation
of virtue with nobility. Count Lewis's discussion of the
'virtue' of gracefulness is purposefully vague. There
are some men, he claims, who appear so naturally graceful
that they seem 'not [...] borne, but rather fashioned
with the verie hand of God' (32). One such man, he
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offers by way of illustration, is Lord Hyppolitus (the
son of the Duke of Ercole I), a man blessed with so
'happie a birth, that his person, his countenance, his
words, and all his gestures are [...] fashioned and
compact with this grace' (32-33). Lewis's claim that
Hyppolitus derives his virtues from good fortune does not
make Nature's distribution of talent a random affair; his
description of Lord Hyppolitus's natural virtues, indeed,
occurs just after he has insisted on the importance of
the courtier's inherited social rank, and it becomes
apparent, without being explicitly acknowledged, that
Hyppolitus's happiness derives less from Nature's
unpredictability than from the 'naturally' superior
status of the house into which he has been born. The
courtierly virtues, Count Lewis implies, belong to the
traditional nobility, not to those 'untowardly
Asseheades' of whom Sir Frederick Fregoso complains that
they 'through malapartnesse thinke to purchase them the
name of a good Courtier' (29).
Such arguments have left one of Castiglione's critics,
Frank Whigham, convinced of the conservative nature of
the Courtier. For him it is a reactionary response to a
period of social change and class mobility, combining a
desire to 'teach the members of an endangered aristocracy
how to reascribe themselves the self-evident ascriptive
status that their forebears had enjoyed' with a desire to
conceal the stages of advancement from the upwardly
mobile, that is, from those who might 'purchase' the name
of a courtier.72 Thus, Castiglione wishes in the Courtier
both to 'grace' the members of the old aristocracy and to
'disgrace' (Hoby's apt translation of the Italian
xreprimere') those hopefuls jockeying for a higher
position on the social ladder. Such an interpretation
appears warranted by the fact that Sir Frederick proposes
the challenging debate in the first place with the
expressed intent not only of 'disgrac[ing]' but literally
of suppressing (reprimere) the social climbers (29).
However, as I will show, the matter is somewhat more
complicated than Whigham suspects.
Elyot and Castiglione may share a similar interest in
political idealism, but the way in which they use this
Greek tradition seems to be very different. While Elyot
uses the Platonic ideal of a meritocracy to legitimate
the political ambitions of a new class of men (the
humanists), Castiglione, in contrast, showing an
aristocratic bias in his interpretation of the Stoic
'seeds of virtue', and supporting this interpretation
with Bembo's Neoplatonism at the end of the treatise,
appears to reaffirm the social privileges of an
established elite, who are struggling to maintain their
political primacy in the face of increasing autocracy and
social mobility. And yet, as a study of both the theme
of imitation and the conflicting allegiances of
Castiglione's speakers will demonstrate, this familiar
perception of the conservatism of the Courtier cannot be
taken so entirely for granted.
Taking into consideration the idealist pretensions of
the Book of the Courtier, we should not be surprised by
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the emphasis placed by Castiglione on the importance of
natural instinct to the development of courtierliness.
The assertion of Castiglione's speaker Count Lewis that
the courtierly art cannot be 'learned' influences the
style of discussion in the Courtier/ giving the treatise
the form of a descriptive, rather than a prescriptive,
handbook, and so distinguishing it further from Elyot's
Book of the Governor, which gives practical advice on
education, and from Thomas Wilson's Arte of Rhetorique,
which lays down helpful rules for oratorical delivery.
The model or source of inspiration for the Courtier is
Cicero's rhetorical treatises, Orator and De Oratore,
which Castiglione interprets as idealist treatises. In
these treatises, and in Orator in particular, Cicero
appears to place so much emphasis on the importance of
native judgement, which informs not only collective
opinion but also the rules of art, that the focus remains
almost always on the natural effect caused by particular
tropes rather than on the techniques or tropes that bring
about its creation; 'we shall lay down no rules', Cicero
explains at the beginning of Orator, 'but we shall
outline the form and likeness of surpassing eloquence:
nor shall we explain how this is to be produced, but how
it looks to us' (xiii 43), an intention shared by his
character Antonius in De Oratore (I xlviii 208), who is
insistent that the orator will be naturally pleasing if
he studies nature, and follows his own instincts. The
same sentiment is expressed by Castiglione's Count Lewis:
in response to the demand for clarification of the
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methods used by the courtier to acquire gracefulness, he
explains that he is not obliged 'to teach [the Urbino
courtiers] to have good grace, nor any thing els, saving
onely to shew [them] what a perfect Courtier ought to be'
(44). Precedence is superficially given by Cicero to
natural instinct rather than artistic knowledge since it
is the former, abetted by knowledge of the rules of art,
which supposedly gives excellence to a speech; moreover,
oratorical merit is ultimately determined, he claims, by
the approbation not of learned fellow orators but of the
people themselves, who are likewise guided by natural
instinct.73 Castiglione reaffirms both of these claims in
his letter to de Sylva. At the end of the letter, for
example, he submits his treatise to 'the judgement of the
commune opinion', 'bicause for the most part the
multytude, though they have no perfect knowleage, yet do
they feele by the instinct of nature a certein savour of
good and ill' (14), and a little earlier, he praises the
works of Boccaccio, who allowed himself to 'be guided
with witt and his owne naturall inclination, without anie
other maner studie or regarde to polish his writinges'.
(Castiglione finds least successful those works in which
Boccaccio studied hard 'to be most fine and eloquent'
(11) .)
This view, that natural instinct should inform
literary composition, is shared and enlarged upon by the
speaker Count Lewis in the first book of the Courtier.
Side-tracked into a digression on techniques of literary
imitation, Lewis recalls the advice of Antonius in
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Cicero's De Oratore that 'there are many that follow no
man, and yet climbe they to a high degree of excellencie'
(62), namely men who are endowed by nature with an
ability to think and communicate lucidly, rendering
unnecessary painstaking study. Antonius's advice to
orators to follow nature informs Lewis's advice to the
courtier's tutors: prospective courtiers should be
prompted by their tutors 'in the way that their wit [lo
ingegno] and naturall inclination [la natural
disposizion] moveth them' (62). As proof of the truth of
this doctrine he adduces the example of two modern
writers, Petrarch and Boccaccio. While many people think
that the excellence of their work is based on an eminent
model which has since been lost, Lewis observes, he
believes instead that 'their verie maister was witt
[1'ingegno], and their owne naturall inclination and
judgement [giudlco naturale]' (61). Castiglione's
commitment to the cultivation of natural virtues could
not be more clearly announced: and yet, as the debate
continues, this commitment is unexpectedly compromised.
Castiglione's concern to communicate with an audience
means that he is acutely conscious of the need for
clarity of expression. In the letter to de Sylva, for
example, Castiglione explains that he has not imitated
Boccaccio, the master of Italian letters, partly because
of the antiquity of his language ('bicause the force and
rule of speach doeth consist more in use, than in anye
thinge els: and it is alwayes a vice to use woordes that
are not in commune speach') (11), and partly because he
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does not speak well the 'hard and secrete' Tuscan dialect
(13). In the discussion of literary imitation in Book I
Count Lewis shows a similar concern for the courtier to
convey the 'dignitie and brightnesse' of his ideas to his
audience, and he insists, consequently, that the courtier
must frame them 'in a good order'. But like Castiglione
in his prefatory letter Count Lewis also insists that the
courtier make sure that the words he chooses for
expression are 'apt, chosen, cleare, and well applyed,
and (above all) in use also among the people' (56).
Castiglione's awareness of the transient nature of
literary tastes and lexicons gives us a different
perspective on his unease with literary imitation. For
his character Lewis argues against imitating classical
authors not only because he thinks a writer should follow
his natural instinct but because the style of early
writers is often anachronistic, seeming awkward or
strange to a contemporary audience; tastes change, he
concedes, and new styles evolve to replace the old. One
example he uses to illustrate this problem is the
existence of new words in the Tuscan language, words
which he thinks have gained precedence over older and
more traditional words, and he borrows from Horace's Ars
Poetica the seasonal metaphor of the cycle of linguistic
change to reinforce this point; 'Time', he tells us,
'make[s] those first words to fall, and use maketh others
to spring a fresh, and giveth them grace and estimation'
( 60) . 74 What is interesting about this 'borrowing' is
that Castiglione makes 'grace' [grazia], as well as
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literary tastes, subject to the cycle of time, and in so
doing, he both draws attention to the unstable nature of
the phenomenon imitated by the courtier, and suggests
that the gracefulness of the courtier is not so much an
expression of heavenly harmony as the reflection of
particular cultural tastes. Lewis's advice against
imitation has to be modified in the light of this
argument. Although it is useless to copy the exact
phrases and words of the ancients, Lewis explains, the
courtier should copy instead their practice of imitating
'the mistresse' 'custome': 'we must learne of their
writinges', he explains, 'that they learned by use and
custome' (60).
Once alerted to the cultural sensitivity of
Castiglione we may begin to detect in the Courtier itself
the presence of an alternative, sceptical tradition at
odds with the idealism so warmly embraced by Castiglione
in the letter to de Sylva. Not only does Lewis join two
antithetical traditions, but the many voices which
participate in the dialogue, and which represent one or
other of the traditions, are often consciously brought
into conflict. Sometimes this 'clash' of interests is
intentionally confrontational, as in the case of Gaspar's
interruptions, which seem to be intended to force Lewis
to clarify his vision; at other times, however, the
'clash' appears to be designed to undermine Lewis's
position from a distance. This is the case with Sir
Frederick Fregoso's speech in Book II, in which he
presents a very different view of several topics already
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treated by Lewis, including the topic of imitation.
Whereas Lewis emphasises the importance of naturalness to
the writer, Fregoso argues, instead, for the importance
of perceptible dissimulation and self-conscious display
whenever the courtier assumes a role that is not
naturally his; when wearing a disguise the courtier
should always leave some mark to 'betray' his real
person, so, for example, if he disguises himself as a
shepherd he may ride 'an excellent horse' or if he
dresses as an old man he should make sure that his
garments suggest his 'nimblenesse', the intention of this
being to delight an audience with the element of
ambiguity (99).
For Virginia Cox the differences between Lewis and
Frederick have 'been insufficiently recognised by
critics': Frederick, she argues, 'casts a veil of doubts
over his predecessor's arguments',75 countering the
importance attached to virtue by Lewis with an interest
in the techniques of dissimulation, and accompanying all
his proposals with an acute consciousness of audience
expectations, much like a rhetorician. Though Frederick
insists, like Lewis, that the courtier should be
virtuous, Cox recognises that, because of 'his emphasis
on techniques of manipulating appearances [. . . ] he
provides all the necessary hints for one less scrupulous
than himself [. . . ] to develop a fully-fledged art of
simulation',76 In Book II, it seems, we move furthest
away from Castiglione's idealism. However, in the
Courtier we find that contradictory positions belong not
only to the various disputants but often, as Lewis
demonstrates in his discussion of literary imitation, to
the individual speaker. Castiglione's voice is equally
divided. Although Castiglione sets the idealist tone for
the first book and, indeed, for the treatise as a whole,
not only does he express a willingness in his letter to
de Sylva to 'leav[e] apart the disputing of the
intelligible world and of the Ideas or imagined fourmes1,
suggesting his rather superficial interest in the
Platonic theory of the forms, but he qualifies his own
claim that there exists a form of the perfect courtier
with the parenthetical aside 'according to that opinion';
moreover, Castiglione's persistent use of the term
'imagination' ('imagined fourmes', 'conceyved in
imagination') leaves us unsure whether the form of the
ideal courtier exists in a transcendent realm apprehended
by the mind or, literally, in his imagination (13). As
soon as we enter the proem to Book I we find the idealism
endorsed in the letter further compromised by
Castiglione's recognition of the difficulty of
discovering the perfect courtier. For Castiglione
quickly indicates that the model upon which the courtier
is based is less an 'Idea' than the sum of contemporary
fashionable tastes, the instability of which he fears
will make his task impossible ('use maketh us many times
to delite in, and to set little by the selfe same things'
(16) ) .
While it is important, then, to draw attention to the
fact that the various speakers do not 'together' provide
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a coherent and single portrait of the courtier, it is
also necessary to notice that the individual speakers
often provide an equally incomplete or contradictory
account. What we are often left with, despite the
efforts of a particular speaker to conjure for us a
complete picture of the courtier, is merely an impression
of what the ideal courtier should be like, and very
little understanding of what contributes to his
perfection. Castiglione's source for this kind of effect
is clearly Cicero, from whom he has learned the
importance of declaring an allegiance, even if
disingenuously, to idealist philosophy. For although
Cicero and his character Antonius depict the rhetorical
art in terms similar to those used by Plato in the
Phaedrus to describe his own art, they are in fact
imitating the effects of Plato's expression, and
concealing from us the self-conscious artistry of their
own compositions. Rather like Cicero in Orator and his
character Antonius in De Oratore, Castiglione's Lewis
sets out both to present the studied effects of the
rhetorical art as if they came from nature, and to lead
us to believe that the transient object of imitation is a
stable entity representative of a higher truth. Cicero
is not, however, the only literary influence portrayed in
a rather one-sided way by Lewis. Lewis's representation
of Petrarch as one of the Italian literary masters who
followed his own 'naturall inclination' rather than any
established model does not entirely fit with the advice
Petrarch gives on literary imitation in his letters.
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Petrarch himself no doubt had the cunning advice of
Cicero's Antonius in mind when he described in a letter
to Boccaccio the imitative practice of his scribe
Giovanni Malpaghini of Ravenna: 'I won't say that he
will avoid all imitation, but he will conceal it, so that
his work won't resemble any particular author but will
appear to bring Italy something new out of the work of
the ancients'.77 In Book I of the Courtier, then, Lewis
gives the imagined Urbino court an account not so much of
Petrarch's actual imitative practice as of the effect
Petrarch wished to produce.
Count Lewis's ambiguous discussion of literary
imitation might appear something of an overly complex and
unnecessary digression in a book dedicated to a variety
of courtierly skills. This is certainly the view of the
character Emilia Pia, who breaks up the discussion rather
abruptly: 'me thinke (quoth she) this your disputation
hath lasted too long, and hath beene very tedious' (64).
But the debate does have an important part to play,
throwing light on the important issue of nature versus
custom in the creation of courtierly virtues. Indeed,
the debate on literary imitation functions as a
complement to an earlier discussion on the nature of
courtierly imitation - the imitation of persons rather
than texts - which forms part of the courtier's
education. Just as the courtier's natural instinct for
literary creation cannot be taken so entirely for
granted, so the 'privie seed' of the courtierly virtue
89
turns out to be less essential an entity than Lewis would
have us believe.
Although Lewis insists that the courtier should always
aim at clarity of expression if he is to convey the
'brightnesse and dignity' of his ideas to his audience,
such lucidity is not always a feature of his own
discourse. For example, Lewis's discussion of the
intricate interrelation of the respective influences of
nature and nurture on the development of the courtier
exasperates the Lord Cesar, provoking him to remark on
what he sees as contradictions inherent in Lewis's
argument on the quality of gracefulness: 'you have saide
sundry times that it is the gift of nature and of the
heavens, and againe, where it is not so perfect, that it
may with studie and diligence be made much more' (43-4) .
Lewis's emphasis on the naturalness of the courtier's
manners, that is, his suggestion that gracefulness
derives from the nature of the courtier, because it is
contradicted by his simultaneous claim that these effects
can be acquired with practice, is seen by Cesar not as a
clear doctrine that might inform an interested audience
but as a means of obscuring the actual stages of the
production of the courtier's manners from such an
audience.
Support for Cesar's criticism can be found in Count
Lewis's equivocal discussion of the courtier's 'privie
seed', which complements his discussion of courtierly
imitation, and to which I will now turn. When Lewis
describes the importance of noble birth to the ideal
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courtier he simultaneously, and unexpectedly, places
great emphasis on the importance of a good education.
Men who are 'trained up in good nurture', he explains,
'most commonly [...] resemble them from whom they come,
and often times passe them'/ however, if they do not have
any one to train or nurture them they may 'growe (as it
were) wilde, and never come to their ripenesse' (32).
Almost immediately afterwards, however, Lewis claims that
there are some men who 'through the favor of the Starres
or of nature' seem to have been 'borne indued with such
graces, that they seem not to have been borne, but rather
fashioned with the verie hand of God' (32). (Such a
twist resembles that in Antonius's claim in De Oratore,
subsequent to his description of the importance of
imitation, that 'there are [also] many who copy no man,
but gain their objects by natural aptitude, without
resembling any model' (II xxiii 98).) It is not
surprising that Cesar should be confused. In response to
Lord Cesar's request Count Lewis, in a statement which
recalls the position of Cicero's Antonius, insists that
the quality of gracefulness is something that cannot be
'learned' (44); however, he then goes on to add that the
lucky individual who is not unapt by nature, 'ought to
beginne betimes, and to learne his principles of cunning
men [ottimi maestri]' (44). Before jumping to the
conclusion that this reference to 'cunning' constitutes a
Machiavellian turn in Lewis's conception of the courtier,
we need to be conscious that the term 'cunning', Hoby's
translation of 'ottimi' (excellent) means here 'wise' or
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'skilful', although its modern sense of 'crafty' was also
in existence in the sixteenth century. Yet when Lewis
goes on to describe the act of imitation that will secure
the courtier the full development of his inherent nature
our suspicions should be aroused. Just as the literary
artist selects excellent models in order to imitate their
gracefulness, so the courtier, intent on the composition
of his character, sets out to 'steale his grace from them
that to his seeming have it, and from eche one, that
parcell that shall be most worthie prayse' (italics mine)
(45). For Lewis the act of creation is not a process of
discovery, as it is for Plato, or as Cicero's Antonius
pretends it to be, but a process of theft. Lewis's
theory of imitation is reflected in the advice he gives
to the courtier on the subject of gracefulness, which
forcefully reminds us of his debt to Cicero's crafty
'Antonius'. For Lewis declares that the courtier should
copy the example of the orator and conceal the art he has
used to acquire his skills:
And I remember that I have redde in my dayes,
that there were some most excellent Orators,
which among other their cares, enforced
themselves to make everie man believe, that they had
no sight in letters, and dissembling their cunning,
made semblant their Orations to be made verie
simply, and rather as nature and truth ledde them,
than studie and arte, the which if it had beene
openly knowne, would have put a doubt in the peoples
minde, for feare least hee beguiled them (46).
Count Lewis's description of gracefulness as a natural
gift is modified by his acceptance of the possibility of
stealing gracefulness from a model, of making such a
quality seem inherent in or natural to the imitator.
This equivocation about the source of gracefulness
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inevitably reflects on the question of inherited virtue.
Count Lewis's assertion that it is noble birth which
guarantees the development of virtue is not left
unchallenged: Gaspar Pallavicin wonders how noble birth
can be essential to a courtier when many of the virtues
of his trade are found in those of lower rank, and when,
indeed, many of those born into noble families are seen
to be 'heaped full of vices' (33). 'Nature', he claims,
reminding us of Cicero's democratic universalism, 'hath
not these so subtile distinctions' (34). Since the
'first seede' (33) is to be found in all things, he
insists, the possession of virtue cannot be dependent on
social rank. Although he does not completely agree with
Gaspar, Lewis does not attempt to refute his arguments.
The ideal courtier should be nobly born, he concedes, not
because this guarantees his innate virtue but because
this is the social ideal and therefore gives him a head
start over his adversaries (34). Gone is the concern for
the development of innate virtue; instead we are left
with an awareness of the role played by social customs,
and the courtier's exploitation of them, in shaping his
identity. Thus, when Gaspar asserts in Book II that the
courtier might develop his wrestling skills by engaging
in fights with his social inferiors, since 'no comparison
is there made of noblenesse of birth, but of force and
sleight", Sir Frederick quickly expresses his
disapproval. The courtier should only fight with such
men if he is sure he can prove himself against them, for
there is nothing more unseemly, he suggests, than the
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sight of a 'gentleman overcome by a carter' (97-8). If
nature is a force that lacks respect for social
distinction in her distribution of virtue then it is
necessary that the courtier call attention to his talents
and so secure his social position.
When describing the education of the courtier Lewis
depicts the practice of imitation not only as a theft,
but as an act of usurpation: the courtier, he insists,
should 'evermore set all his diligence to be like his
maister, and (if it were possible) chaung him selfe into
him' (45). Although Lewis's educational advice seems to
be nothing more than an elaboration of the educational
theory of the Roman rhetoricians Cicero and Quintilian,
the suggestion he makes that imitative practices can
elevate an individual in status, that it can change an
apprentice into his 'master', jars with the notion of a
preordained social structure advocated by Lewis in his
discussion of the courtierly 'privie seed'. The
existence of the possibility of self-advancement, which
is suggested by this example, supports the view that
Castiglione is not simply trying to turn the clock back
in an attempt to reinstate a rigid feudal hierarchy, as
Whigham argues, nor simply intending to express
allegiance to a powerful monarch, as other critics have
claimed.78 Indeed, despite the emphasis on the fixity of
the natural social order in both Book I and Book IV,
there is a simultaneous recognition that nature, as
Octavian declares, 'hath not appointed such narrow
boundes to the dignities of men, that one may not come up
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from one to another', a recognition that the social
status of an individual is subject to alteration: 'many-
times meane souldiers arise to bee Captaines: private
men, Kinges: priests, Popes: and scholars, maisters'
(299). The courtier envisaged by Castiglione is much
closer to Elyot's governor than is usually allowed, in
respect of his potential for political ascent (a
similarity which is strengthened, as we shall see, with
the discussion of the advisory role given to the courtier
in Book IV). But there is one important difference
between Elyot and Castiglione. Whereas Elyot makes it
clear in the Governor that the power of the magistrates
complements the power of the prince, Castiglione, in
contrast, offers a more dynamic account of the relations
between the prince and the courtier, depicting the
courtier as being at once subservient to, and influential
on, the prince, helping to create his own princely
'virtue'. In this respect Castiglione comes closer to
the position taken by Erasmus in the The Education of a
Christian Prince, the treatise in which he set out both
to create a good prince and to remind the prince of the
source, and limitations, of his power.
It is in Book IV of the The Book of the Courtier that
the Lord Octavian tries to explain the function of the
courtierly arts so carefully described in the preceding
books, and the relationship of the courtier to his
prince. Although at the beginning of the Courtier
Castiglione claims to teach the courtier how 'to serve
[his prince] perfitely in every reasonable matter',
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thereby gaining the 'favour' and 'praise of other men'
(15), by the time we have reached Book IV the courtier
has been promoted to the position of adviser and tutor to
the prince, and The Book of the Courtier itself has
become an educational treatise for princes in the fashion
of Erasmus's The Education of a Christian Prince,
including within its scope debates on the right form of
government, and the duties that pertain to princely
office. This is a strange turnabout in a treatise which
has dedicated itself so far to the development of
ornamental skills in the courtier (singing, dancing, the
playing of instruments), and to shaping the career of a
social group defined increasingly by their political
dispossession, a 'turnabout' to which the Lord Octavian,
the principal speaker in this book, appears to be
sensitive. For Octavian admits that the 'precise
fashions' of the courtier, 'the setting forth of ones
selfe' and 'merry talke', which belong more to the
1entertainement of women and love', can indeed 'womanish'
a man, (and thus detract from his serious political role
at court); at the same time, however, he recognises that
it is by these means that the courtier shall win the
'favour' of the prince, an essential requirement if he is
to 'set him in the way of vertue1 (2 60-1) . The seemingly
frivolous pursuits of the courtier turn out to be
'political' skills necessary for winning him the
friendship of his prince. Once he has attained the
prince's friendship the courtier can 'breake his minde to
him' and 'enforme him franckly of the truth of every
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matter meete for him to understand, without fear or
perill to displease him1 (261) . He becomes, in short, a
political adviser.
For Daniel Javitch and Joan Kelly the fact that the
courtier's influence rests as much on his ability to
charm the prince, 'beguiling him with wholesom craft', as
it does on his ability to 'enforme' him 'franckly of the
truth of every matter', indicates the extent of the
courtier's political demotion.79 But this interpretation
underestimates the potential efficacy of the courtier's
'charm', his Ciceronian eloquence, assuming that direct
counsel is more politically meaningful than indirect
methods of communication, when, as we know from Cicero's
Antonius, it is such indirect techniques which lie at the
heart of persuasive oratory: it is better for the orator
to have his hearer 'so affected as to be swayed by
something resembling a mental impulse or emotion, rather
than by judgement or deliberation' (II xlii 178).
Octavian's insistence that the same skills which
purportedly 'womanish' the courtier are also the means of
his political advancement indicates the paradoxical
nature of the courtier's existence, at once subservient
to and influential over his prince.
The extent of the courtier's subservience depends on
how the prince's virtue is seen to be determined: that
is, whether we consider his virtue to be inherited or
acquired through instruction. This is a point which we
never fully resolve, mainly, I suggest, because of the
conflicting account given by Castiglione of the prince's
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education. The principal sources for the educational
theory expressed by Octavian are Cicero and Aristotle,
although there are other important influences tightly
woven into the debate, for example, the teachings
attributed to Protagoras in Plato's treatise of that
name. Thus, in response to Octavian's claim that the
princely virtues are to 'bee learned', the Lord Gaspar
insists instead 'that they are given the men that have
them, by nature and of God' (266), and to support this
argument he cites the Promethean myth recounted in
Plato's Protagoras. But there is one important
difference in Gaspar's version of this myth. Like
Plato's Protagoras he emphasises the democratic nature of
Mercury's distribution of the virtues of 'justice and
shame'; however, unlike Protagoras he uses the story to
explain the naturalness of these virtues to humankind:
Mercury willed, Gaspar asserts, that these virtues
'shoulde be imprinted in every man' (267) . In contrast
to Protagoras, who uses the story to demonstrate that
knowledge of justice is not 'innate or automatic' but is
'acquired by instruction' (323c), Gaspar uses the story
to affirm that these virtues are a gift of grace, that
'God hath graunted these vertues to men, and they are not
to be learned, but be naturall' (267). As if to
reinstate the original version of the myth, however,
Octavian then proceeds to give an account of the
educational process which emphasises the importance of
practice to its success - although the immediate source
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of his inspiration is Aristotle, not Plato. 'The morall
vertues are not in us altogether by nature', he declares,
because nothing can at any time be accustomed unto
it, that is naturally his contrarie: as it is seene
in a stone, the which though it bee cast upward ten
thousand times, yet will he never accustome to goe
up it selfe (267) .
If the moral virtues were natural to us, he reasons, then
we would not be able to accustom ourselves to vice so
easily. Like Aristotle, then, Octavian suggests that we
are 'borne apt to receive' the moral virtues, but not
actually in possession of them, thereby emphasising the
importance of 'practice' to the cultivation of
disposition. However, rather like Count Lewis in Book I,
Octavian appears unwilling to commit himself to any one
particular educational theory. No sooner has he
described the courtier as having an innate capacity to
receive the moral virtues than he adopts the subtly
different Ciceronian doctrine of the 'seeds of virtue',
bringing his argument suddenly closer to that of Gaspar
by suggesting that all individuals already innately
possess these virtues. The role of the educator, it
turns out, is to 'stirre up and quicken in us those moral
vertues, whereof wee have the seede inclosed and buried
in the soule, and like the good husbandman till them and
open the way for them', thus 'weeding' out 'the briars
and darnell of appetites, which many times so shadow and
choke our mindes, that they suffer not to budde nor to
bring forth the happie fruites' (268) . Returning his
attention to Gaspar's argument Octavian suddenly concedes
'in this sorte then is naturally in every one of us
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justice and shame, which you say Jupiter sent to earth
for all men', with the result that education is finally
seen to depend on a combination of natural inclination
and practice. If 'the roote of these vertues [...]
potentially engendred in our mindes', Octavian concludes,
'bee not aided with teaching, [it] doth often come to
nought' (268). Just as in Book I Count Lewis leaves us
unsure whether the courtier inherits the virtue of
gracefulness, or whether he acquires it through practice,
so here the Lord Octavian leaves us uncertain whether the
courtier merely fosters virtues already latent in the
prince, or whether, in the fashion of the Erasmian
educator, he makes sure the princely virtues are 'fixed
in, pressed in, and rammed home' to a mind that is not
necessarily naturally attuned to receive them (210) .
Octavian's political idealism leads him to endorse the
supremacy of the prince, and to require the subservience
of the courtier, thus leaving the latter little political
freedom. At the same time, however, he undermines this
conservative ideal by emphasising the importance of
imitation or practice to the apprentice prince, in which
attempt he is unconsciously supported by Gaspar who, in
his re-telling of the Promethean myth, reminds us of the
democratic ideal of human virtue. Such observations
imply the suitability of other candidates for the role of
governor, such as, for example, the courtier himself.
Indeed, it is notable that in the process of creating
this divinely approved prince the status of the courtier
is simultaneously augmented, so much so that the Lord
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Julian feels compelled to object to his apparent ascent.
If the courtier acts as the prince's educator, he
reasons, then he must necessarily be his superior (296).
His objections are quickly answered by Octavian, who
insists on two preconditions for the prince's education:
first, that the prince be naturally apt for study and,
secondly, that the prince have the opportunity to
practise the precepts taught him by the courtier. There
is, as Octavian observes, no difficulty in fulfilling
these conditions for since the prince 'may' be of 'noble
progeny' he will incline anyway 'to vertue of hys owne
naturall motion, and through the famous memorie of his
auncestors, [if he is] brought up in right good
conditions' (276). His noble blood ensures that he will
develop the right 'habits' naturally, just as it ensured
the suitable disposition of the nobly born courtier.
Moreover, Octavian adds, because of his position as head
of the realm the prince will have the opportunity to
practise his skills in a way denied the courtier, and
will consequently quickly surpass his tutor in virtue.
But Octavian's response is again inherently ambiguous.
While he reaffirms the importance of inherited virtue he
simultaneously draws attention to the role played by
practice, reaffirming our suspicion that the courtier, if
given the occasion to practise the skills which he knows
only theoretically, could also prove a proper prince.
In Book IV, in the discussion of the prince's
education, we find the same discrepancy between a
described effect and the techniques of its production
101
which we found in the discussion of the courtier's
education in Book I. Moreover, in both books the
ambiguity concerning the determining factors of character
formation appears ironically to be increased at the very
moment when an explanation is being offered. One of the
results of this ambiguity in Book IV is that we can never
be sure whether the prince's character depends more on
innate virtue or on a good education, and, consequently,
we can never be sure of the prince's natural right to the
office he inherits, or the exact nature of his
relationship with the courtier. Although Octavian
repeatedly asserts the subordination of the courtier to
the prince, the 'naturalness' of his servile role is not
self-evident. Not only may the courtier be endowed with
the same abilities as the prince, lacking only the
occasion to practise them, but in the educational role
imagined for him by Octavian he is temporarily the master
of the prince. It might be useful at this point to
recall the theory of imitation espoused by Count Lewis in
Book I: his claim that it is the aim of the imitator to
emulate and surpass the art of his master suggests that
the prince will quickly equal the standard set by the
courtier. Even so, the dynamic nature of the relations
between the prince and the courtier cannot help but
undermine the absoluteness of the prince's authority.
Sometimes the courtier appears to be subservient not only
to the prince but to a superior, divine author of whom
the prince is the earthly representative; at other times,
however, it is the prince who appears to be dependent on
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the 'favour' of the courtier. Such uncertainty, while
not actually denying the primacy of the prince, does make
problematic the power relations between the prince and
the courtier, the stability of which commentators on the
Courtier have usually taken for granted.
The dynamism of the courtier's political relationship
with his prince is represented also, I suggest, in
Bembo's account of Neoplatonic love which ends Book IV.
At first sight, Bembo's Neoplatonism, which Wayne
Rebhorn describes as promoting 'a world-denying
ecstasy',80 appears to reaffirm the courtier's political
dependence on the prince. Indeed, the use of
Neoplatonism to reaffirm princely temporal power was a
regular feature of Italian politics. Eugenio Garin
observes that the 'reorientation' from humanism to
Platonism coincided with the transition from
republicanism to monarchy, from 'social co-operation' to
autocratic rule: 'the new prince forced everybody from
active political life and transformed culture either into
an eloquent demonstration of his court or into a
desperate flight from the world'.81 Joan Kelly makes a
similar argument: Bembo's Neoplatonism, she claims, acts
as a palliative for the politically dispossessed
courtier, giving him the illusory satisfaction of
resigning 'the power of self-determination' which he has
actually been denied.82 However, what Bembo's vision
actually offers, I believe, is a 'veiled' account of the
courtier's influence on the prince in his role as
educator, and a mask which conceals the rhetorically
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constructed, as opposed to the inherited or inspired,
nature of his identity. Bembo's vision offers the
courtier a genuine, not a wishful, appraisal of his
'power of self-determination'. To argue this point I
shall draw an analogy first between the courtier and the
male lover in Bembo's narrative, and, then, between the
courtier and the female beloved in Bembo's narrative.
Although it is the courtier who has usually been seen
by critics as effeminate, as a result either of his
interest in self-ornamentation or of his political
demotion, and who, therefore, can be seen to be analogous
to the female beloved, it is important to note that the
same analogy can be drawn in the case of the prince.83
Not only is the Urbino prince, Guidobaldo, an 'imperfect
man', having been physically weakened and rendered
impotent by gout, but his place at the head of the table
is taken throughout the debate by a woman, the Duchess
Elizabeth Gonzaga. (Guidobaldo, we are told in Book I,
usually withdraws from company after supper 'by reason of
his infirmitie' (20).) But the analogy between the
prince and the female beloved is strengthened by the fact
that Bembo intends his narrative in the first place as an
illustration of how the older courtier can rival his
younger counterpart as a lover, and by the similarities
between Octavian's account of the moral education of the
prince and Bembo's account of the moral education of the
female beloved. Once the lover has apprehended the form
of Beauty, Bembo tells us, he returns to the beloved and
shares with her some of the beauty he has apprehended,
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taking care 'not to suffer her to run into an errour, but
with lessons and good exhortations seeke alwaies to frame
her to modestie, to temperance, to true honestie1, thus
'sowing vertue in the garden of that minde'. Having
achieved such an end, Bembo tells his audience, the lover
'shall also gather the fruites of most beautiful
conditions, and savour them with a marvellous good
relise' (314). In much the same way the courtier,
according to Octavian, educates the prince, inculcating
in him moral virtues, with the result that 'dayly he
shall see spring', in the mind of his prince, 'such
beautiful floures and fruites, as all the delicious
gardens in the world have not the like', and he will be
rewarded with 'great contentation', knowing that he has
given his prince one of the most valuable of gifts,
virtue (273) .
If we see the female beloved as being representative
of the prince then the shift from courtly love in Book
III to Neoplatonic love in Book IV can be seen to have
genuine political significance for the courtier. The
courtly lover, as C.S. Lewis describes him, is an
'abject' being whose only virtues are 'obedience to his
lady's slightest wish, however whimsical, and silent
acquiescence to her rebukes, however unjust'.84 This
extreme form of altruistic service, C.S. Lewis suggests,
was modelled on a particular political contract: the
obedience offered by the lover to his female beloved, who
is usually his social superior, is analogous to the
loyalty professed by a vassal to his feudal lord.85
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For the courtly lover freedom can only be obtained by a
complete rejection of his vocation, as Andreas
Capellanus, the twelfth-century writer on courtly love,
warns his dedicatee, Walter, in the third book of his
treatise The Art of Courtly Love. He has described the
arts of love in the preceding two books, he explains, not
to bring his friend success in this field but to enable
him 'once instructed' in these arts to refrain from such
action and 'win an eternal reward'.86 However ironic we
may suspect Capellanus's volte face of being, what we
cannot here doubt is the essential incompatibility of
secular love for a woman with a more spiritual kind of
love: 'no person could be pleasing to God', Capellanus
insists, 'by any good works as long as he seeks to devote
himself to Love's services'.87 The courtly lover cannot
attain spiritual freedom because he remains a slave to
the whims of his beloved, an arrangement Capellanus
finally dismisses with contempt. Who would want to
reveal himself, Capellanus asks, 'such a fool and madman
as to try to obtain what forces him with oppressive
serfdom to subject himself to another's dominion, and to
be wholly tied to another's will in all things?.88 (We
may take as an example the chivalric hero and lover
Lancelot, who, according to Chretien de Troyes, did not
prove his worth until he had learnt to put his lady first
before his own honour, and who is depicted in The Quest
for the Holy Grail as a knight unable to fulfil his
spiritual quest on account of his love for Guinevere.89)
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In Neoplatonic love, however, the immediate, physical
object of desire is not the sole end of the lover's
devotion/ the Neoplatonic lover recognises the existence
of a divine being superior to the proximate beloved, to
whom he directs his service in the hope of advancing his
spiritual self-interests, and the beloved becomes an
instrument in his personal self-improvement. Thus, Pico
della Mirandola describes how the lover uses the beauty
of the beloved as 'a means to looking within [him]self at
the proportion and fitting quality of that figure even
apart from that gross and material body in which [he has]
seen it'.90 The introduction of a third party, and the
recognition of the lover's implicit self-interest in the
love relationship, present differences that unsettle the
privileges of the beloved, giving the lover an
independence greater than that possessed by his 'abject'
courtly predecessor. Moreover, the beloved is reduced to
a state of dependence if he or she wishes to advance his
or her own spiritual status. In his Commentary on
Plato's 'Symposium' on Love, Marsilio Ficino suggests
that there are benefits to be derived by both parties,
but he also recognises the different quality of those
benefits. While the pleasure obtained from the
relationship is greater for the lover because both his
sight and intellect are satisfied, Ficino claims, the
exchange is more useful for the beloved, since he gains
beauty of the soul from his contact with the lover.91
When Ebreo Leone applies these ideas to his vision of
heterosexual Neoplatonic love in The Philosophy of Love,
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we can see how far we have come from the courtly love
arrangement. As Philo explains to his beloved Sophia,
spiritual love is superior to corporeal love because it
gives rather than receives; in the same way the love of a
benefactor is superior to that of the beneficiary, and
the love of the man to that of a woman.92 According to
the courtly love tradition it was the male lover who sued
his female beloved for favour, and the female beloved who
acted as the benefactor of her lover. The picture is
here inverted; it is the female beloved who has become
dependent on the male benefactor, and who seeks rather
than inspires self-improvement. As this redistribution
of power suggests, there is no reason to suppose, if we
consider the courtier's role as educator to the prince,
that Bembo's Neoplatonism offers the courtier merely a
palatable justification for his supposed political
marginalisation.
But the representational status of the female beloved
is not fixed. Although it seems clear that Bembo intends
the Neoplatonic lover to be identified with the courtier,
an analogy between the courtier and the Neoplatonic
female beloved is equally noticeable. For like the
female beloved the courtier uses his physical beauty to
attract to himself the attention and the favour of his
'lover', the prince. This second analogy also throws
light on the relationship between the prince and the
courtier, providing an imaginative account of the way in
which the courtier might win the favour of his prince
with the aid of his personal attractions. But, as a
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study of Bembo's theory of beauty reveals, this second
analogy also unexpectedly helps to establish the nature
of the courtier's gracefulness as the product of
rhetorical skill, rather than divine inspiration, and
thus reveals that Bembo's Neoplatonism, like Count
Lewis's idealism in Book I, is an ironic mask which
conceals the sceptical rhetorical art of the courtier.
Not only does Bembo allow for the independent or artful
as well as the inspired creation of beautiful things in
his account of Neoplatonic beauty, but he borrows his
terms for describing beauty from the craft of painting,
the craft depicted by Lewis in Book I as an art of
dissimulation.
For the Middle Platonists and the Neoplatonists there
were two ways of explaining the phenomenon of beauty;
they could describe it either as a harmonious arrangement
of parts (beauty as proportion), or as a quality of
participation in the divine. For Cicero, beauty, whether
of a rhetorical speech or Nature itself, is a product of
proportion: a decorous speech, that is, one which is
ornamented with the figures of speech appropriate to its
content, is naturally pleasing because it recreates the
same harmonious effects which are found to be so
beautiful in the natural world, although on a much
smaller scale (III xlv 178-181) . Likewise, for Bembo,
the beauty of the courtier pleases the prince because it
reflects the harmony of a greater scheme in which he
finds his security, namely the political hierarchy. By
establishing the representative nature of the courtier's
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art, and the representative nature of the material world
itself, Bembo succeeds in affirming the importance of the
body as a sign of moral virtue; the body marks the
'inwarde goodnesse' of the soul, he declares, just as the
buds of a tree provide proof of its fruitfulness (309) .
The relationship between the respective 'beauties' of the
body and soul is not simply reflective, however, as Bembo
later indicates when he calls the physical manifestation
of gracefulness 'the true monument and spoile of the
victory of the soule' (311) . Bembo advances the idea
that the body not only takes after the soul but is in
some way immanently infused with it. Thus, beauty is
attained 'when [the soul] with heavenly influence beareth
rule over the martiall and grosse nature, and with her
light overcommeth the darknesse of the bodie' (311)
(italics mine). The suggestion that the body's beauty
derives from the light of the soul suggests the influence
of Plotinus's ideas on Castiglione's aesthetics, an
influence possibly at odds with the Ciceronian debt so
far discussed. For Plotinus, the father of the revived
Platonic ontology, the classical notion of beauty as
harmonious proportion is inadequate because it fails to
explain how simple things can be beautiful, and it is
replaced by the concept of beauty by participation. The
Ciceronian artist who in the Orator was advised to look
into his own mind and copy the vision of beauty he finds
there is comparable to Plotinus's artist since he is also
searching for his interior form, but when the Ciceronian
artist copies the form he produces a proportionate object
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whose beauty derives from its likeness to the original
object, whereas the Plotinian artist 'run[s] back up to
the forming principles from which nature derives',93 and
produces an artifact whose beauty derives from the fact
that it has 'some share of the art'.94 In the same way,
the beauty of the human body, Plotinus argues elsewhere,
derives from its participation 'in a formative power
which comes from the divine forms', and not simply from
the harmonious arrangement of its parts.95
Plotinus's ideas were disseminated in the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries through the works of Italian
Neoplatonists Ficino and Pico. While Ficino attempts to
syncretise Plotinus's concept of beauty with the position
held by Cicero and the fifth-century Neoplatonist
Proclus,96 Pico reveals his primary allegiance to
Plotinus, not only by recognising the failure of the
theory of proportion to explain the existence of 'simple'
beauty, but also by denying the representative nature of
the body's beauty. As Pico remarks, an ugly body can
just as easily contain a virtuous soul as one which is
more pleasing to the eye. Beauty, therefore, does not
depend on the harmonious relation between parts but is 'a
certain quality' which 'lights the fire of love in human
hearts'/97 for Pico it is quite clear that 'the material
body is not the source and fount of this beauty but that
it is of a nature wholly averse and detrimental to such
beauty'.98 Pico's tentative admission that the pleasing
arrangement of bodily parts can sometimes indicate a
virtuous soul is soon lost as a result of his deep
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suspicion of the material world, and his desire to see
the heavenly lover transcend to the contemplation of
•worthier' objects as quickly as possible. Despite the
emphasis Bembo places on the importance of physical
beauty in the Courtier, he acknowledges that the body in
which 'beautie shineth, is not the fountaine from whence
beautie springeth' (313) . In stating this much he
appears to echo the sentiments of Pico; in fact he is
following standard Neoplatonic doctrine which insists on
the derived nature of physical beauty, and which
encourages the ambitious contemplator to ascend to its
source. But, curiously, alongside Bembo1s recognition of
the inferior quality of human beauty, and the need
ultimately to renounce the pleasures of the material
world, there exists an emphasis on the body which it is
difficult to pass over. The body's importance is invoked
not only by Bembo, who alludes to its representative
nature, and by the other debaters in the books of the
Courtier, who variously describe the actual qualities of
the ideal courtier, but by Octavian, who claims that in
education the 'bodie [should] bee cherished before the
soule' (283) . When Octavian uses the term 'bodie' here
he is referring not only to the actual limbs of a human
being but, by analogy, to the unreasonable or appetitive
part of the soul; he is following the educational advice
of Aristotle to establish good 'instincts' in an
individual before developing his intellectual capacity:
'therefore ought there to be a ground made first with
custome, which may governe the appetites not yet apt to
conceive reason' (283). But the corporeal sense of
Octavian's 'bodie' reappears in Bembo1s discussion of
beauty. As Bembo explains, when the form or idea of
Beauty, which exists independently of the body,
discovers a
face well proportioned, and framed with a
certaine lively agreement of several colours,
and set forth with lights and shadowes, and
with an orderly distance and limits of lines,
thereinto it distilleth it selfe and appeareth
most welfavored, and decketh out and lightneth
the subject where it shineth with a marvellous
grace and glistering (304).
The form of Beauty may give light to 'grosse nature' as
Bembo earlier argued, but the material into which it
descends has already been prepared for its reception.
Thus, the physical body stands in relation to the soul
not only as its mirror image but as a suitable
receptacle, so that the creation of beauty is envisaged
not simply as an infusion of gracefulness that produces
beautiful body but as an infusion into a body already
gracefully arranged. Bembo's coalescence of the concept
of proportional beauty with the idea of beauty by
participation suggests Ficino's Commentary on Plato's
Symposium on Love as the source for his Neoplatonism.
While Ficino reveals his debt to Plotinus by defining
beauty as a 'certain grace' which shines 'through the
influence of its own Idea', he also shows the extent of
the influence of the notion of beauty as proportion on
his conception of beauty by emphasising that this
'certain grace' 'does not descend before the matter has
been appropriately prepared' in terms of the arrangement
quantity, shape and colour of its parts." As Bembo's
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allegiance to Ficino makes clear, even in this idealist
narrative we re-encounter the old problem which has
dogged us throughout the Courtier: whether it is the
courtier's innate 'seeds of virtue' which inspire his
self-expression or whether he is the author of his own
image? Bembo's contribution to this debate is to suggest
that 'beauty', the quality whereby the courtier attracts
to himself the favour of his prince, is something that he
can create: in short, the courtier can become beautiful.
Bembo reinforces the notion that the courtier can make
himself beautiful by choosing to discuss the beauty of
the Neoplatonic female beloved in the terms of the
painting art, rather than in the terms of sculpting
(the art chosen by Plotinus to describe the creation of a
virtuous self in the Enneads) .10° For Bembo' s description
of a face 'set forth with lights and shadowes, and [with]
an orderly distance and limits of lines' suggests that he
is aware of the new painting techniques such as
chiaroscuro and perspective, techniques which enable an
artist to create images that might appear to have real
being.101 While the artistic work produced by the
Neoplatonic sculptor participates in the beauty of the
form which he has apprehended, the work of the Italian
painter appears to be similarly inspired, even though it
is actually the product of his skill in the art of
painting. Bembo's decision to describe the beauty of the
Neoplatonic beloved in these terms is particularly
revealing in view of the debate between Lewis and John
Christopher in Book I concerning the relative merits of
114
painting and sculpture. When John Christopher insists
that sculpture is the superior art because it is of more
'travaile' and more 'dignitie' (78) Lewis meets his
attack by claiming that though both arts aim to 'set out
a thing' it is the painting art which is the more
successful. John Christopher then complains that the
painting art is 'an artificiall following of nature', and
observes that as a representative art it scarcely attains
the achievements of sculpture: the truth and property
that nature maketh', he claims, can,
not bee followed better in a figure of Marble
or Mettall, wherein the members are all rounde
proporcioned and measured as nature her selfe
shapeth them, than in a Table, where men
perceive nothing but the outwarde sight, and
those colours that deceive the eyes: and say
not to me, that being, is not nigher unto the
truth than seeming (79).
Count Lewis defends his chosen art from the accusation of
'seeming' rather than 'being' by employing John
Christopher's arguments; the painter, he suggests, needs
the same knowledge as the sculptor to produce well-
proportioned figures. This claim, however, cannot
obscure the fact that while the sculptor creates rounded
limbs as nature does, the painter's art creates limbs 'in
a round wise'. In contrast to the sculptor, who creates
something that clearly is an imitation of nature, the
painter creates a fiction which will be credited with
'being'. Although the painter requires the same
knowledge as the sculptor, Christopher observes, he must
also have 'an other craft', one which will help him to
'frame' his subject in such a way that it will seem like
perfected nature. Rather like the painter, who makes his
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fictional images appear to reflect nature, the courtier
makes his created beauty appear to reflect a divine
source; he uses his rhetorical art to construct for
himself an image or self which appears to be not only
natural to him but to assign to him his naturally
superior social place.
Castiglione's Book of the Courtier is, I conclude,
hardly an affirmation of a conservative political ideal
which protects the privileges of an established 'noble'
elite and promotes autocratic rule. Indeed, it offers a
more unstable account of the relations between the
courtier and the prince, and hence of the exact locus of
power, than is usually recognised. For this reason it
needs, I suggest, to be considered alongside the
supposedly more serious political treatises of humanists
such as Erasmus. However, Castiglione's treatise can
also be set alongside Erasmus's treatises for a different
reason. For like Erasmus Castiglione sets out to
establish the legitimacy of his art, as well as to defend
the place of his pupil in the active political world of
his day. While Erasmus clearly promotes a different type
of rhetoric to Castiglione (he is attempting to replace
the scholastic logic of the Middle Ages with rhetorical
methods of argumentation), he nonetheless makes his point
with the same non-discursive methods of persuasion used
by Castiglione, imitating the ironic mask of Cicero's
Antonius which blurs the distinctions between the
idealist and sceptical, the philosophical and rhetorical,
traditions. But Erasmus is different from Castiglione in
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one important respect: his aim is not ultimately, or not
only, to create fictions which will be taken for truths,
or which will become truths, but to use the art of
creating credible fictions as a means of discovering, or
revealing, truths. In this respect Erasmus's interests
coincide with those of the Protestant rhetoricians, who,
like him, used their skills to explore, and communicate,
biblical truths or - as we will see in chapter four, with
the example of Philip Sidney - as a tool to create
convincing representations of virtue. What it is less
easy to see, however, is what Castiglione1s art, namely,
his interest in naturalising fictions, has to offer
Protestants. This is a question I will seek to answer in




1. In this thesis the term 'idealism' describes the
position which holds, first, that 'universals have a
real, objective existence', and, secondly, that they can
be apprehended by the human mind. Although this position
was named 'realism' in the Middle Ages I have chosen the
term 'idealism' in accordance with the predilection of
literary critics: see, for example, Jonathan Dollimore,
who contrasts the notions of 'idealist' and 'realist'
mimesis, Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology and Power in
the Drama of Shakespeare and his Contemporaries,
(Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1984), p.71. My use of
the term 'idealism' must also be distinguished from its
use in contemporary philosophy, where it means a position
which holds that no 'material objects or external
realities exist apart from our knowledge of them, the
whole universe being thus dependent on the mind or in
some sense mental', The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed.
Paul Edwards vol. 7 (New York: The MacMillan Co. and The
Free Press; London: Collier MacMillan Ltd., 1967), p.77.
I use the term 'scepticism' to describe a position or
attitude which questions 'the reliability or the
knowledge claims made by philosophers', Edwards, p.449.
A sceptic, in the sense in which I use it, is someone who
doubts not the existence of, but our ability to
apprehend, a universal reality.
2. For an explanation in the former terms of the
burgeoning interest in Neoplatonism in the fifteenth
century see Nesca A. Robb, Neoplatonism of the Italian
Renaissance, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1935) .
For an account of the main areas of conflict between
Neoplatonism and humanism see Frances A. Yates, Giordano
Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1964), pp.159-168.
3. Eugenio Garin, Italian Humanism: Philosophy and Civic
Life in the Renaissance, trans. Peter Munz (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1965), p.78.
4. William J. Bouwsma, 'The Two Faces of Humanism,
Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance Thought' in
Heiko A. Oberman and Thomas A. Brady eds, Itinerarium
Italicum: The Profile of the Italian Renaissance in the
Mirror of its European Transformations, (Leiden:
E.J.Brill, 1975), p.52.
5. Plato, 'The Phaedrus' in The Collected Dialogues of
Plato including the Letters, eds Edith Hamilton and
Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1989). All quotations from Plato's works will be from
this edition and will be given in parentheses in the
text, according to the Stephanus pagination, for example
(273d). See also the distinction Plato makes in the
'Symposium' between 'earthly' and 'heavenly' love: 'Now
you will all agree, gentleman, that without Love there
could be no such goddess as Aphrodite. If, then, there
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were only one goddess of that name, we might suppose that
there was only one kind of Love, but since there are two
such goddesses there must also be two kinds of Love. No
one, I think, will deny that there are two goddesses of
that name - one, the elder, sprung from no mother's womb
but from the heavens themselves, we call Uranian, the
heavenly Aphrodite, while the younger, daughter of Zeus
and Dione, we call Pandemus, the earthly Aphrodite',
180d.
6. For a description of words as images see 'The
Sophist': if a painter, Plato's 'stranger' in this
treatise argues, shows his paintings to children from a
distance then he can beguile them 'into thinking that he
is capable of creating, in full reality, anything he
chooses to make'. We can find 'a corresponding form of
skill in the region of discourse', which makes 'it
possible to impose upon the young who are still far
removed from the reality of things, by means of words
that cheat the ear, exhibiting images of all things in a
shadow play of discourse, so as to make them believe that
they are hearing the truth and that the speaker is in all
matters the wisest of men', 'The Sophist' (234b-c). R.C.
Cross and A.D. Woozley explore this connection, see Cross
and Woozley, Plato's Republic: A Philosophical
Commentary, (London, Melbourne, Toronto: MacMillan; New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1966) pp.221 ff.
7. Although all quotations from the 'Republic' are taken
from Plato's Collected Works, where the term 'psuche' is
translated as 'soul', I have chosen to adopt Desmond
Lee's suggested translation of this term as 'character'
in the Penguin edition. Lee recognises the variety of
meanings attributed to the term: 'The Greek word [psuche]
is used to cover [...], both the principle of life (its
original meaning was the breath of life) and the seat of
mental functions [...]. So it sometimes means
personality or character. But it can also carry the
religious and moral connotation of the English world
"soul"'. It is used in Book X in this last meaning;
however, in book III Plato is discussing moral action,
and hence the term 'character' seems more appropriate.
See Plato, Plato: The Republic, trans. Desmond Lee
(Penguin Books, 1974) n.l p.100.
8. I am indebted to Paul Suttie's discussion of the
relationship between Plato's cave narrative and the
geometer's images in 'Allegory in Action: The Relation
Between Literal and Figurative Meaning in the 1590
Edition of Spenser's The Faerie Queene' unpublished Ph.D
dissertation, Edinburgh 1994, pp.30-5.
9. Plato's invitation to Glaucon to 'apply' his 'image
[...] as a whole to all that has been said', 'Republic'
517a-b, is often seen to imply a connection between the
cave narrative, the sun simile, and the divided line. A
discussion of their possible points of connection is
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, I have found
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useful Cross's and Woozley's account of, and contribution
to, the critical debate concerning this issue; for them
the lowest level of the divided line, and the shadows
cast on the cave wall, represent the images produced by
rhetoricians as well as other human artists.
10. Coulter observes that Plato's distinction between the
two types of images was used by Neoplatonists such as
Proclus to reinstate the educational value of Homer's
poetry. Proclus argued that Homer's fiction is symbolic
as well as mimetic, pp. 4 7 ff. The Literary Microcosm;
Theories of Interpretation of the Later Neoplatonists,
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976).
11. A related account of the lover's ascent appears in
the 'Phaedrus': 'as soon as [the lover] beholds the
beauty of this world, [he] is reminded of true beauty,
and his wings begin to grow; then is he fain to lift his
wings and fly upward', 249e.
12. 'The true analogy for this indwelling power in the
soul and the instrument whereby each of us apprehends',
Socrates explains, 'is that of an eye that could not be
converted to the light from the darkness except by
turning the whole body. Even so this organ of knowledge
must be turned around from the world of becoming together
with the entire soul, like the scene shifting periactus
in the theater, until the soul is able to endure the
contemplation of essence and the brightest region of
being', 'Republic' 518c.
13. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian,
trans. H.E. Butler 4 vols (London: William Heinemann
Ltd.; Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1963). All quotations from Quintilian will be from this
edition and will be given in the text in parentheses, for
example (I Pr 11).
14. Quintilian does not, however, reject all branches of
philosophy. Indeed, he considers moral philosophy or
ethics to be 'entirely suited to the orator', XII ii 15,
and physics to be useful because it provides the orator
with the knowledge with which he can support his case,
XII ii 20-22.
15. In 'Nicoles or the Cyprians' Isocrates explains that
we are inferior to animals in terms of their physical
prowess 'but, because there has been implanted in us the
power to persuade each other to make clear to each other
whatever we desire, not only have we escaped the life of
wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities
and made laws and invented arts; and, generally speaking,
there is no institution devised by man which the power of
speech has not helped us to establish' in Isocrates,
trans. George Norlin 3 vols. (London: William Heinemann
Ltd.; New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1924), vol 1, 6-7.
For an account of the importance of practice to the
development of rhetorical skills see Isocrates's short
speech 'Against the Sophists' in Isocrates, vol 2.
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16. Aristotle, 'The Nicomachean Ethics' in The Complete
Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed.
Jonathan Barnes 2 vols (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1985), 1103a 17-19.
17. Aristotle, ibid., 1103b 21.
18. This technique is discussed further in chapter two,
see pp.164-5, p.201 n.41.
19. Cicero, De Oratore, trans. E.W. Sutton 2 vols
(London: William Heinemann Ltd.; Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1942) . All
quotations from De Oratore will be from this edition and
will be given in the text in parentheses, for example (II
ii 7) .
20. James J. Murphy, for example, explores Cicero's
contribution to rhetoric without considering his
philosophical position, while Stephen Gersch, in
contrast, focuses on Cicero's contribution to Middle
Platonism. See James J. Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle
Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from Augustine to
the Renaissance, (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1974), and Stephen Gersch, Middle Platonism and
Neoplatonism: The Latin Tradition, 2 vols (Notre Dame,
Indiana: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), vol.
1.
21. Hans Baron argues that it was Macrobius's aim in his
translation of, and commentary on, Cicero's 'Dream of
Scipio' 'to prove that, despite his championship of the
active political life, Cicero had been aware that
religious contemplation was on a higher plane'. In this
way he helped to disguise 'Cicero's philosophy of civic
participation', Baron, Ln Search of Florentine Civic
Humanism: Essays on the Transition from Medieval to
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CHAPTER TWO
Sir Philip Sidney's 'Defence of Poetry':
The Art of Being Persuaded
2a. Protestant interest in 'The Book of the Courtier'
Among the treatises that can be classed as 'favourite
reading' of the Elizabethans, John Guy writes, are
Erasmus's New Testament, Paraphrases, Colloquies, and
Adages, Sir Thomas North's translation of Plutarch's
Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, and Sir Thomas
Hoby's translation of Castiglione's The Book of the
Courtier.1 This last treatise, The Book of the Courtier,
might seem somewhat out of keeping with the rest of this
reading list, which is otherwise clearly orientated
towards moral instruction: for not only is the Courtier,
unlike the other treatises, written by a professional
courtier rather than a humanist, but the emphasis placed
by Castiglione in this treatise on the arts of
dissimulation make it seem an unusual choice for
Protestant educationalists. Taking into consideration
Roger Ascham's attack in The Schoolmaster on the
purveyors of courtly love, the translators of Italian
romances and Italianate Englishmen, we might expect to
find Castiglione's treatise given short shrift by this
eminent Protestant educationalist.2 But this is not the
case. 'To join learning with comely exercises', Ascham
131
observes, 'Conte Baldassare Castiglione in his book
Cortegiano doth trimly teach; which book, advisedly read
and diligently followed but one year at home in England,
would do a young gentleman more good, iwis, than three
years' travel abroad spent in Italy'.3
Ascham's mention of the Courtier is clearly calculated
to advertise the new translation by his friend Thomas
Hoby, which first appeared in 1561.4 Even so, we might
wonder what a dedicated Protestant educationalist such as
Ascham, and a former Marian exile such as Hoby, have in
common with an Italian courtier like Castiglione. (We
might also observe that the Courtier was dedicated by
Hoby to the eminent Protestant peer Lord Hastings.)
David Norbrook and Fritz Caspari offer some help here.
'Castiglione's Book of the Courtier did in fact contain
enough didactic matter to attract mid-century humanists',
Norbrook explains, perhaps with Hoby's own justification
of his translation in mind;5 moreover, Castiglione's
'anti-ecclesiastical satire', he suggests, seems to have
increased its attractiveness to Protestants.6 Caspari,
shedding a different light on the matter, argues that the
Courtier suited the Elizabethan political world: he
considers it significant, for example, that Hoby's
translation - the first English translation - did not
appear until thirty years after the publication in 1528
of the original II Libro del Cortegiano. It was not
until Elizabeth's reign, he remarks, 'that the court
reached its climax as a social and cultural center, and
that, in consequence, Castiglione's doctrines became more
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directly relevant'.7 Caspar!'s sense of the Elizabethan
court world must be understood in the light of his
attitude to the distinctions between courtiers and
humanists: the educational treatise of the English
humanist Thomas Elyot, The Book of the Governor, is
described by Caspari as a contemporary and contrasting
counterpart to the Courtier, which indicates for him 'the
need [in the reign of Henry VIII] for a man different
from the Italian courtier, for an independent individual,
capable of governing, able to act and decide on his
own'.8
The reasons given by Norbrook and Caspari for the
success of the Courtier do not seem, however, entirely to
justify the importance attached to the treatise not only
by Ascham and Hoby but also by later Elizabethans such as
Sir Philip Sidney. Indeed, Castiglione's interest in the
creation of the appearance of truth seems to be directly
antithetical to the Protestant inheritance of humanist
rhetoric which is promoted by Continental figures such as
Melanchthon. Responding to the accusation made by Pico
della Mirandola on the behalf of the scholastics that
'eloquence is a forced sort of adornment, something like
rouge on the face, to be used only for pleasure, or to
deceive men', Melanchthon explains that Pico has not
defined the term 'eloquence' properly, thus failing to
see that it is in fact also 'the faculty for proper and
clear explicating of mental sense and thought'.
Melanchthon compares rhetoricians to painters who 'copy
bodies truly and properly': 'the object of the
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rhetoricians [...] is to paint, as it were, and to
represent the mind's thoughts themselves in appropriate
and clear language' (55-6).9 (This role is accorded to
oratory in the late sixteenth century in England by
Protestants such as Henry Peacham, who describes speech
in The Garden of Eloquence (1577) as the means 'whereby
we open secretes of our hartes, & declare our thoughts to
others', and no doubt reflects the importance attributed
by them to personal expression.10) If we set this analogy
against Castiglione's comparison of the courtier to the
kind of painter who sets out to make his object 'more
sightly to beholde' (94), in a treatise in which painters
are depicted as artists whose skill is 'an artificiall
following of nature' which is meant to 'deceive the eyes'
(79), then we can see the extent, and the nature, of the
differences. For Melanchthon eloquence is an instrument
essential to the philosopher and the theologian, to the
seeker of truth, while for Castiglione rhetorical
techniques are essential to the courtier who is intent on
creating the appearance of truth, and thus in producing
belief. Castiglione's courtier appears to be far removed
from the humanist rhetorician described by Melanchthon,
and closer to the 'subtle and secret papists' accused by
Ascham of attempting to bewitch 'overmany young [English]
wills [...] to wantonness'.11
But the Courtier is, nonetheless, an important
treatise for Protestant educationalists and activists.
Different sixteenth-century Protestant thinkers will, of
course, have different reasons for their interest in
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Castiglione1s treatise and it needs to be pointed out
that it is not the intention of this chapter to explain
the general relevance of the Courtier to the Protestant
movement, but rather to explain its unexpected relevance
to one particular Protestant writer, Philip Sidney.
Castiglione's handbook on courtierly practices might seem
an appropriate text for Sidney, who, after all, was one
of Elizabeth's courtiers.12 Even so, like Ascham, Sidney
reveals, in the words of Katherine Duncan-Jones,
'schizoid responses to Italian culture' in his writing:
although Sidney's interest in Italian painters such as
Titian is evident in the pictorial style of the new
Arcadia, in the letters which he wrote to his mentor Hugh
Languet from Venice in 1573-4 he suppresses all reference
to such an interest.13 Moreover, the conventional
assumption that Castiglione's courtier is an emasculated
version of the earlier Italian humanist hardly seems to
suit the conception we have of Sidney as a militant
Protestant and a central player in the attempt to create
a powerful Protestant league among the Northern European
nations.14 Such considerations might seem to make
Castiglione's Courtier a less relevant manual for Sidney
to consult. And yet Sidney is, I will argue, influenced
by the Courtier.
In chapter one I argued that the conception of the
courtier as an emasculated version of the humanist
scholar and politician is misconceived; indeed,
Castiglione inherits from Cicero an interest in
conflating the idealist and sceptical traditions in order
135
to legitimate his rhetorical art, and thereby to wrest
some measure of power back from the increasingly
absolutist ruler he serves, an interest which is shared
and practised by Desiderius Erasmus, the leading light of
humanist reform in Northern Europe. Castiglione's
imitation of Cicero is imitated in turn by Philip Sidney.
Although A Defence of Poetry is written not as a dialogue
but as a tightly structured examination it shares with
the Courtier a tendency self-consciously to juxtapose its
seemingly sceptical position with arguments drawn from
the idealist tradition, making it difficult for us not
only to locate the actual position taken by the author,
but to detect the original source of particular ideas.
Sidney's reason for doing so is similar to that of
Castiglione: that is, an interest in the creation of
credibility, with a view to gaining 'influence' over an
audience, through the appropriation of a familiar
idealist vocabulary for an essentially sceptical
position. Rather than representing 'nature' in his art
(as his language sometimes suggests is the case), Sidney
sets out instead to naturalise the artificial in his art.
But Sidney also imitates Castiglione in another respect.
The twists of Sidney's argument, while demonstrating how
the conflation of idealism and scepticism can be used to
legitimate the poetic voice, simultaneously allow us to
glimpse the tension between the two positions, so that
Sidney could be said not only to bring about a
coalescence of two opposed positions but, in the treatise
as a whole, to argue ironically, the effect of which is
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the destabilisation of the speaking voice of the Defence.
Sidney brings us to the brink of belief, and then
suddenly prevents us from believing completely, and he
does so for two reasons: first, to alert the reader to
the insidious influence of the poetic art, and, secondly,
to reveal to the reader a method whereby he can become
similarly influential.
Very few critics, however, have been willing to take
seriously the self-contradictions which riddle Sidney's
Defence of Poetry. One of the more recent critics to
note the existence and nature of the contradictions in
the Defence is Jonathan Dollimore. Sidney's claim that
'the poet ranges "only within the zodiac of his own wit"'
suggests to Dollimore Sidney's conviction that 'the poet
is not imitating a pre-existent, eternal ideal, but one
which he himself creates'.15 However, as Dollimore
observes, in other sections of the Defence Sidney
'affirms the contrary', speaking 'of poetry's "universal
consideration", its "perfect pattern", and the "idea or
fore-conceit of the work"'.16 Dollimore deals with the
problem by suggesting that the conflict is unconscious on
the part of Sidney: that it is the mark of an age in
transition, a shift from Neoplatonic essentialism to
Baconian realism.17 O.B. Hardison similarly finds that
there are 'two discordant voices' in the Defence, and he
divides the text accordingly into two parts. The first
part, which stretches from the exordium to the
digression, is dominated, he holds, by the 'familiar
voice of humanist poetics', and the remaining part, by
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the voice of 'incipient neo-classicism'. The Defence/ in
other words, appears to embrace the voices of two
important but very different traditions, from which
Hardison concludes that the two parts of Sidney's poetic
treatise were written, like the old and new Arcadia, at
different times, and consequently reflect the respective
interests of those times.18 The divided nature of the
Defence has also been endorsed by Victoria Kahn. Basing
her interpretation on the reference to Xenophon's Cyrus
made early in the Defence (24),19 which suggests to her
Sidney's interest in developing the reader's prudential
virtue, she argues that in the later parts of the
treatise Sidney 'retreats to the "aesthetic" position',
and that he moves from a defence of poetry 'in terms of
its power to persuade to a defence of poetry as mere
"play"'.20 For Kahn, Sidney is arguing here in utramque
partem, with the intention of making the Defence a
training ground for the reader's judgement.21
None of these positions, however, is wholly adequate.
Hardison's and Kahn's division of the Defence into two
parts fails to account for the fact that the treatise is
in any case riddled throughout with contradictions.
Moreover, Hardison and Dollimore ignore the possibility
that the text's contradictions are actually intentional,
while Kahn fails to see that there is an important link
between the seemingly incongruous interest in aesthetic
effect in the later sections of the Defence and the style
of argumentation in the treatise as a whole.
Understanding the aims of Sidney's Defence in the light
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of Castiglione's Courtier means that we must move not
only beyond Hardison's description of the treatise as
unconsciously divided, but also beyond Victoria Kahn's
interest in the persuasive power of probable arguments at
the expense of the persuasive power of figures and
tropes.
The point at which Sidney launches into a discussion
of the state of contemporary English poetry in the
section towards the end of the Defence, which is
unfortunately known as the 'digression',22 is considered
by both Hardison and Kahn to mark the treatise's change
in tone. Contrasting the digression with the earlier
parts of the treatise, O.B. Hardison observes that
'instead of images of freedom and flight' the 'emphasis
is on control and guidance' and that 'instead of
imagination, "unflattering Reason" is to assist the
poet'.23 Hardison is right, I believe, to recognise that
there is a shift in emphasis from freedom to restriction
in the last sections of the Defence; however, he is
mistaken in interpreting this reversal as a sudden
inversion of the argument, as an unexpected and final
shift in perspective. In the following sub-chapters I
will explore the thematic tension between freedom and
restriction not only among the various parts of the
Defence but within its individual 'parts', and will focus
on how this tension relates to two important
relationships explored in the treatise: the relationship
between the poet and nature, and the relationship between
the poet and the reader. For in the Defence Sidney urges
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us to consider, first, whether the poet is tied to
representing nature (or creatively tied by his own fallen
nature) or whether he is able to recreate a new and
better nature, and, secondly, whether the reader is
simply influenced passively by the text he reads, or
whether he is expected to read actively, exercising his
skill in judgement. What Sidney offers the reader in the
'digression', I will argue, is something of a compromise:
the poet not only conceals the rhetorical nature of his
expression, but naturalises to himself feelings and
states of mind of which he may have little or no direct
experience, states which he attains as a result of his
prudent use of the rhetorical effects which he encounters
in his own reading of literature. Thus, the reader
learns from being affected passively by the texts he
reads how to write persuasively himself, and, thus, how
to influence others.
2b. A Defence of Poetry
i. Freedom from nature
From the very beginning of the Defence it seems clear
that it is the quality of imaginative freedom which
distinguishes the poetic art from the other disciplines.
For example, when Sidney declares that the philosopher
and historian, are merely 'actors and players [...] of
what nature will have set forth' he underlines the
limitations under which these particular scholars work
(23), and he contrasts their lesser pursuits with those
of the true disciple of knowledge, the poet who
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disdaining to be tied to any such subjection,
lifted up with the vigour of his own invention,
doth grow in effect another nature, in making
things either better than nature bringeth
forth, or, quite anew, forms such as never were
in nature [. . . ] so as he goeth hand in hand
with nature, not enclosed within the narrow
warrant of her gifts, but freely ranging only
within the zodiac of his own wit (23-24) .
The poet, unlike the historians and philosophers, is not
'tied to' nature but is able to invent either an improved
version of the natural world or a quite different world;
he is able to bring forth 'so rich [a] tapestry' as could
never be found in nature, and 'grow in effect another
nature' (24). The 'golden' world of the poet not only
rivals but, it would seem, surpasses the 'brazen' world
of nature (24). The independence which is here
accredited to the poet, however, is weakened by the
simultaneous claim, included in the passage above, that
the poet creates 'hand in hand with nature'. This
comment would seem to imply that the poet's imagination
is constrained by nature in some way, a constraint
reinforced by the subsequent observation that it is in
the poet that Nature's 'uttermost cunning is employed'
(24);24 the poet here appears not as a rival of but as a
servant to nature, an appearance which, if taken
seriously, threatens to diminish the poet's claim to
independence and to align him more closely with the
historians and philosophers who are tied to nature.
When Sidney suggests shortly afterwards that 'the
highest point of man's wit' can happily be compared with
the 'efficacy of nature' he appears to suggest once again
that the poet is the equal, not the the servant of
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nature, and thus to resolve the problem discovered in the
passage above. This reassertion of the poet's
independence is further reinforced by Sidney's claim that
honour should be shown to God, the 'Maker of that maker',
since it is He who has set man 'beyond and over all the
works of that second nature' (24). Not only does Sidney
displace Nature from her hallowed position with the
epithet 'second', reminding us of her created status on
the Platonic ladder of being, but he places 'man' in
command over her; by virtue of his divine inheritance,
'man' becomes a superior creator to Nature, producing
'with the force of a divine breath [...] things [...]
surpassing her doings' (24-5),25 However, neither the
certainty of the poet's creative superiority, nor his
independence from that 'second' or fallen Nature, is long
maintained. As Sidney suddenly and quirkily reminds the
reader, the scope of poetic creativity is not unlimited:
for, while the aim of the poet is still to represent
nature (in the sense of an original, prelapsarian
Nature), he is prevented from attaining that goal by his
own fallen nature: the poet approximates rather than
recreates an original Nature, Sidney explains, 'since our
erected wit maketh us know what perfection is, and yet
our infected will keepeth us from reaching unto it' (25).
The independence and the superiority of the poet are
short-lived: he cannot escape the restrictions imposed on
him by his own nature. His wings are clipped and he
(temporarily) falls back to the 'brazen' earth with a
bump, and we return to our previous puzzlement.
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ii. The affective text
The tension between freedom and restriction, described
above, affects not only the complicated relationship
between the poet and nature but also the troubled
relationship between poetic texts and their readers. At
the same time that Sidney attempts to clarify the extent
of the poet's dependence on nature, he also discusses in
what way the poet can 'substantially' change nature, that
is, influence the human nature of the reader. Although
the poet bestows on the world exemplary figures like
Xenophon's Cyrus, new 'Cyruses', or prudential leaders,
can only be made if the reader 'will learn aright why and
how that maker made him' (24): if the reader, as Victoria
Kahn suggests, will actively exercise his judgement in
the act of reading. Alongside the rational independence
here accorded to the reader, however, there also exists a
possibly contradictory recognition and commendation of
the affective influence of the poetic text, an influence
which threatens to deprive the reader of his judgemental
autonomy, and leave him as a passive and impressionable
recipient of ideas. For example, at the beginning of the
treatise we are told that the existence of native
American songs proves both the naturalness of poetry
(that is, its cultural universality) and the potential of
this primitive people to be acculturated through the
'sweet delights' of European poetry (20). Sidney's
description of the effect of poetry in these terms draws
attention to the insidious or unconscious way in which
its images instruct the reader, an idea that is
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reinforced in a later depiction of poetry as a 'medicine
of cherries' which even the most wicked and 'hard¬
hearted' of men 'steal to see' (41). Importantly, it is
this very effect of poetry which Sidney admires. Sidney
disapproves of philosophy on the grounds that unlike
poetry it cannot 'strike, pierce, [or] possess the sight
of the soul' (32) but requires instead 'attentive
studious painfulness' on the part of the reader (39).
For Sidney the success of poetry lies in its ability to
appeal to the affections of the reader.
The importance of the use of judgement in the act of
reading appears again to be dismissed in the later
sections of the Defence in which Sidney discusses the
weakness of history as an instructive medium. Sidney
argues that poetry is superior to the other arts,
including history, because the poet, 'not enclosed within
the narrow warrant of [nature's] gifts, but freely
ranging only within the zodiac of his own wit', can 'grow
in effect another nature' (24); the poet has the ability,
in other words, to improve on the fallen natural world.
The historian, in contrast, is tied to the representation
of the events of this 'foolish world', with the result
that he cannot present the best or most appropriate
examples of virtues and vices (38). To illustrate this
point Sidney offers for our examination the history of
the cruel Severus, the Roman dictator who lived happily
and died peacefully despite a life of iniquity; examples
of this kind, he complains, are 'many times a terror from
well-doing' (38). Sidney's reference to Severus recalls
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Machiavelli's similar interest in history in the
Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livy. Rather
than excluding such difficult examples from his treatise,
however, Machiavelli suggests that it is by their careful
consideration that the reader becomes immune to their
effect. Thus, when he describes the wicked life of
Severus he ascribes his comfortable and fortunate death
to his efficiency and good luck; he explains this
exception to the rule by offering a reason for Severus's
success which weakens its potentially harmful effect on
the credulous reader. Machiavelli is convinced that with
a careful weighing of cause and effect it will be
revealed 'on what principle a good kingdom should rest'.26
For Sidney, however, it appears to be the image of an
action that 'stirreth and instructeth the mind', and thus
a text which offers a virtuous or noble model will
necessarily be more successful: 'so the lofty image of
such worthies most inflameth the mind with desire to be
worthy, and informs with counsel how to be worthy' (47).
The 'lofty image' provides the impetus to good action, by
comparison with Sidney's conceived historical text, which
is tied to the depiction of events as they are:
And then how will you discern what to follow
but by your own discretion, which you had
without reading Quintus Curtius? (36)
Sidney here dismisses the skill that made Machiavelli's
historical readings so novel and his reader so actively
involved;27 Sidney's ideal reader appears to be more like
Caxton's medieval romance hero, Blanchardyn, who chanced
to see the stories of Hector, Troilus and Aeneas in a
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tapestry, and was 'sore mouyd and styryd' with 'a wylle
for to be lyke unto those noble and worthy knyghtes'.28
Sidney's confidence in the affective power of the poetic
text also recalls the description Antonius gave in
Cicero's De Oratore of his own education as a process of
unconscious assimilation, that is, as a process in which
the casual reading of philosophical texts spontaneously
prompted his native capacity to speak eloquently (II xiv
60). Sidney seems to share with Antonius a confidence in
human nature/ as he explains in the Defence, we naturally
possess a knowledge of good and evil: 'learned men' have
claimed, he argues, 'that where once reason hath so much
overmastered passion as that the mind hath a free desire
to do well, the inward light each mind hath in itself is
as good as a philosopher's book'. We already know that
'it is well to do well, and what is well, and what is
evil'; the question is whether we can be 'moved to do
that which we know', or be 'moved with desire to know'
(39). The only difference between Antonius and Sidney is
that whereas the former chooses philosophical texts to
inspire the recognition of such knowledge, the latter
believes it is poetry alone which produces such an
effect.
In the first few sections of the Defence, then, Sidney
appears to be interested in poetry as an art that moves
or stirs in the reader a recognition of his 'inward
light' and a desire to shape his actions accordingly, and
he rejects the alternative type of analytical reading
offered by Machiavelli, which is based on his pragmatic
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conception of human nature. Sidney appears to give his
greatest support to affective reading in his discussion
of the relevance of verse to poetry, in which he
establishes that the true business of poetry is not
rhyming but the 'feigning notable images of virtues,
vices, or what else, with that delightfull teaching'
(27). The purpose of the poet, in short, is to create
images of virtue which will instruct the reader at the
same time that they delight him. However, almost as soon
as this purpose is established Sidney proceeds to
consider the case against poetry, exploring the
accusation of the anti-poets that poetry is full of lies
(54). In his reply to these critics Sidney does not
invoke the efficacy of feigned virtuous images as he did
in his discussion of history/ rather, he introduces a new
twist to his defence by accepting the charges against
poetry and admitting 'that being abused, by the reason of
his sweet charming force, [poetry] can do more hurt than
any other army of words' (55). Poetry, it turns out, has
the power to conceal as well as to reveal the 'inward
light': it has the power both to persuade its uncritical
reader to act virtuously and to mislead its unsuspecting
reader to act wrongly. Such an admission augurs the need
to recall the dismissed skill of 'discretion' for the use
of the reader at a moment when we least expect it.
iii. What is good poetry?
In the early part of the Defence Sidney leaves it
unclear whether the poet is constrained by nature in his
attempts to create, or whether he has the freedom to
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create independently, and thus to 'grow in effect another
nature'. This is a problem which reappears in a
different form in other parts of the treatise, and
especially in Sidney's discussion of the object of poetic
imitation. Although Sidney asserts unequivocally that
the poet should imitate good things, it is not clear
whether he means by this that the poet should literally
imitate something good, namely something beautiful or
morally outstanding, or whether he should imitate, in the
sense of produce (or 'figure forth'), credible poetry,
that is, poetry which is good because it is persuasive.
This final tension which I wish to explore is a familiar
one from our reading of Erasmus and Castiglione: for it
is here that we can see Sidney's attempt to bring
together the two antithetical traditions of Platonic
idealism and rhetorical scepticism.
Sidney's sudden acknowledgement of the dangers of
poetic manipulation comes at an important moment in the
Defence, for until this late point we have considered
poetry only in its ideal form, in the form Sidney calls
x eikastike (which some learned have defined: figuring
forth good things)', and we now encounter a second kind
of poetry, 'phantastike (which doth, contrariwise, infect
the fancy with unworthy objects)' (54). Whereas the
icastic imitator gives 'the eye either some excellent
perspective, or some fine picture, fit for building or
fortification, or containing in it some notable example',
Sidney explains, the phantastic imitator offers instead
'wanton shows of better hidden matters' in order to
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delight an 'ill-pleased eye' (54-5). The distinction
between these two types of poet rests on the fact that
they imitate different kinds of objects; the icastic
imitator produces something which is useful to the reader
while the phantastic imitator simply sets out to please
the reader. The terms icastic and phantastic recall a
similar distinction between types of imitative arts in
Plato's Sophist. In Plato's text, however, the nature of
the distinction is quite different: Plato's stranger
distinguishes the icastic artist who, like the bed-maker
described in Book X of the Republic, 'creates a copy that
conforms to the proportions of the original in all three
dimensions' from phantastic artists who, like the
painters, actors and rhetoricians attacked in the
Republic, abandon the truth and 'put into the images they
make, not the real proportions, but those which will
appear beautiful' (236b). (We may remember the
distinction made by John Christopher in The Book of the
Courtier between the art of sculpture and painting; while
the sculptor produces something real, 'measured as nature
her selfe shapeth them', the painter, in contrast, uses
colours to 'deceive the eyes', relying on techniques such
as perspective and chiaroscuro to create 'seeming' rather
than 'being' (79).) The Platonic distinction between the
two types of imitation, however, can still be found in
Sidney's text. Early in the Defence Sidney contrasts the
'right poets' (the artists who are distinct from both the
'actors and players (...] of what nature will have set
forth') with the 'meaner sort of painters', who literally
copy what is put before them. The 'right poets', Sidney
explains, 'bestow that in colours upon you which is
fittest for the eye to see'; and in the act of imitating
they 'borrow nothing of what is, hath been, or shall be;
but range, only reined with learned discretion, into the
divine consideration of what may be and should be' (26).
Rather like the artist envisaged in Plato's Republic
Sidney's 'right poets' copy not the world around them
(itself a disgraced copy) but the forms themselves. The
result is that the images which they create are 'real' in
the sense that they are based not on what they see in the
actual world but on an apprehension of a universal
Nature.29 Importantly, this early 'Platonic' distinction
between good and bad artists need not be seen to conflict
with the later ethical distinction made between icastic
and phantastic poets in the Defence; for example, in the
argumentum to the Ion in his Latin edition of Plato's
dialogues Jean de Serres adapts the distinction made by
Plato between the two types of poetry so as to lend it a
moral perspective.30 Sidney's allegiance to a Platonic
conception of poetry is reinforced more strongly by the
fact that he endorses the idealism implicit in Plato's
conception of good imitation (the notion that the good
poet imitates a universal form latent in his own nature).
Sidney's claim that the poet 'ranges' into 'the divine
consideration of what may be and should be' must be read
in the light of his earlier analogous claim that the poet
soars into 'the zodiac of his own wit' (24). Like the
reader, whose possession of 'natural' knowledge we have
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already noticed, the poet is endowed with a native
insight into the 'divine consideration of what may be and
should be'. In short, a poet is by nature endowed with a
knowledge of and an ability to depict virtue. For
Sidney, then, the 'right poet' or icastic imitator is
someone who discovers in his own 'wit' his inherent
knowledge of virtue which he then recreates in poetic
images; he is tied to a universal Nature (implicit in his
own nature), and therefore freed from his physical fallen
nature. Not surprisingly, Sidney here dabbles with the
notion of divine inspiration; he notes that the 'oracles
of the Delphos and the Sibylla's prophecies [...] did
seem to have some divine force in it' (22), and he quotes
the same Latin 'proverb' ('orator fit, poeta nascitur*)
(63), which appears in Serres's argumentum: Plato's
attribution to poetry of 'a certain divine spirit',
Serres suggests, 'might signify that true and genuine
poetry is not so much composed by industry and labor as
produced by a certain divine impetus, whence the well
known saying, Oratem fieri, poetam nasci1.31
Sidney's description of icastic imitation appears in a
section which is headed by a reference to an Aristotelian
view of imitation, suggesting the importance of the
Poetics, as well as the Platonic texts, as a source for
Sidney's poetic theory. Sidney's suggestion that the
poet should copy the painter who depicts not what is
literally before him but what 'is fittest for the eye to
see' is a clear echo of Aristotle's own advice to the
tragic poet to copy 'the example of good portrait-
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painters, who reproduce the distinctive features of man,
and at the same time, without losing the likeness, make
him handsomer than he is'.32 Aristotle's claim here that
art enhances its original must not be seen as an example
of cosmetic tampering; rather, it should be understood in
the light of what he says in the Physics that art often
'completes what nature cannot bring to a finish'.33 The
artist, according to Aristotle, does not alter nature but
works alongside her, bringing objects to a more perfect
state. The relevance of these ideas to Sidney is
obvious; not only does he commend poetry for presenting a
'golden' version of the 'brazen' world of nature but he
also describes the poet as working 'hand in hand with
nature'. The reference to Aristotle also helps us to
understand the nature of the relationship between the
icastic poet, the reader and the text as conceived by
Sidney. When Sidney claims that the poet shapes the
nature of the reader he is arguing that the poet presents
to the reader images which will make him virtuous,
images, that is, which will awaken his inherent capacity
for virtue.
These idealist claims of the Defence are, however,
challenged from within the text, by a more sceptical
strain of thought. Even though the reference to
Aristotle reinforces the idealist pretensions of the text
it does not help to explain, for example, the provocative
claim in the same passage that the poet 'grow[s] in
effect another nature'. This claim breaks any connection
between the poet and nature (however 'nature' is
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conceived); indeed, it appears to reinforce the
proclaimed independence of the poet from nature, and so
undermine the Aristotelianism of Sidney's position. The
existence of this ambiguity could perhaps be ignored were
it not for the fact that when Sidney explains
Aristotelian mimesis he does not describe it as a
completion of natural processes, as we would expect, but
as a 'counterfeiting' and a 'figuring forth' (25).34 In
reminding us of the fictional nature of the poetic world
Sidney breaks the link with nature carefully cultivated
by Aristotle, and suggests the influence of a different
tradition on his ideas, a tradition in which the images
created by the artist are the product of his rhetorical
know-how. Sidney's allegiance to this alternative
tradition is suggested also in the passage of the Defence
in which he expresses his scepticism about Plato's notion
of divine inspiration: Plato 'attributed unto poesy more
than myself do', he declares, 'namely, to be a very
inspiring of a divine force, far above man's wit, as in
the forenamed dialogue [i.e. the Ion] is apparent'(60).
If we accept the presence of this second, rhetorical
influence on Sidney's theory then we arrive at a slightly
different conception of the skill of the poet; the poet
should try to avoid not only phantastic imitation, that
is, the imitation of 'unworthy objects', but fantastic
imitation, that is, the creation of objects which appear
unnatural or fabulous to an audience.35 (He sets out not
to produce a true image of something, as Plato required,
but an image which will appear to be a true
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representation, as Quintilian required.) Such a shift in
the meaning of the word phantastic, strange as it may
seem at this point in the Defence, is warranted by the
discussion which takes place in the ensuing section, the
so-called digression. Alerted to the existence of poetic
abuse by the anti-poets, Sidney undertakes a survey of
contemporary poets; what he finds to complain about is
not their failure to portray virtuous images but their
failure to portray images convincingly. The advice that
he gives to these poets in this section is based on two
assumptions: that they are not only writers but also
readers (or rather, readers who would be poets) who need
to understand better 'why and how' to imitate poetic
texts, and that they are prompted by a desire to create
characters which are not simply virtuous but which are
convincing and rhetorically persuasive. It is in this
penultimate section of the Defence that we arrive at a
different understanding of the use of the idealist
perspective in the Defence, and begin to resolve an
earlier problem: just how should we read literary texts?
iv. What is fittest to nature
Sidney's discussion of poetry in the Defence is
influenced by classical rhetorical theory and this is
nowhere more clear than in the section of the treatise
known as the 'digression'. For it is here that Sidney
proves himself to be a true Ciceronian, by claiming, like
Cicero, to follow the example of 'nature', and berating
contemporary writers who imitate too slavishly the rules
propounded by their master. There are many writers who,
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Sidney complains, over-use the rhetorical 'figure of
repetition', which is advocated by Cicero for the
expression of anger, in a 'familiar epistle, when it were
too too much choler to be choleric' (71). Such writers
fail to convince their readers that they are angry, he
observes, because they have misjudged the effect of a
figure; they have followed the rules of rhetorical theory
rather than the example offered by experience. The same
complaint is implicit in his representation of
contemporary love poets, writers who, he protests, 'so
coldly [...] apply fiery speeches, as men that had rather
read lovers' writings [...] than that in truth they feel
those passions' (70). These unsuccessful poetic lovers
fail to impress their mistresses because they write by
the book instead of expressing what they feel. Like
Cicero himself, then, Sidney offers 'nature' as the
better guide to oratorical and poetic excellence. The
need for the poet to copy 'nature' could not be more
emphatically expressed than in Sidney's advice to the
poet to follow the practices of the courtier who
'follow[s] that which by practice he findeth fittest to
nature' rather than the example set by the scholar who,
in his verbose renditions of such emotions, 'flieth from
nature' (72). Curiously, however, this argument seems to
mark a break with the earlier part of the Defence in
which Sidney celebrates the creative independence of the
poet, his freedom from nature. Indeed, we may well
wonder at this point if there is any difference between
the poet who follows that which he 'findeth fittest to
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nature' and the moral philosopher who was dismissed by
Sidney for doing precisely that, for 1 follow[ing] nature'
(23). Any resolution of this dilemma, I suggest, depends
on what we consider Sidney's understanding of the concept
'nature' to be.
Sidney's invocation of the natural art of the courtier
suggests immediately the conservative influence of the
ideal of the courtierly art described by Count Lewis in
Book I of Castiglione's Courtier, the ideal which is
based on the supposed Ciceronian precept that education
is a development of an individual's inherent virtue (62).
Acceptance of this doctrine led Count Lewis to reject the
imitation of classical models: Boccaccio and Petrarch
excelled in their art, he suggests, because 'their verie
maister was witt [l'ingegno], and their owne naturall
inclination and judgement [giudico naturale]' (61), and
he advises contemporary court-writers to show a similar
independence from written models. Sidney, likewise, is
suspicious of the benefits derived from close imitation,
as both his condemnation of the too diligent imitator of
Cicero and his rejection of the practice of filling
'Nizolian paper-books' with borrowed 'figures and
phrases' reveal (70). Like Count Lewis, he shows an
apparent confidence in the native ability of the poet;
his claim that the courtier should imitate what is
'fittest to nature' seems to be a reaffirmation of the
claim which opened the digression: 'no industry can [the
poet] make, if his own genius be not carried into it'
(63). Sidney's conception of native ability, moreover,
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is influenced, like that of Count Lewis, by his
perception of the importance of inherited social status.
Like Count Lewis, Sidney transforms Cicero's democratic
'seeds of virtue' into an aristocratic creed; he
discusses his conception of the perfect poet and the form
of perfect poetry in the language of social distinction,
and he connects the writing of good poetry with the
possession of noble blood. Thus, when Sidney complains
about the state of contemporary English poets he berates
his fellow practitioners for being 'base men with servile
wits', concerned only with getting their work into print
(62): in other words, 'lower-class' men who write to gain
employment and financial support. The Earl of Surrey is
one of the few English poets who is complimented, because
Sidney seems to find evidence of 'many things tasting of
a noble birth, and worthy of a noble mind' in his writing
(64); in short, Sidney finds in his writing signs of his
inherited social rank. A lack of nobility, however, is
generally evident in the majority of contemporary poetry,
Sidney suggests, and is manifested in its failure to
represent the natural hierarchy of society (of which the
nobleman is presumably the guardian). Sidney complains
of a failure in English poetry not only to 'marshal[...]'
words 'into any assured rank', with the result that
'readers cannot tell where to find themselves' (64), but
to observe the strictures of literary genre, with the
result that 'plays be neither right tragedies, nor right
comedies, mingling kings and clowns' (67). There is a
tendency, Sidney notes, to 'thrust in the clown by the
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head and shoulders to play a part in majestical matters
with neither decency nor discretion' (67), an
insensitivity to poetic and social decorum which also
manifests itself in stylistic excess. English poetry is
'base' not only because it is not written by men of noble
birth but because it fails to imitate the structure of
society in which the superior place of nobleness is
firmly fixed 'by nature'. Its writers, Sidney complains,
are akin to
those Indians, not content to wear
earrings at the fit and natural place of the
ears, but they will thrust jewels through their
nose and lips, because they will be sure to be
fine (70).
Like the Indians, the poetic and courtierly apes are
ridiculous figures because in an attempt to appear
'fine', that is, to be upwardly mobile, they fail to
recognise what is tasteful and appropriate, and
consequently reveal themselves to be nothing more than
'base men with servile wits'; in short, they reveal
themselves to be little better than savages. Sidney's
criticism of contemporary English poetry reads as a
pointed attack on social mobility - as a reaffirmation of
a conservative ideal in which social rank is conceived to
be both determined and permeated by nature. Not
surprisingly, it is Cicero's conception of the inherent
quality of 'virtue' (here undemocratically interpreted as
noble blood) which is 'naturally' most suited to Sidney's
apparent ideological position.
In associating noble birth with nobility of expression
Sidney shows a commitment to a particular courtierly
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adaptation of humanist republicanism which became popular
in the sixteenth century. In The Book of the Courtier
Count Lewis's claim that the courtier must be a man of
noble blood is merely one position which is introduced as
part of a wider debate concerning the 'nature' of the
courtier; in Annibale Romei's The Courtier's Academie
(1585), however, this doctrine is left unchallenged:
noblemen and women, according to Romei, are held in
estimation because they seem to be born with 'a better
inclination, and disposition unto vertue'.36 Sidney's
support for such a doctrine appears to be proof of his
aristocratic arrogance, a characteristic evident also in
the defensive account he gives of his lineage in the
Defence of Leicester.37 What is curious in this
convention, though, is the degree to which the term
'courtierly' functions as a synonym for the terms
'natural' and 'virtuous'. An interesting example of this
type of conflation is offered by George Puttenham in The
Art of English Poesie. The courtierly poet should choose
to write in the language which is 'naturall, pure and the
most usuall of all his country', a language, Puttenham
suggests, such as that of the court.38 For Puttenham
regional dialects are less 'natural' because they are
less well known in the court and, one suspects, because
they are perceived as being less refined. It is this
kind of attitude which helps to account for the seemingly
ridiculous assumption made by Sidney that the wearing of
earrings is ultimately more natural than the wearing of
noserings or lip-rings, when obviously the 'naturalness'
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of such jewellery is the result of its being a fashion
indulged in by his peers.
Yet we must be cautious about supposing that Sidney is
ignorant either of the strangeness of his New World
analogy or of the fact that 'custom1 has been suddenly
substituted in this instance for the much vaunted term
'nature'. There is much in the Defence to suggest that
Sidney is conscious of the irony inherent in his
discussion of naturalness.39 The fact that Sidney can
portray an American Indian at one moment as incapable of
acculturation, comical in his attempts to improve his
social appearance, and yet, in another instance, stress
his natural susceptibility to the acculturating influence
of poetry (20), ought to call to our attention the
possibility that Sidney is playing with the term
'nature', and not simply prescribing a rather rigid
social structure in which character is 'naturally'
already fixed. Indeed, the rather tortuous sentence in
which Sidney attempts to explain why the poet should
follow the example set by the courtier rather than the
scholar, while simultaneously setting out to establish
the greater naturalness of the courtierly art, can also
be seen, on closer inspection, to present a very
different perspective on the notion of naturalness
itself. The courtier is praised by Sidney because in his
art he imitates
that which by practice he findeth fittest to nature,
[and] therein (though he know it not) doth according
to art, though not by art
whereas the scholar
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using art to show art, and not to hide art (as in
these cases he should do), flieth from nature, and
indeed abuseth art (72) .
There are two points that need to be noted here: first,
that the courtier follows not nature itself but what 'by
practice he findeth fittest to nature' and, secondly,
that the scholar is berated not for failing to follow
nature but for failing to 'hide' his art. The scholar is
unnatural only because his artificiality is evident in
his writing. In contrast, the courtier is praised for
his ability to follow unconsciously the rules of art,
thereby concealing their presence in the act of
composition. Sidney appears here to be suggesting that
the difference between the courtier and the scholar lies
in the fact that the courtier has assimilated or
naturalised the rules of art, and that he is therefore
able to make his compositions appear to be natural or
inspired, and his words appear genuinely to reflect his
mind. Sidney's source for this conception of the
courtierly art, and for its expression, is, I suggest,
Castiglione's Courtier.
The conservative assumptions of Count Lewis in The
Book of the Courtier, unlike those of Annibale Romei in
The Courtier's Academie, are not left unchallenged. Not
only does Sir Frederick question Count Lewis's elitist
view of the distribution of talent, but Count Lewis
himself weakens his earlier arguments, saying that the
courtier follows a model not in order to discover his own
'privie seed', as we had been led to believe, but to
'steale his grace' from his master (45). Count Lewis
offers us an image of literary usurpation which threatens
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to topple the hierarchy of relations he has so carefully
constructed. The threat increases when Count Lewis makes
a connection between the courtier and the orator, for he
compares the courtier not to those orators who claim to
follow nature, whose language reflects their natural
character, but to those who
made semblant their Orations to be made verie
simply, and rather as nature and truth ledde
them, than studie and arte, the which if it had
beene openly knowne, would have put a doubt in
the peoples minde, for feare least hee
beguiled them. (46)
In this instance Lewis recalls Antonius's recognition in
De Qratore that 'any suggestion of artifice, is likely to
prejudice an orator with the judiciary' diminishing 'the
credibility of the orator and the cogency of his oratory'
(II xxxvii 156), a recognition which follows close on his
own claim to possess natural eloquence, and which
suggests that he has been more keen in his prior
discussion of the art of rhetoric to illustrate the end
at which he aims than to disclose the actual methods he
uses. Antonius's admission throws light on Cicero's
intention in treatises such as Orator, where he attempts
to conceal the sceptical nature of his rhetorical
position by appropriating idealist vocabulary, insisting
in this treatise, for example, on the existence of 'an
ideal of perfect eloquence' (ii 8-10); in the same way,
the character Count Lewis throws light on Castiglione's
interest in the Courtier, that is, his concern to present
virtue, manifested visibly in the actions and appearance
of the courtier, as a reflection both of his innate
worthiness and of a metaphysical truth. Sidney does
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something similar, I suggest, in the section of the
Defence that I have been discussing. His recommendation
that the poet should follow 'that which he findeth
fittest to nature' suggests at first sight that he has
taken literally Antonius's advice in De Oratore,
especially when he refers directly in the middle of this
discussion of natural virtue to Antonius and his fellow
speaker Crassus. However, Sidney's description of these
two characters recalls not the emphasis in De Oratore on
the appearance of naturalness achieved by Crassus and
Antonius but the astute rereading of their self-
presentation by Castiglione's character Count Lewis,
which is itself authorised by Antonius's brief revelation
of the studied nature of his eloquence in Book II of De
Oratore (II xxxvi 152-xxxvii 156). Crassus and Antonius,
Sidney explains, are
the great forefathers of Cicero in eloquence,
the one (as Cicero testifieth of them)
pretended not to know art, the other not to set
by it, because with a plain sensibleness they
might win credit of popular ears (which credit
is the nearest step to persuasion, which
persuasion is the chief mark of oratory)
(71-2) .
Just as the unexpected acknowledgement of the role played
by dissimulation in De Oratore and the Courtier forces us
to reconsider the treatment of the theme of innate virtue
so, in the Defence, Sidney's canny admission that he
understands Cicero's 'art' must make us reconsider the
emphasis placed in this treatise on the importance to
poetic expression of either knowledge of intelligible
reality or natural eloquence. For Sidney the poet is not
constrained entirely either by the need to represent a
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pre-existing nature, or by his own given 'nature':
rather, like Castiglione's courtier, he is able to 'grow
in effect a new nature', that is, to give an artificial
creation a natural appearance.
Cicero's De Oratore is an important source for
Castiglione's discussion of imitation in the Courtier for
one overriding reason: Cicero's Antonius offers the
Renaissance courtier a way of naturalising skills (and,
indeed, emotions) which will help him to advance his
social status in an age which places value on inherited
nobility - an age, that is, in which nobility can still
be equated with aristocratic birth. Sidney's interests
are similar to those of Castiglione in this respect.
Indeed, the Defence of Leicester, I suggest, is as much a
tribute to Sidney's anxiety concerning his aristocratic
legitimacy as it is a self-assured reassertion of his
social rank. As H.R. Woudhuysen has suggested, in view
of Sidney's disinheritance from the Leicester estate with
the birth of Lord Denbigh in 1581, his social position in
the 1580s was anything but stable.40 Moreover, the
techniques explored in the Defence have wider, related,
implications for Sidney's political interests, pointing
to a way of legitimating a political and religious
movement (Protestantism) which, as I shall argue, is
based on the creation, as well as the discovery, of its
origins. (Sidney's posthumous image as
a leading aristocrat seems, curiously, to be bound up
with the promotion of the Protestant propaganda from the
1590s onwards.) But before I consider the significance
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of the poetic technique described in the Defence for
specifically Protestant modes of expression, I would like
first to consider what Sidney's espousal of courtierly
imitation means for his theory of reading in this
treatise, and, thus, how the reader-poet is actually able
to create 'a new nature'.
The advice Sidney gives to both contemporary love
poets and the users of 'Nizolian paper-books' has to be
read in the light of his allusion to Crassus and
Antonius. Sidney berates not only those who imitate
their masters too diligently but contemporary love-poets
who fail in their writing to convince their readers 'that
in truth they feel those passions, which easily (as I
think) may be bewrayed by that same forcibleness or
energia (as the Greeks call it) of the writer' (70), and
he thus implies the appropriateness to poetic composition
of the rhetorical technique of self-persuasion. In The
Art of Rhetoric Aristotle describes the effect of
energeia, that is, the use of metaphors which convey
action to lend animation, and, thus, credibility, to a
scene described by the orator; in The Poetics, however,
Aristotle describes a somewhat different technique, with
which energeia was to become confused, whereby the poet-
actor imagines the action he wishes to portray, and,
thus, having persuaded himself of its veracity, is
enabled to portray the action more vividly (enargestata),
and more persuasively, to his audience.41 Quintilian
contributes to the confusion between the two techniques
in the Institutio Oratoria, for he uses the term
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1enargeia* , to describe what he says 'Cicero calls
illumination and activity' (I ii 32), and describes a
technique whereby the orator visualises the scene he is
describing so that he appears 'not so much to narrate as
to exhibit the actual scene', with the result that his
'emotions will be no less actively stirred than if [he]
were present at the actual occurrence' (VI ii 32). For
Aristotle, the techniques described in the Poetics and
the Rhetoric help a poet-actor or an orator to portray
actions dramatically, while for Quintilian, the technique
of enargeia enables the orator to create a persona, or a
version of events, convincing enough to influence the
emotions and judgement of an audience in court. What is
important for both Aristotle and Quintilian, however, is
the necessary susceptibility of the poet or orator to the
emotions he portrays (which for Plato was a reason to
criticise poetry). By imagining a scene vividly the poet
or orator is able to invoke in himself feelings which
will become natural to him and which will inspire both
his speech and his audience. When Sidney complains that
contemporary love poets 'coldly [...] apply fiery
speeches' he is accusing them not simply of experiencing
love through other people's writings but of not reading
love poetry receptively. The cold love poets, like the
diligent imitators, need to change not their reading
material, or their actual experience, but their imitative
practices; they should read not analytically with
'attentive studious painfulness' but try instead with
'attentive translation (as it were) [to] devour [their
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models] whole', that is, complete with the emotion that
inspires their composition (70). 42 Sidney's
representation of the reader as a devourer of poetic
texts is an important development; not only does it echo
Quintilian's description of the creation of 'naturalised'
habits as the consumption and digestion of other people's
writings (X i 19) but it is an interesting departure from
earlier images of poetry in the Defence. Poetry has
already been represented as 'food for the tenderest
stomachs* (34), as 'a medicine of cherries' (41), and as
a means of sweetening 'wholesome things' (40), images
which imply poetry's insidious educational influence.
Sidney's later description of the reader as a devourer of
poetry, however, figures the reader not as a passive
recipient of ideas (as the earlier images imply), nor as
a detached decoder of texts (as someone who needs to
resist the affective influence of the text), but as
someone who is actively and passionately engaged through
the process of imitative reading in growing 'another
nature', or as Castiglione might put it, in 'chaug[ing]
him selfe into' his master (45). Thus, Sidney's ideal
reader is not one who is simply influenced by the text,
nor one who simply exercises his skill of judgement on
the text, but one who knows how to use prudently the
emotions he experiences in the act of reading.
v. Riding Pugliano's horse
In one of the early sections of the Defence, Sidney
tells the reader that he can only become another 'Cyrus'
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if he will 'learn why and how' Xenophon created the
fictional Cyrus. This suggestion has led Victoria Kahn
to argue convincingly that Sidney gave poetry the
educational role of developing the skill of judgement:
'To learn aright "why" and "how" Xenophon made Cyrus',
Kahn explains, 'is to imitate the poet's own imitative
process, not merely the image of Cyrus'.43 Kahn's
explanation of this passage has been recently endorsed by
Lorna Hutson: 'Sidney praises Xenophon's Cyropaedia above
other fictional discourses - certainly above the Amadis
de Gaule', she writes, 'because attention paid to the
emplotment of its examples will enable the reader to
reproduce their instructive potential'.44 As Kahn and
Hutson suggest, Sidney's Defence appears to be designed
to develop the reader's skill in the first two parts of
the rhetorical art, that is, the discovery and
arrangement of rhetorical resources, namely arguments,
and, thus, his virtue of prudence, his ability to
discover 'the means of material provision in a practical
situation'.45 It is for this reason, Hutson suggests,
that the Amadis de Gaule is replaced by Sidney with the
Cyropaedia: the former, unlike the latter, 'does not
enable the reader to read "for the plot"', that is, 'to
become the man capable of discerning the potential for
the persuasive emplotment of circumstances', but produces
instead a man 'whose heart is moved to become the agent
of someone else's plot'.46
The emphasis Kahn and Hutson place on the importance
to Sidney of the exercise of judgement is made more
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credible by the knowledge we now have, thanks to Lisa
Jardine's and Anthony Grafton's scholarship, of Sidney's
own reading practices. If Gabriel Harvey's marginalia
are to be trusted it appears that he and Sidney read
Livy's histories together at Leicester House between
October 1576 and February 1577, just before Sidney's
embassy to Emperor Rudolph II.47 '"Scrutinizing them
[...] from all points of view'", Harvey writes in his
copy of Livy, 'we' applied '"a political analysis"' to
the text; '"our consideration"', he further adds, '"was
chiefly directed at the forms of states, the conditions
of persons, and the qualities of actions"'.48 Harvey's
reading practice is designed not only to inculcate
knowledge about possible forms of action available to a
diplomat but to act also as a 'trigger for action',49 in
short, to make the reader, in this case Sidney, a man of
action. Further evidence of Harvey's influence can be
found in a letter signed by Sidney (dated 22nd May 1580),
in which he advises the soldier and statesman Sir Edward
Denny to study histories in preparation for the 'trade of
our lives'.50 Sidney's sympathetic identification with
Denny suggests that he is describing an educational
programme similar to one which he may have undertaken in
preparation for his own political career (perhaps under
the supervision of Harvey). The list of history texts
which he gives includes such authors as Herodotus,
Thucidides, Xenophon, Cicero, Livy, Sallust, Caesar,
Tacitus, as well as more nearly contemporary writers such
as Machiavelli and Melancthon. Walter Reichelt notes the
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similarity between the reading list offered here by
Sidney and that offered in Methodus ad facilem historicum
cognitionem (1566) by Jean Bodin, the early modern
historiographer who 'believed that a statesman could find
a thoroughly comprehensive education through a careful,
analytical survey of history'.51
The importance to Sidney of the exercise of judgement
in the act of reading is revealed, then, not only in the
margins of Harvey's copy of Livy but in the letter he
wrote to Edward Denny, in which he endorses Harvey's
belief in the importance of history reading for training
a man of action. However, although there is an interest
in the Defence, as Kahn notes, in preparing the reader
for action by training the reader's judgement, Sidney
makes poetry, and not history, the means of such
edification. Moreover, despite the fact that the reader
is encouraged to enquire into the 'why and how' of
literary composition (and so exercise his judgement),
there exists a concurrent disapproval of the
discretionary reading essential to history and an
approbation of the affective influence of poetry.
(Tellingly, the distinction between romance heroes and
classical military heroes is not such a clearly defined
one in the Defence as Hutson suggests/ indeed, we find
Theagenes, the hero of the Greek romance An Ethiopian
Romance, cited alongside Cyrus in the Defence on more
than one occasion (24, 27).) For Kahn the 'logical
contradictions' of the argument are proof that the reader
should not imitate 'any single example but rather the
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activity of judgement that produced the defensive
rhetoric of Sidney's text'.52 But it is difficult, I
think, to dismiss Sidney's approval of the affective
power of the text as just another 'logical contradiction'
when the emphasis placed on enargeia in the digression,
and the description of Sidney's rhetorical awakening in
the peroration is taken into consideration. Kahn places
too great an emphasis, I suggest, on the first two parts
of rhetorical composition, and attaches too little
importance to style and delivery. For Sidney advises the
poet to imitate not just the activity of judgement which
produces probable arguments but the activity of self-
persuasion which helps to win him the credence of an
audience, and in this respect he is following the advice
of Cicero's Antonius, who considers non-discursive or
emotional, rather than discursive, proofs as the mainstay
of persuasive oratory (II xlii 178) .
Although Kahn's claim that the reader is expected to
imitate not the fictional image but the act of judgement
which informed its creation seems absolutely right, and
although, as she points out, the complications of the
Defence do demand the exercise of judgement, it is
important to bear in mind the affective power which is
simultaneously given to poetry. For while the Defence is
a treatise concerned with the dangers of poetry's
potentially insidious influence (as both the example in
the exordium, when Sidney describes how Pugliano's
enthusiasm almost persuaded him 'to have wished [himself]
a horse' (17), and the experience of Sidney's ironic and
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hyperbolic praise of poetry in the peroration, prove), it
is also a treatise about the importance of this
influential power. What Sidney learns from his encounter
with the rhetorically proficient Pugliano is not how to
become but how to ride a horse; Pugliano teaches him the
efficacy of enthusiasm or 'self-love' for the management
of emotions. The Defence does not begin simply with a
story about the effect of forceful oratory but with an
explanation of the success of forceful oratory. And
having revealed that the source of rhetorical mastery
lies in 'self-love', which I understand in this
particular context as denoting 'self-conviction', Sidney
then goes on to declare 'if Pugliano's strong affection
and weak arguments will not satisfy you, I will give you
a nearer example of myself' (17-8). (This emphasis does
not, of course, revoke the importance of the skill of
judgement; after all, as Sidney admits, 'if I had not
been a piece of a logician before I came to him, I think
he would have persuaded me to have wished myself a horse'
(17).) A Defence of Poetry, then, begins not so much as
a defence of poetry but as an attempt to prove the
efficacy of a particular rhetorical technique. And the
reader of the Defence will gain an understanding, and the
use, of this technique if he, like Sidney, in some way
succumbs to the charm of the rhetorician,
vi. Poetry and history: Sidney and Amiot
In contrast to the analytical treatment of historical
texts advocated by contemporary educationalists, and
despite his apparent commitment to the development of his
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own prudential or judgemental skills, in the early part
of the Defence Sidney appears to offer a rather old-
fashioned view of reading. Unlike histories, which
require the application of discretion if they are to be
made educationally valuable, poetry, Sidney argues,
provides 'lofty image[s]' which 'inflameth the mind with
desire to be worthy, and informs with counsel how to be
worthy' (47). As I observed above, the reader described
in the earlier part of the Defence appears sometimes to
be closer to Caxton's romance-hero Blanchardyn, the
knight who saw a picture of the noble Hector and Aeneas
and was 'moved' with a desire to emulate them, than to
the prudential reader, the new Cyrus, described by Kahn.
(The relationship between Caxton's reader and Sidney's
reader is closer than it might appear at first sight, for
although Caxton's translation of Blanchardyn and
Eglantine (1489) is presented as a history, not as
fiction, for Caxton as for Sidney the truthfulness of the
events described in the story is less important than
their educational value.) Yet there is one obvious way
in which the two writers disagree. For Caxton the
'overriding purpose of history, just as for fiction, [is]
edification' and therefore a formal distinction between
the two disciplines is irrelevant;53 for Sidney, in
contrast, a distinction between fiction and history
appears to be essential because the purpose of the
Defence is to prove the superiority of poetry to other
forms of educational writing. Sidney's claim that poetry
is superior to history because it is fiction flies in the
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face both of Caxton's nonchalance and of Sidney's own
advice to Edward Denny; moreover, it contradicts the
educational spirit of the age, which emphasises the
important role played by the reading of history in the
education of future statesmen. As Amiot remarks in his
preface to Plutarch's Lives, history can provide a
practical education for a man of action because it
'helpeth not it selfe with any other thing than with the
plaine truth', while poetry, in contrast, 'doth commonly
inrich things by commending them above the starrs and
their deserving'.54 Sidney's contrary claim that it is
precisely because poetry can fly 'above the starrs' that
it is the most useful form of educational writing, would
seem to suggest how determinedly Sidney has pitted
himself against the new historiographers. However,
Sidney's attitude to history is more complicated than his
dismissive statements in the Defence imply. After all,
Xenophon, the writer who was listed among the historians
in Sidney's letter to Denny, is offered as an example of
a good teacher in the Defence, albeit he is classified
there as a poet (24).
Amiot is concerned with establishing the important
contribution made by history, rather than by poetry or
philosophy, to the education of a man of action.
Although he begins his defence of history with a
reference to the Horatian poetic maxim that art should
teach and delight, Amiot makes it quite clear that he is
aware of a distinction between poetry (fiction) and
history. Such a distinction is important, for it becomes
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manifest that it is because history relates true events
that it can offer the 'next best thing' to, or even a
substitute for, real action. Although many critics claim
that leadership skills can only be derived from practice,
Amiot upholds 'that a wise governor of a common weale, or
a great Captaine can be made of such a person, as hath
never travelled out of his study, and from his bookes'.55
Amiot explains:
the reading of histories is the school of
wisedom, to facion mens understanding, by
considering advisedly the state of the world
that is past, and by marking diligently by what
lawes, maners, and discipline, Empires,
kingdoms and dominions, have in old time bene
stablished, and afterward mainteyned and
increased: or contrariwise chaunged,
diminished, and overthrowen.56
The use of judgement in the act of reading, as Kahn
explains with reference to Sidney, develops in the reader
the prudential virtue that is essential to the successful
career of a statesman; reading is an effective substitute
for governmental experience. But Amiot also claims that
history is an effective substitute for real action for
another reason, namely that histories depict past events
'so lively',
as in the very reading of them we feele our
mindes to be so touched by them, not as though
the thinges were alreadie done and past, but as
though they were even then presently in doing,
and we finde our selves caried away with
gladnesse and griefe through feare and hope,
well neere as though we were then at the doing
of them.57
What Amiot here appears to be describing is the effect of
the rhetorical technique of enargeia, the technique
which, in the words of Quintilian, does not 'narrate' so
much as 'exhibit the actual scene', and which is used by
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the orator to stir 'actively' not only his own emotions
but those of the audience so that they feel as if they
'were present at the actual occurrence [...]' (VI ii.
32). History is a substitute for real action because it
rhetorically recreates the moment of historical action, a
moment that can be imaginatively reenacted by the
receptive reader. Such a technique of educational
imitation is derived not from Aristotle's Ethics but from
his Poetics, and it requires for its appreciation a
reader who is sensitive to its effect. Amiot is not the
only educationalist to promote such a technique for the
reading of history. For example, in The Book of the
Governor Thomas Elyot advises that a young boy should be
schooled in the art of 'portraiture' so that when he
happeneth to read any noble and excellent history,
whereby his courage is inflamed to the imitation of
virtue, he forthwith taketh his pen or pencil, and
with a grave and substantial study, gathering to him
all the parts of the imagination, endeavoureth
himself to express lively and (as I might say)
actually in portraiture, not only the fact or the
affair, but also the sundry affections of every
personage in the history recited, which might in any
wise appear or be perceived in their visage,
countenance or gesture.58
When Amiot refers to the affective power of history he
invokes the poet Lucretius who, he observes, described
how pleasant it is to read about other people's trials in
the comfort of one's own familiar surroundings. Although
such an invocation shows the influence of classical
conceptions of poetry on Amiot's conception of history,
he does not acknowledge any connection between the two
disciplines. Sidney, in contrast, while paying lip
service to the distinction between history and poetry
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made by historiographers like Amiot, and while exploiting
it for his own rhetorical ends, shows a simultaneous
consciousness of the fragility of this distinction.
History claims to base itself on truth, Sidney notes, and
yet it often depends more on the 'notable foundation of
hearsay' (30), while 'even historiographers', despite the
fact that '([...] their lips sound of things done, and
verity be written on their foreheads) have been glad to
borrow both fashion and, perchance, weight of the poets';
moreover, history, he asserts, has 'either stale or
usurped of poetry their passionate describing of
passions, the many particularities of battles, which no
man could affirm' (20). The distinction between poetry
and history is further obscured by Sidney's apparent
appropriation, in his defence of poetry, of the arguments
used by Amiot to defend history. Like Amiot, for
example, Sidney contrasts his chosen discipline with
philosophy and law: his complaint that philosophy teaches
with 'attentive studious painfulness' echoes Amiot's
claim that 'reasons and demonstrations are generall, and
tend to the proofe of things, and to the beating of them
into understanding',59 while Amiot's declaration that it
is better to be educated by history rather than 'civill
lawes and ordinances' since 'it is more grace for a man
to teach and instruct, than to chastise and punish',60
anticipates Sidney's own condemnation of justices who
'seeketh to make men good rather formidine poenae than
virtutis amore (31). Moreover, just as Amiot claims that
historical examples 'declare what is to be done, but also
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worke a desire to doe it',61 so Sidney similarly insists
that it is the 'lofty image' of poetry which 'inflameth
the mind with desire to be worthy, and informs with
counsel how to be worthy'. Sidney, in short, has taken
many of Amiot's arguments in support of history and
applied them to a defence of poetry. His reason for
doing so, I suggest, is not simply to 'underscore' the
educational value of poetry by borrowing the arguments of
an historian, as Elizabeth Story Donno has argued, but to
imply the spurious nature of the distinction made so
carefully by Amiot between history and poetry.62 Despite
recognising a nominal distinction between the two
disciplines Sidney also acknowledges what Amiot refuses
to admit: the importance of the art of poetry to that
most truthful of genres, 'history'.
The relationship between rhetoric and history is well
established in the Renaissance, thanks mainly to Cicero's
recognition in De Oratore of 'the great responsibility
the orator has in historical writing' (II xv 62).
Indeed, for Cicero there is no incompatibility between
the historian's commitment to truth and the orator's
interest in rhetorical excellence, as his character
Antonius makes clear in De Oratore: 'History, which bears
witness to the passing of ages, sheds light upon reality,
gives life to recollection and guidance to human
existence, and brings tidings of ancient days, whose
voice, but the orator's can entrust her to immortality?'
(II ix 36). 63 Sidney's recognition of the relationship
between the two disciplines is indicated by the
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appearance in the Defence of Antonius's account of
history: 'I am testis temporum, lux veritatis, vita
memoriae, magistra vitae, nuntia vetustatis' claims
Sidney's historian in defence of his discipline (30).
However, in the Defence the quotation is unexpectedly
truncated, so that it omits Antonius's claim for the
importance of oratory to history; moreover, it appears in
the mouth of Sidney's caricature of a loquacious and
ignorant historian, a 'tyrant in table talk' who knows
'better [...] how this world goeth than how his own wit
runneth' (30). Since Sidney accuses historians in the
same passage of imitating the poets by basing their
reports on 'the notable foundation of hearsay', then it
might seem reasonable to suppose that we are meant here
to recognise the importance of rhetoric to history (which
his caricature has failed to do), that is, that it may
(as Antonius suggests) actually contribute to, rather
than conflict with, the truthfulness required in this
discipline. The Welsh historian Humphrey Lhuyd is the
possible butt of Sidney's humour here;64 in his Breviary
of Britayne Lhuyd attempted to breathe new life into the
Brutus myth of Geoffrey of Monmouth, a myth which had
been discredited by Protestant historians such as William
Camden, an historian who had been encouraged in his plan
to write about 'Britain' by Sidney.65 But Sidney's
discussion of the relationship between history and poetry
needs to be seen in the larger context of the Defence, a
treatise which explores the efficacy of rhetorical
techniques for the creation of credible fiction, and
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which identifies falseness as a lack of attention to
rhetorical decorum. Indeed, if we take this interest
into consideration then it seems possible that Sidney
objected to histories such as the Breviary of Britayne
not so much because they are not truthful per se but
because they do not appear to be truthful.66 If this is
Sidney's concern, however, then it would seem to put him
in a position contrary to that of sixteenth-century
historians such as Camden, men whom he seems to have
admired, and to put in question his Protestant
allegiance, since for Protestant historians it is the
truthfulness of history which makes it a genre suitable
for legitimating the Reformation. Yet, as I shall argue
in the remainder of this chapter, Protestant
historiography is more complex than this overview has so
far suggested: so that, for example, in Edmund Spenser's
A View of the Present State of Ireland the character
Irenius may reject the 'forged and fabulous' chronicles
of the Irish, but, as he indeed acknowledges, he is
forced, all the same, to base his own historical
reportage on them, taking from them 'a likelihood of
truth';67 while in 'The Ruines of Time', Spenser himself
actually conflates the poetic with the historical both in
form and in content in an attempt to create a Protestant
version of history.
2c. Rhetoric and Protestant History
Sidney's commitment to Protestantism is suggested by
many of his friendships and activities in the 1570s and
1580s. On the continent Sidney's mentor and
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correspondent was the Huguenot Hugh Languet, an activist
who saw in Sidney a potential leader of the international
Protestant cause,68 while at home he was closely allied
with his uncle, the Earl of Leicester, a patron and
protector of radical reformers such as Thomas
Cartwright.69 In the early eighties Sidney himself
offered protection to Protestant radicals: not only was
he a member of a parliamentary committee in 1581 which
revised the Bill of Sedition (the changes made to which
ensured the 'relative' safety of outspoken Protestants
like John Stubbs, who had lost a hand as a result of his
anti-Alengon propaganda),70 but he established the radical
reformers James Stile and George Gifford as his personal
chaplains.71 Sidney's literary skills were often
harnessed to the Protestant cause. In 1579, at the
instigation of his uncle and other members of the
Leicester faction, Sidney penned a controversial letter
to Elizabeth urging her to drop marriage negotiations
with the Catholic Duke of Alengon and devote herself
instead to the interests of her Protestant people,72 while
in 1584 he began translating two 'Protestant' works into
English: Philippe de Mornay's A Worke Concerning the
Trewenesse of the Christian Religion, and the Psalms of
David.73
But not all of Sidney's literary efforts and actions
fit so neatly into his Protestant career. Indeed, while
in Prague in 1576 Sidney made a visit to the expatriate
Edmund Campion, a Jesuit Professor of Rhetoric who
thought he detected in Sidney a potential convert to the
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Catholic faith.74 As far as Sidney's literary works are
concerned, both his defence of fiction in A Defence of
Poetry and his fictional writings themselves can be said
to challenge rather than to reinforce his Protestant
allegiance: in its celebration of the persuasive power of
fiction, A Defence of Poetry runs counter to the position
of radical reformers like Stephen Gosson, who were deeply
suspicious of the deceptive potential of the art of
rhetoric (which was often associated with Catholicism);
while his own fictional writings, with their attachment
to courtly love intrigue, appear to be frivolous and
youthful when set next to his later, more pious
translations of Protestant literature. Tellingly, the
attitude of Sidney's close friend and Protestant ally
Fulke Greville to his literary works is one of
embarrassment.75 In his Life of Sir Philip Sidney
Greville makes two significant points: that Sidney is
best remembered as a man of action, not as a man of
letters, and that the educational medium of Protestant
reformers is best provided by history, not poetry.
Sidney's Defence is often interpreted as a response to
Stephen Gosson's The Schoole of Abuse, published in 1579.
Indeed, one of Gosson's objections to poetry, that it has
an insidious power to affect the character of its
audience, is the very quality Sidney praises in his
justification of the poetic art, suggesting that Sidney
had Gosson's treatise in mind when he composed the
Defence. Since Gosson is one of the most prominent of
the Protestant 'anti-poets' it is worth considering his
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objections to poetry in some detail. For Gosson, it
seems, poets and dramatic artists are little better than
the artists condemned by Plato in Book X of the Republic
for corrupting human nature. Contemporary playwrights,
he complains, offer 1straunge consortes of melody, to
tickle the eare; costly apparel, to flatter the sight;
effeminate gesture, to ravish the sence; and wanton
speache, to whet desire too inordinate lust', which 'by
the privie entries of the eare, slip downe into the hart,
& with gunshotte of affection gaule the minde, where
reason and vertue shold rule the roste'.76 They have the
power to undermine the 'character', even the gender, of
an individual, transforming 'nature' into something
monstrous. In a subsequent work, Playes Confuted in Five
Actions, Gosson argues that the boy actors, used in the
Elizabethan theatre to play women's parts, are
particularly vulnerable to the emasculating effects of
dramatic action; there is a danger, Gosson warns here,
that in acting as women they will become as women.77
Gosson's concern with the threat posed to 'nature' by the
poetic art is prompted, however, not by an immediate
concern with the issue of gender but by a concern for the
security of the state and the national religion.78
Contrasting the men of times past, 'English' men who
'could suffer watching and labor, hunger & thirst, and
beare of al stormes with hed and shoulders', with the
effeminate men of his own day, men who are 'so weake,
that wee are drawne with every threade; so light that we
are blown away with every blaste' and too eager to rush
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into theatres 'where we are soonest overthrowne1,79 Gosson
draws an alarming picture for his reader of the state of
the national defences. Instead of fortifying the
defences of the nation, English men idle away their time
in the theatres, unconscious of the fact that their
strength is being undermined while they pursue pleasure.
'Let gunns to gouns, & bucklers yeeld to bookes', he
warns, and England will be susceptible to foreign
invasion, and he reminds his readers that their Catholic
enemies 'do but tarry the tide', waiting for an
opportunity to begin an invasion that would mean the
imposition of a false Christian doctrine on the nation.80
For Gosson the threat to 'nature', or rather, to truth,
is presented not only by contemporary playwrights but by
Catholic powers waiting in the wings.
Although in 1579 Pope Gregory XIII had landed a force
in Ireland, his would-be 'spring-board' for an invasion
of England,81 thereby exacerbating the fears of zealous
English Protestants, Gosson's distrust of Catholic
missionaries is prompted mainly by the perceived danger
of an 'invasion' effected by Catholic propaganda from
within the state. Protestant radicals had been alerting
their countrymen to such a danger for many years; indeed,
Roger Ascham drew the attention of Protestants to the
danger of Catholic subversion in The Schoolmaster early
in the 1570s; the 'secret papists at home have procured
bawdy books to be translated out of the Italian tongue',
he warns his readers, 'whereby many young wills and wits,
allured to wantonness, do now boldly contemn all swere
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books that sound to honesty and godliness1,82 and the
educational programme he outlines in this treatise is
designed to develop a young man's resistance to such
temptations. The popular perception of Catholic
missionaries as cunning rhetoricians stems from their
being seen as the purveyors of an attractive but
'fictional' or false doctrine, although it was no doubt
fuelled by the underhand means which Jesuit missionaries
were forced to adopt in a hostile country,83 and by their
portrayal in Protestant literature as malevolent
deceivers: Spenser's depiction in Book I of the Faerie
Queene of the infamous Duessa, whose outward beauty hides
her inward foul corruption, and Archimago, whose story¬
telling skill succeeds in diverting the Redcross knight
from his true (Protestant) quest,84 are obvious examples.
Even popular ballads alert their audience to Jesuit
intrigue, such as the ballad attributed to William
Elderton, 'A Triumph of True Subjects', which warns that
Catholic missionaries 'will talk so divinely, with fancie
to feede you/ and rattle out Rhetorique your mindes to
amaze'.85 In the Life of Sir Philip Sidney, first printed
in 1652, Fulke Greville reveals the endurance of such
images; he alerts his readers to the need to forestall
the 'creeping Monarchie of Rome', led by the Jesuit
'Arch-instruments' and 'mist-raisers', and, like Gosson
many years earlier, urges his compatriots to throw away
their books and adopt a more active, that is, a more
military, form of self-defence.86
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Sidney's emphasis on the affective power of the text,
and the confidence he expresses in the educational value
of fiction, seems both out of place in an age in which
the threat from Catholicism is ever-present and out of
tune with the educational doctrine of his Protestant
peers. Although Sidney appears to have shown his
Protestant friends active support on several occasions,
he seems willing nonetheless to compromise his religious
and political position when it comes to literary matters.
Indeed, A Defence of Poetry offers several examples of an
apparent compromise, the most notable being Sidney's
often quoted description of the clash within an
individual between his 'infected will' and his 'erected
wit' (25). Although Sidney does not entirely condone the
Neoplatonic confidence in human nature as this important
example shows, he simultaneously seems reluctant to
endorse fully Calvin's emphasis on the weakness and
corruption of human nature. Alan Sinfield notes that
this kind of conflict has been 'traditionally smoothed
over' by Renaissance critics with the use of the term
'"Christian Humanism"', a term which implies an
'harmonious co-operation between religion and literature
founded upon a noble reciprocity between divine power and
human dignity'.87 Although Sinfield himself finds the
term '"Christian Humanism"' attractive, he prefers to
identify Sidney as a puritan and a humanist 'in
respective theological, political and social contexts'.88
Even so, while recognising Sidney's commitment to
humanism in the Defence, Sinfield also perceives that in
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this treatise Sidney attempts to convince Protestants of
the benefits of the poetic art. In the Defence, he
suggests, Sidney offers three arguments which are
'designed to appeal to protestants': first, he emphasises
that there are three types of poet (the divine, the
philosophical and ethical); secondly, he insists that the
function of poetry is didactic; and thirdly, he 'appeals
to the fall to validate his argument', claiming that of
all the arts it is poetry alone which can 'entice [the
"infected will"] to virtue'.89 In his exploration of
Sidney's Protestantism in the Defence, Sinfield thus
allies himself with an earlier critic, Andrew Weiner, who
similarly argues that Sidney is concerned in the treatise
'with correcting what he considers an inadequate
conception of the nature and function of poetry' rather
than with attacking puritans like Gosson.90 For these two
critics Sidney is first and foremost a Protestant
activist before he is a humanist poet, although for
Sinfield the tension between the two positions is never
fully resolved.
One reason why Sidney can be claimed as a Protestant
poet by these critics, I suggest, is that he chooses to
defend poetry in terms familiar to Gosson, a man who,
like Sidney, had received a classical education.91
Although Gosson condemns contemporary drama and poetry in
The Schoole of Abuse he simultaneously recognises that
literature can be a useful component of an educational
programme: the 'right use of auncient Poetrie was to have
notable exploytes of woorthy Captaines, the holesome
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councels of good fathers, and vertuous lives of
predecessors set downe in numbers'.92 (In a similar way
Fulke Greville rejects poetry in the early pages of A
Treatise of Human Learning as 'an idle mens profession',93
but later recognises that, when based on 'truth', poetry
'beautifies the same// Teacheth us order under pleasures
name;/ which in a glasse shows nature how to fashion/ her
selfe againe, by ballancing of passion'.94) The kind of
educational position taken by Sidney in some parts of the
Defence, for example where he discusses the educational
efficacy of poetry's 'lofty image[s]', is therefore not
antithetical to the position taken by Gosson. However,
if we also draw attention to Sidney's discussion, in the
'digression', of the process of naturalising fiction and
of creating manipulative rhetorical personae, then it can
be seen that Sidney actually goes much further than
Gosson allows, advocating the very type of poet Gosson
saw fit to vilify in The Schoole of Abuse. The argument
used by Sinfield and Weiner that Sidney can be defined as
a Protestant writer because he advocates in his Defence a
didactic role for poetry, is no longer useful to us
because it forms only part of Sidney's argument. But
Sidney is not really out of touch with his Protestant
allies, even though he appears in the Defence to be
defending what could be seen as a 'Catholic' art of
poetry. In its defence of the techniques of this type of
rhetoric the Defence is neither a petulant nor a
rebellious response to Gosson's iconoclastic attack on
poetry, but a serious attempt both to justify the use of
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courtierly rhetoric for Protestants, and to provide for
its Protestant readers an insight into the rules of this
art, thus helping them to resist the arts of their
enemies and, at the same time, to wield the same
rhetorical power over their enemies. Such a reading
allows us to re-imagine the nature of Sidney's
controversial relationship with Thomas Campion/ rather
than being almost converted to Catholicism, as Campion
optimistically thought, Sidney perhaps responded to this
famous teacher of rhetoric in much the same way that he
responded to his riding master Pugliano, letting himself
be almost persuaded in an attempt to acquire the
rhetorical skill of his master.
The question with which we are left, however, is what
Sidney's promotion of rhetoric means for Protestant
historiography. Although both Luther and Calvin insisted
that Protestantism found its verification in Scripture
alone there was an increasing interest among sixteenth-
century Protestant reformers in the use of history to
legitimate the Protestant Church.95 One of the most
famous of the Protestant historical works, John Foxe's
Acts and Monuments (1563), set out to establish the
antiquity of the Protestant church, discovering its roots
in the true Roman church of the apostles and, at the same
time, presenting the apostolic claim of the Roman
Catholic church as 'aequivoce, that is, in name only, and
not in effect or matter'.96 Guided by the Book of
Revelation Foxe divides church history into a number of
periods, each of which spans three hundred years: the
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first period (from the time of the apostles) denotes the
suffering of the church, the second, its flourishing, the
third, its decline and the fourth period, the coming of
the Antichrist. The end of the fourth period (marked for
Foxe by the appearance of John Wycliffe and Jan Huss),
heralds the Reformation of the church. As Foxe1s survey
of church history suggests, Protestantism is a
fundamentalist movement, a movement back to the practices
of an 'original' Christian church. (The emphasis on the
fundamentalist nature of Protestantism needs to be
stressed, for it helps to explain both the Protestant
suspicion of 'fiction', seen as a creation without divine
authorisation, and their preference for history, the
genre of 'recovery'.) Foxe's history, with its
'monuments' or narratives of Protestant martyrs, is
designed both to legitimate the Reformation by affirming
the rightness of the reformed religion, and to provide
examples of the heroic suffering of the faithful,
examples which are meant to inspire their readers to
complete the Reformation which the Marian exiles saw
prophesied in the Book of Revelation.97 Given its
propagandist aim the question of Foxe's historical
veracity is a vexed one; it is difficult to ascertain
whether Foxe consciously manipulated his material to fit
it to the established interpretation of the Book of
Revelation or whether his material seemed to him to fit
naturally the framework in which he was working. What
can be ascertained more immediately, however, is the
importance to Foxe that his work be perceived as
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truthful, for it is on this quality that his attempt to
legitimate the Reformation depends. In the opening pages
of Acts and Monuments Foxe explains that he was moved to
write such a work because of the inadequacy of existing
accounts of church history: many important moments have
been lost, he complains, 'either through obtrectation
[sic] or flattery of writers; who, not observing "legum
historiae", as Tully required, seemed either not bold
enough to tell the truth, or not afraid enough to bear
with untruth and time'.98 In his 1570 dedication to
Elizabeth Foxe offers his Catholic detractors a barbed
response to their accusation that his Acts contains a
'"thousand lies"': 'they themselves altogether delight in
untruths, and have replenished the whole church of Christ
with feigned fables, lying miracles, false visions, and
miserable errors'.99 Taking into consideration his
impressive use of sources, and his scepticism of the
sometimes fabulous tales of Geoffrey of Monmouth, then
Foxe's historiography is impressive according to modern
criteria.100 But, all the same, it is worth bearing in
mind the different view of John R. Knott, who finds that
though 'Foxe and his protagonists' condemn Catholic
theatricality, and contrast it with their own plain
speaking, they have their own 'kinds of playing, [...]
making their commitment to plainness a dramatic
statement' .101
Although Foxe's 'monuments' may well be an early
example of the attempt by an historiographer to preserve
the records of ancient times, the 'monuments' erected by
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Sidney's Protestant biographers in his honour are
certainly not examples of something similar: or at least,
they are not just this. For Mary Sidney, Edmund Spenser
and Fulke Greville, the desire to create emotive
Protestant propaganda clearly outstrips the desire to
produce a faithful portrait of a Protestant activist. In
their attempts to historicise Philip Sidney they
succeeded in turning a man who seems to have been a
volatile and unbridled figure into a national Protestant
hero,102 and in transforming an unpleasant death resulting
from a gangrenous wound after an insignificant battle
into a moment of martyrdom. Although Foxe is an obvious
precedent for these 'biographies', a more immediate
precedent is, I suggest, A Defence of Poetry. Alan Hager
argues that the creation of the 'mirage of Sidney' is not
a case of self-fashioning in the style of Sir Walter
Raleigh but a case of 'the image-making of a second
[partial] party', making Sidney a passive object of
reconstruction.103 However, not only had Sidney
anticipated in the Defence the myth-making potential of
poetic histories, as Hager notes, but he had also offered
approbation of and an insight into the rhetorical
technique of enargeia, the device used by Mary Sidney,
Spenser, and Greville to bring Sidney's cause to life
again.
The works of Sidney's 'biographers' share in common
two important intentions: one is to recall for their
contemporaries the need for more militant action on the
part of Protestants (in this sense Sidney becomes a
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'lofty image' which the readers are meant to emulate);
the other is to keep alive the memory of Sidney, thus, in
the words of Spenser, 'eternizing' the 'noble race' of
the Dudleys.104 They are interested in the 'writing' of
history in two respects: first, with reference to the
future in an attempt to influence events to come and,
secondly, with reference to the past in an attempt to
influence the perception of bygone actions. Importantly,
both Mary Sidney and Edmund Spenser choose poetry as the
medium for their celebration of Philip Sidney, and both
aim to produce a vivid, rather than a precise, account of
past events which is intended to inspire political
action. Mary Sidney's poem entitled 'To the Angell
Spirit of Sir Philip Sidney' appears in the preface to
the Psalms, which she and her brother jointly translated,
and alongside a dedicatory poem addressed to Elizabeth I,
in which Mary Sidney urges the Protestant 'Deborah' to
'Sing what God doth, and do What men may sing'.105 At
first sight this poem appears to be a personal lament for
the loss of a dearly held brother; however, once placed
in its prefatory context it quickly becomes, as Margaret
Hannay argues, 'a powerful political statement',
reminding Elizabeth that she has not yet fulfilled her
duty as a Protestant ruler.106 The poem is powerful, I
suggest, because of the rhetorical skill with which the
Countess relives an event which took place more than a
decade earlier, and thus reaffirms the importance of a
cause neglected but not forgotten. Not only does she
invoke the presence of Sidney, suggesting that he lives
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on in his translation of the Psalms (his 1 Immortal
monuments'), and in her own writing ('So dar'd my Muse
with thine it selfe combine, as mortall stuffe with that
which is divine'), but she also manages to recreate the
moment of his death ('Deepe woundes enlarg'd, long
festred in their gall/fresh bleeding smart') and re-
experience her mourning ('Ah memorie what needs this new
arrest?') .107 In this poem Mary Sidney sets out
discreetly to invoke in Elizabeth the feelings of remorse
and sorrow that will make her more susceptible to the
harsher message of the juxtaposed dedicatory poem, in
which she reminds Elizabeth, with rather less discretion,
of her responsibility for the failure of the Protestant
military effort in the Netherlands.
In Spenser's poem 'The Ruines of Time' there is a
similar desire to revitalise the memory of Sidney's
'heroic' death (and thus the cause for which he died),
which he achieves by adopting a role akin to that
visionary poet of the Book of Revelation ('Whilest thus I
looked, loe adowne the Lee,/I sawe an Harpe stroong all
with silver twynne') .108 At the same time, Spenser, like
Mary Sidney, emphasises the continuing existence of
Sidney (again to remind his reader of the continuing
Protestant struggle). With a gesture that looks back to
the Ovidian motif of metamorphosis but which
simultaneously looks forward to the Christian
resurrection of the faithful, Spenser writes a history of
the death of Sidney which becomes an account of his
transformation into a 'living' Protestant hero. The
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description of Sidney's apotheosis at the end of this
poem works on three levels: on the first, historical
level Spenser describes the return of Sidney's corpse to
England in a 'curious coffer made of Heben wood'; on the
second level he describes the resurrection of Sidney's
soul and its return to heaven; while on the third level,
in his characterisation of Sidney as a 'Bridegroome', he
offers Sidney as a Christ-like figure who presages the
coming of the true Church.109 Like Foxe's Acts and
Monuments, Spenser's poem exploits the imagery of
Revelation, interpreting Sidney as a Protestant martyr
with a place in a prophesied Reformation; however, unlike
Foxe, Spenser does not fit events into an historical
framework provided by the Book of Revelation but becomes,
like St. John himself, a visionary for whom the
distinction between past, present and future has no
meaning. The distinction for Spenser between the
historian and the poet necessarily collapses in a way in
which it did not so clearly do for Foxe nor, indeed, for
William Camden, the historian whom Spenser claims to
follow in the Ruines, and whom he praises for having
secured the 'moniments' of Roman Britain. At the end of
the poem Spenser's narrator offers his vision as a
' moniment',110 thus making clear his dual role both as a
recorder of past events, that is, as someone who
supplements existing accounts, and as a creator of
'images'; the Ruines both remembers and gives birth to a
Protestant hero.
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Of the three 'biographers' Greville is the only one
who chooses not to use the medium of poetry for his
account of Philip Sidney, yet this does not make him any
less a poet in Sidney's own terms. Indeed, the Life of
Sir Philip Sidney, in the final pages of which Greville
depicts the generosity of the wounded Sidney, has
contributed most to the myth of Philip Sidney as the
ideal Renaissance courtier and soldier.111 But Greville
is also a poet in a different sense. Greville's Life is
not just a 'biography' of a great Protestant hero; it is
also a political treatise which uses the image of the
heroic Sidney to lend authority to the international
Protestant policies which it advocates. While praising
Sidney for the contribution he made to the Protestant
cause, Greville simultaneously attacks both the Catholic
nations for their attempt to expand their influence in
the New World, and the Protestant nations for their
apparent lethargy. While the Protestant princes live
'fettered within the narrowness of their Estates, or
humours', he complains, Spain has 'all the Western lands
laid as a Tabula Rasa before him; to write where he
pleased' ,112 Spain, in short, has the opportunity to
'write' the international map as it chooses. Recognising
the futility of attacking the problem at its root, that
is, sending a force directly to Spain, Greville suggests
that the Protestant nations imitate Spain and 'plant'
their own colonies in the New World. As Greville's
argument for colonisation suggests, radical Protestants
were as much concerned with the creation of new worlds as
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they were with the rediscovery of old, and that they
were, moreover, willing in the process to imitate the
'art' of their enemies.
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CHAPTER THREE
Sidney's 'Fiery Speeches': The Art of Being
in Love
Sidney's Defence of Poetry is a useful introduction
to his literary writings, and especially to Astrophil and
Stella and the old Arcadia, with which it is roughly
contemporaneous. For the principal heroes of these
fictions, namely Astrophil and Pyrocles, are, I will
argue in this chapter, fictional versions of the ideal
reader described by Sidney in the 'digression' of the
Defence. Although both Astrophil and Pyrocles
participate in love plots, in each case the relationship
between lover and beloved explored in the narrative also
dramatises the theory of imitation outlined in A Defence
of Poetry, which is itself inspired by Cicero's De
Oratore as mediated through the influence of
Castiglione's The Book of the Courtier. Thus, Astrophil
and Pyrocles treat their respective beloveds as texts
which influence them, as well as women whom they, in
turn, seek to influence; what they learn from their
reading of their beloveds is the importance of a charming
and graceful self-presentation to the creation of
credible fictions. In order to achieve graceful self-
presentation the two lovers disguise the sexual nature of
their desire, by representing their sexual energy as a
kind of divine fury, and the studied, as opposed to
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spontaneous, nature of their self-expression, by making
their words and actions seem to be inspired by the beauty
of their beloved. Moreover, the style of these two
fictional texts is also reminiscent of the style of the
Defence and, in turn, the style of De Oratore or the
Courtier: we not only respond to the persuasive rhetoric
of Astrophil and Pyrocles but watch them in the act of
creating credible fictions in much the same way that we
watch Cicero's Antonius or Castiglione's Count Lewis
demonstrate the way in which seemingly inspired discourse
or actions can be fashioned. Sidney employs this
pedagogic style in the political arena as well as in
erotic narrative. In the final section of this chapter I
shall examine the letter Sidney wrote to Queen Elizabeth
in 1580, and explore the way in which Sidney's ironic
style becomes a tool for both creating and unmasking
political fictions in much the same way that the ironic
style of Octavian in Book IV of the Courtier enabled him
to augment and to undermine the power of the prince,
suggesting that his supposedly divinely-authorised
position is actually rhetorically constructed.
3a. Creating Credible Personae
(i) Astrophil
Since Sidney's sonnet sequence Astrophil and Stella
was written in 1582, the same year as the Defence, it is
not surprising to find that Sidney puts into practice
there the literary theory outlined in his theoretical
treatise.1 Indeed, Sidney's persona Astrophil can be
considered to be an example of the ideal reader depicted
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in the Defence, the reader who learns from the models he
imitates how to create credible fictions. But Sidney's
sequence is not just a literary example of the poetic
theory outlined in the Defence; indeed, like the Defence
it is itself a pedagogic work which teaches through
demonstration a poetics based on the concealment of its
rhetorical technique. In this respect Sidney can be said
to imitate in Astrophil and Stella the style of Cicero's
De Oratore and Orator, and to inherit from these
treatises an ironic style of presentation. Although one
of the more important sources for Sidney's sonnet
sequence is Petrarch's Canzoniere, in which antithesis,
inversion and oxymoron are conventional devices used to
convey the experience of being in love, the
contradictions evident in Astrophil and Stella, like
those in Cicero's treatises, also owe something to an
inherent tension between its pedagogic aims and method.
For Sidney's sequence, while seemingly intent on giving
voice to turbulent emotions, is concerned simultaneously
to show how an impression of such emotional turmoil can
be achieved by means of the concealment of rhetorical
techniques. Because of its pedagogic aim, and its
partial revelation of its method, however, we are left
unsure about the representational status of its images:
that is, whether Astrophil's speech reflects Sidney's
actual emotional state, or whether Sidney has instead
created with the aid of his art a persuasive fiction
which is meant to be taken as a reflection of his
emotional state.
210
The tension between truthfulness and truth-likeness,
and the concern with literary imitation, are themes which
are introduced at the very beginning of the sequence. In
the first sonnet Astrophil reveals that his interest lies
as much in the production of credible love poetry (the
'fiery speeches' of the Defence) as with the object of
love itself. Rather than beginning his sequence with
praise of his mistress, Astrophil tells us instead about
his attempts at poetic composition and his experience of
writer's block. In order to find 'fit words to paint the
blackest face of woe' - in other words, to communicate
his despair - Astrophil tells us that he tried initially
to imitate the 'inventions fine' of other poets, hoping
that 'thence would flow/Some fresh and fruitful showers
upon my sunburnt brain' .2 But the attempt proves
unsuccessful: 'Invention, nature's child', he claims,
'fled step-dame study's blows'. It is not until he is
finally encouraged by his muse to 'look in [his] heart,
and write' that he appears to find relief for his pent-up
emotions. The exhortation from Astrophil's muse
resembles the advice given to the reader of A Defence of
Poetry, the text in which Sidney berates contemporary
love poets for imitating their literary predecessors
instead of using their 'own' emotions to inspire their
writing. It also resembles the advice of Protestant
moralists such as Stephen Gosson; for as Jonas Barish
observes, in their attacks on the theatre Protestant
moralists are motivated by a belief in the importance of
expressing one's 'essence': 'one has only to descend into
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one's own being, consult one's deepest feelings, and
report them honestly to the world'.3
The appearance of a strong personal element in
Astrophil and Stella is greatly augmented by the ease
with which several sonnets seem to lend themselves to
topical interpretation, making Astrophil, for some
critics, a straightforward pseudonym for Sidney himself.4
For example, sonnets 24, 35, and 37, each of which plays
with the adjective and proper noun 'Rich', are clearly
meant to invoke the name of Lord Rich, the husband of
Penelope Devereux (assumed to be the Stella of the sonnet
sequence); while sonnet 33, in which Astrophil laments
his failure to love Stella when he had the possibility of
realising his desire ('I might (unhappy word), 0 me, I
might,/And then would not, or could not, see my bliss')
accords with the knowledge we have of his relationship
with Penelope: Penelope's father, Walter Devereux, the
first Earl of Essex, had suggested a match between Sidney
and his daughter on his death bed in 1576, a proposal in
which Sidney appears at that time to have shown little
interest.5 Other sonnets depict a world which would have
been familiar to Sidney: in sonnet 30, for example,
Sidney refers to the affairs of state in the Netherlands,
in Ulster, and at the Scottish court, in all of which
Sidney and his family had a political interest.6
In what sense, however, is Astrophil a mask for
Sidney? It is difficult to gauge the extent to which
Astrophil actually represents Sidney's feelings and
thoughts because Astrophil is as much an ironic mask as a
212
pseudonym for Sidney. The first sonnet of the sequence,
which begins 'Loving in truth, and fain in verse my love
to show', seems to suggest two ideas: on the one hand,
that Sidney is genuinely in love and wishes to express
this experience through a persona 'Astrophil'; on the
other hand, as an interpretation of the word 'fain' as a
pun on 'feign' suggests, that Sidney may be genuinely in
love and may wish to express this experience, but
recognises that there is a great difference between
actual experience and its poetic representation - in
which case Astrophil is not so much a pseudonym as a
character through which Sidney explores the issue of
literary expression. Indeed, as Astrophil continues,
describing how he 'sought fit words to paint the blackest
face of woe', it becomes even clearer that Sidney is
concerned in this sequence not just with writing about
love, but with the 'why and how' of writing credible love
poetry. Sidney's sensitive recognition of the fact that
there is no necessary connection between experiencing
real emotion and being able to present oneself
persuasively as someone who is experiencing real emotion
is nowhere better expressed than in sonnet 45. Here,
Astrophil notes that although Stella often sees 'the very
face of woe/Painted in my beclouded stormy face' she
remains unmoved, whereas when she hears a fable about
lovers her 'tears' springs did flow'. Since fictional
suffering is more successful in moving Stella than real
suffering, Astrophil urges Stella to consider 'that you
in me do read/Of lover's ruin some sad tragedy:/! am not
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I, pity the tale of me'. Because of such instances of
ambiguity we need to be careful not to equate Astrophil
with Sidney. As Maurice Evans has warned Sidney's
readers, the '"personal" mode of poetry represents to
Elizabethans a dramatic exercise in first-person writing
rather than the exposure of the poet's bleeding heart';
'unlike romantic poetry', he adds, 'the object of the
sonnet is ritual and ceremonial rather than
autobiographical', and this, for him, is nowhere more
true than in Sidney's sequence.7 This is a view shared
by Richard B. Young: commenting on Astrophil's apparent
allusion to Sidney's heraldic arms ('a blue arrow on a
gold background') in the final line of sonnet 65, 'Thou
bear'st the arrow, I the arrow head', Young remarks that
the identification of Astrophil with Sidney here 'is a
means by which Sidney, the real historical figure, in a
sense lends his reality to Astrophil, the dramatic
character, as a kind of concrete "existential" value'.8
Astrophil is not to be confused with Sidney; rather,
Sidney lends his character Astrophil details from his own
life in an attempt to enliven him. The autobiographical
details in the sequence thus function in a similar way to
the lawyer's technique of 'naming' imaginary figures,
which (Sidney explains in the Defence) helps 'to make
[the] picture the more lively' (53).
Sidney's sonnet sequence is concerned primarily, it
seems, with the issue of imitation, that is, with the
question of how to portray emotions convincingly. In the
first sonnet Astrophil rejects the imitative techniques
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of his peers, preferring truthful self-expression.
Astrophil's rejection of Petrarchanism is made explicit
in sonnet 15: he attacks those who 'poor Petrarch's long-
deceased woes/With new-born sighs and denizened wit do
sing'; 'You take wrong ways', he tells them, 'those far-
fet helps be such/As do bewray a want of inward touch'.
His anti-Petrarchanism is evident also in sonnet 6, where
Astrophil distinguishes himself from those lovers who
'speak'
Of hopes begot by fear, of wot not what desires,
Of force of heavenly beams, infusing hellish pain,
Of living deaths, dear wounds, fair storms and
freezing fires.
In contrast to these artificial poets, who clumsily
reproduce the conceits of Petrarch, Astrophil is able to
'speak what I feel'. Thus, while the 'tears' of one poet
help him to 'pour out his ink' Astrophil claims instead
that 'all the map of my state I display,/When trembling
voice brings forth, that I do Stella love'. Astrophil
affects a similar poetic independence and simplicity in
sonnet 2. Having been told by his muse in the previous
sonnet to 'look in thy heart, and write' Astrophil begins
the second sonnet with a poetically unconventional but
seemingly more truthful account of the burgeoning of his
love for Stella: 'Not at first sight, nor with a dribbed
shot,/ Love gave the wound [,..]/I saw, and I liked; I
liked, but loved not'. (This contrasts nicely with the
account of love at first sight given by Petrarch in the
third sonnet of the Canzoniere: 'your eyes, lady, caught
and held me fast'.9) In sonnet 54 Astrophil defends his
unconventionality, scorning the court ladies interested
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only in what he considers to be superficial tokens of
love. 'Because I breathe not love to every one,/Nor do
not use set colours for to wear', Astrophil complains,
the ladies of the court believe '"He cannot love"'. 'Dumb
swans', he rebukes them, 'not chattering pies, do lovers
prove;/They love indeed, who quake to say they love'.
And in sonnet 74 he proudly declares his independence
from classical sources: 'I never drank of Aganippe
well,/Nor ever did in shade of Tempe sit'.
Astrophil's anti-Petrarchanism, however, is itself
conventional. As Richard B. Young has observed, it had
become a convention 'by the time of the P16iade, to deny
any Petrarch affiliations', while simultaneously
following Petrarch closely.10 Sidney's debt to Petrarch
is clear; like Petrarch he offers a blazon of his
mistress's beautiful features (sonnet 9), he intersperses
sonnets with songs, and he usually uses the Italian rhyme
scheme, modifying it only with the adoption of the final
couplet introduced into the English sonnet by Thomas
Wyatt. Moreover, despite Astrophil's claim in sonnet 6
to disavow Petrarchan antithesis, his own sequence ends,
with sonnet 108, with just such a device: 'in my woes for
thee thou art my joy/And in my joys for thee my only
annoy'. Even Astrophil's claim to speak from the heart
is Petrarchan. In sonnet 252 Petrarch claims that if he
could have anticipated the popularity of his sonnets he
would have 'made them from the earliest time/In count
more copious, in style more rare', rather than singing
'in hope but of relieving/My heavy burden, trusting
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thereby merely/To ease my heart'.11 Moreover, Astrophil
has also inherited from Petrarch an interest in creating
the appearance of personal expression. For Petrarch is
as concerned to create the impression of natural
eloquence as he is to express himself naturally. As we
observed in chapter one, in his letters Petrarch echoes
approvingly the imitative advice given by Antonius in
Cicero's De Oratore, and thus throws light on the self-
consciousness of his aiming at the appearance of
naturalness in his own literary expression: 'I won't say
that he will avoid all imitation', he writes to Boccaccio
about the imitative practice of his scribe, 'but he will
conceal it, so that his work won't resemble any
particular author but will appear to bring Italy
something new out of the work of the ancients'.12 Sidney,
then, can be seen to be continuing a tradition which is
promoted by Cicero, and practised by Petrarch himself:
Astrophil's claim in sonnet 74 that 'I never drank of
Aganippe well', rather like Antonius's claim about the
naturalness of his eloquence disguises the rhetorical
construction of his expression.
Petrarch is one of the writers considered to herald
the beginning of the Renaissance, and one of the
characteristics that his sonnets possess which makes him
'worthy' of this categorisation is their apparent
expression of individuality.13 How does Petrarch achieve
this effect? The autobiographical element in Petrarch's
Canzoniere has contributed to the sense of their
representing a real drama, a sense which is no doubt
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reinforced by the ease and elegance with which Petrarch
'conceals' the literary influences on his expression.14
But there are other devices used by Petrarch which serve
to define the personal tone of his sequence, such as the
very different, and more aggressive, expression of desire
which can be found in some of the poems, allowing us to
catch a glimpse of the complexity of the Petrarchan
voice. In sonnet 12 of the Canzoniere Petrarch imagines
a time when Laura has grown old, her golden hair turned
gray and the light in her eyes dimmed/ at such a time, he
claims, he would have the courage to reveal to her the
extent of his suffering, and receive from her 'belated
sighes'.15 Stephen Minta comments on the emotional
complexity of this sonnet: 'on one level', he observes,
'the poet is playing an entirely passive role' which is
intended to elicit the reader's sympathy; 'on another
level', however, 'the poem can be read as a sonnet of
biting reproach', implying that Laura will one day regret
having rejected him.16 In the first sestina of the
sequence Petrarch reveals once again a more assertive and
complex 'self' than his adopted petitioning role usually
allows: he imagines an occasion when he is alone with
Laura 'And she not free to change, or with green wood/To
blend and 'scape my arms, as on the day/When Phoebus
chased her here below on earth'.17 Unlike Phoebus, who
was frustrated in his attempt to rape Daphne when she
turned into a laurel (lauro), Petrarch imagines the full
sexual conquest of his Laura. A similar shift from a
position of passive adoration to one of more threatening
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self-assertion can be found in Astrophil and Stella. In
the second song Astrophil's love affair reaches a crisis,
when Astrophil steals a kiss from the sleeping Stella.
(Astrophil is encouraged to take such a liberty when, by
a sudden change in his fortunes, Stella begins to look
more favourably on his suit.) Astrophil's response to
the anger of the disturbed Stella, however, is ironic
self-chastisement, not self-abasement or repentance -
'Fool, more fool, for no more taking'. In the tenth song
Astrophil imagines a sexual encounter similar to that
described by Petrarch in his first sestina:
Think of my most princely power,
When I, blessed, shall devour
With my greedy lickerous senses,
Beauty, music, sweetness, love,
While she doth against me prove
Her strong darts but weak defences.
Like the normally subservient lover of the Canzoniere,
Astrophil imagines an inversion of the power relations,
fantasizing rape. The political imagery of the tenth
song can be found in other poems in the sequence. In the
fifth song Stella is portrayed both as a tyrannical
prince who needs to be deposed ('I lay then to thy
charge, unjustest tyranny') and a subject who has
rebelled against 'nature's law' ('Thou, sweetest subject,
wert born in the realm of love,/And yet against thy
prince thy force dost daily prove'). In sonnet 69, the
sonnet which marks the first turning point in Astrophil's
fortunes, he declares that Stella has 'Of her high heart
giv'n me the monarchy', and he thus revokes her supposed
sovereignty as depicted in sonnet 40.
In sonnet 30, as we have seen, Sidney refers to
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political events in the Netherlands, Ireland and Scotland
which would have been familiar to his readers, and which
thereby invite us to identify Astrophil with Sidney. It
is not surprising, considering the familiarity of the
political context referred to in this sonnet, that
critics have felt justified in searching for clues in the
sequence as a whole to Sidney's own political interests,
and that an alternative tradition of biographical
reading, one which takes Elizabeth I, rather than
Penelope Devereux, as Stella's alter ego, has been
created. Arthur Marotti observes that when Sidney wrote
Astrophil and Stella his position at court had been much
weakened: 'after a prodigious start in national and
international politics and diplomacy he had been marked
as an ambitious and irresponsible radical Protestant.'18
The bold letter which Sidney wrote to Elizabeth in 1580
denouncing her entertaining of Alengon's courtship had
led, Marotti concludes, to Sidney's political exile and
his years of retreat at Wilton. One other reason for
Sidney's change of fortune is suggested by his biographer
James Osborn, who recounts how, in 1577, William of
Orange offered him the hand in marriage of his daughter
Marie of Nassau. 'If Philip Sidney became Lord Governor
of Holland and Zeeland', Osborn speculates, 'he would
emerge from the Dutch wars as a leader on whom the
Lowlanders would ultimately bestow sovereignty. He would
then become the Dudley candidate for Elizabeth's own
throne'. It was Elizabeth's suspicion of a Dudley
conspiracy which led, he suggests, to the sudden
alteration in her attitude to, and treatment of, Sidney,
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and to the end of his political good fortune.19 Other
critics have seen in Astrophil and Stella a different
version of Sidney's response to his loss of favour. In a
reply to Marotti's article, Maureen Quilligan comments on
the prevalent tone of masculine sexual domination in the
sequence. Although she accepts that the frustration
expressed at the end of the sequence (made all the more
notable by contrast with the spiritual solution offered
by Petrarch at the end of the Canzoniere) 'may repeat
Sidney's public defeat in politics' she argues that 'by
the same token, it is the author's control over Stella as
a (silent) character in his plot which enacts his
masculine, social mastery and redistribution of power'.20
Quilligan sees Astrophil's rhetorical manipulation of
Stella in much the same way that Joan Kelly interprets
the championing of Neoplatonic love by Castiglione's
character Bembo in Book IV of the Courtier, as an attempt
to control 'discursively' political events which are
actually beyond his control.21
However, this kind of topical allegorising, though
thought-provoking, is more problematic than the older,
more traditional biographical reading which took Stella
to be the pseudonym for Penelope Devereux, for it is not
clearly authorised by the text itself. But the plot of
Astrophil and Stella can also be seen to dramatise a very
different kind of relationship from the one suggested by
either of the two autobiographical readings, a
•rhetorical' relationship rather like the one we
discovered in A Defence of Poetry between the imitated
text and its imitating reader, or that between Pugliano
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and Sidney. For, in the love plot of Astrophil and
Stella Astrophil exemplifies the imitative theory of the
Defence: how the reader who is moved by the text he reads
can use that emotional state rhetorically in such a way
as to create his own credible, and moving, self-
expression. What we see in Astrophil is a character who
learns from his experience of being influenced by his
beloved how to become influential himself. This
particular reading of Astrophil and Stella is encouraged
in the sequence itself: not only does Astrophil declare
his interest in the creation of credible love poetry at
the beginning of the sequence, immediately suggesting the
close ties between Sidney's literary practice and his
literary theory as exemplified by the Defence, but the
sequence itself contains many images of Stella as a text,
and as the source for Astrophil's eloquence. In sonnet 3
Astrophil rejects the imitative techniques of his peers,
claiming that he is inspired by the beauty of his
beloved: 'in Stella's face I read/What love and beauty
be; then all my deed/But copying is, what in her nature
writes'. In sonnet 15 Astrophil complains that those who
try to resurrect 'Petrarch's long-deceased woes' 'bewray
a want of inward touch', and he advises his fellows to
look at Stella instead 'and then begin to endite'. In
sonnet 67 Stella is the 'fair text' in the 'blushing
notes' of whose 'margin' Astrophil detects the basis of
his hopes. In sonnet 56 Astrophil yearns to 'read those
letters fair of bliss,/Which in her face teach virtue'.
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Finally, in the eighth song Astrophil celebrates 'Stella,
in whose body is/Writ each character of bliss'.
There are two ways of interpreting Stella's literary
influence in the sequence: either she inspires Astrophil
in much the same way that the beauty of Phaedrus
supposedly inspires the eloquence of Plato's Socrates, or
she teaches him by her own example rhetorical techniques
for the creation of seemingly inspired expression. As
the description of Stella's beauty in sonnet 3 suggests,
the former would seem to be the case; Astrophil's task is
to imitate 'what in [Stella] nature writes'. Similarly,
in sonnet 90, Astrophil attributes his success to the
inspiration of Stella herself: 'nothing from my wit or
will does flow,/Since all my words thy beauty does
endite,/And love doth hold my hand, and makes me write'.
Astrophil's Platonism is further reinforced in sonnet 25,
in which Astrophil gives an account of the Platonic
doctrine of beauty. Astrophil explains that Plato
believes 'That virtue, if once met with our eyes,/Strange
flames of love it in our souls would raise', and that the
man held captive by his senses never 'will, nor can,
behold those skies/Which inward sun to heroic mind
displays'. In view of his experience of being in love
with Stella, Astrophil concludes that 'Virtue's great
beauty in that face I prove,/And find the effect, for I
do burn in love'. In sonnets such as this one, Stella is
the sun or 'star' which inspires his expression in much
the same way that the 'sun' in Plato's allegory of the
cave authors the images of the visible world, or the
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analogous visible beauty of Phaedrus inspires Socrates's
eloquence. In sonnet 1 Astrophil searches vainly in the
compositions of his friends hoping that 'thence would
flow/Some fresh and fruitful showers upon my sunburnt
brain'/ and it is not until the end of the sonnet that he
recognises that the source of his 'sunburn' is also the
source of his poetic relief. But Stella also seems to
influence Astrophil in the second, rhetorical sense. In
Cicero's De Oratore the 'sun', and its tanning
properties, are used to indicate the kind of effects at
which he thinks the orator should aim. His character
Antonius suggests that 'colours' or figures of rhetoric
should be acquired, or should seem to have been acquired,
in much the same way that the sun unobtrusively tans skin
(II xiv 60). In the Renaissance Cicero's simile survives
as an example of the kind of imitative techniques which
produce apparently natural expression: in Arte of
Rhetorique Thomas Wilson compares writers who
unconsciously assimilate, rather than acquire by active
study, techniques for speaking eloquently to those who
'walke muche in the sonne, and thinke not of it, [but]
are yet for the most part sonne burnt'.22 When Astrophil
claims to be 'sunburnt' by Stella, he indicates that he
is inspired not only by Stella's divinely authored
beauty, but by the effects of her physical charms, and
these effects, I suggest, are akin to the ornaments of
the rhetorical art itself. Indeed, we need to remember
that Astrophil burns not with the intellectual ambition
of Socrates but with the desire of unfulfilled sexual
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passion, that is, with the desire for the 'image' of
Stella (consider, for example, sonnet 5: although
Astrophil recognises that his 'eyes are formed to
serve/The inward light', and that 'what we call Cupid's
dart,/An image is, which for ourselves we carve', he
suddenly abandons his assumed iconoclasm: 'True; and yet
true, that I must Stella love'). The desire he describes
in the tenth song to 'devour' Stella with his 'greedy
lickerous senses', thus, is both a sexual fantasy and a
poetic one: Astrophil aspires to attain not only sexual
fulfilment but the ecstatic poetic expression which will
give him power over his reader - the type of expression,
that is, which is derived, as we learnt in A Defence of
Poetry, from swallowing one's models 'whole' (70).
Astrophil is inspired by Stella, thus, in much the
same way that Antonius is affected by the philosophical
treatises he reads for his pleasure at Misenum, prompted
'unconsciously' by them to recognise not philosophical
'truths', which, in turn, inform his eloquence, but
rather a method of dissimulation which helps to create an
effect of genuine, or seemingly truthful, expression.
This is nowhere clearer than in sonnet 58. In this
sonnet Astrophil wonders whether an orator gains
'sovereignty' over 'men's hearts' by carefully choosing
his words 'Clothed with fine tropes, with strongest
reasons lined' or by 'pronouncing grace, wherewith his
mind/Prints his own lively form in rudest brain'. What
Astrophil sets out to test in this sonnet, and actually
confirms, is the validity of the claim made by Antonius
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in De Oratore that the favour of an audience will be won
more easily if they are 'so affected as to be swayed by
something resembling a mental impulse or emotion, rather
than by judgement or deliberation' (II xlii 178).23
Astrophil's answer is offered in the form of an example.
He explains that he wrote 'in piercing phrases late/The
anatomy of all [his] woes' which he then gave to Stella
to read. When she reads his 'sad words' back to him
Astrophil is surprised to find that her 'sweet breath'
breeds in him the 'most ravishing delight'; his 'speech's
might' is overthrown by Stella's charming delivery.
Thus, Astrophil learns from Stella that it is by
'pronouncing grace', or rather, by delivering his words
gracefully, that the orator is most persuasive, and in
the sequence as a whole we see Astrophil's attempt to
imitate this effect. Though it is Stella's gracefulness
which 'persuades' Astrophil, that is, which makes him
'serve' her and think himself content in spite of the
woefulness of his actual condition, Astrophil is not held
entirely in subjection either by his mistress or by his
emotions. Indeed, just as the reader envisioned in the
Defence is first emotionally affected by the text he
reads, and then uses that experience prudently to create
his own persuasive fictions, so Astrophil is first
affected by Stella's beauty, and then uses his experience
of being in love pragmatically to help him create
convincing love poetry. (In the next section of this
chapter we will see how Sidney's character Pyrocles uses
his emotions in a similarly prudent fashion.) The
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obvious question which this raises is whether Sidney
himself created Astrophil and Stella in a similar way:
that is, whether he uses his own emotions - for example,
his supposed love for Penelope Devereux - to inform his
rhetorical expression. While such a practice may be
suggested in sonnet 1 ('Loving in truth, and fain in
verse my love to show'), it needs to be remembered that
Astrophil is not merely Sidney's pseudonym but, as I have
argued, a vividly imagined character through whom Sidney
sets out to explore techniques for the creation of
credible love poetry. Indeed, as Sidney suggests in the
Defence, a poet does not need to be in love in order to
write credibly, but he does need to be able to persuade
himself that he is in love. Sidney suggests in A
Defence of Poetry that this might be brought about by the
act of reading love poetry itself - that is, by reading a
love poem for its emotional content as well as, or
instead of, for the organisation of its rhetorical
strategies - as effectively as by actually experiencing
the emotion of being in love itself. The feeling of
being in love which informs Astrophil and Stella may
reflect Sidney's actual experience of being in love with
Penelope Devereux, or someone like her, but it may just
as well be the product of Sidney's reading of Petrarch,
and his imitators. In this case, the Stella with whom he
claims to be in love in order to take on the character of
Astrophil may owe as much to the Petrarchan love
tradition as to any woman Sidney actually knew in 'real'
life. If so, then the repeated representation of Stella
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as a text might take on another significance: Stella is
quite literally a textual entity - the being with which
one persuades oneself that one is in love when one
devours Petrarchan love poetry whole. What we see in
Astrophil and Stella, I suggest, is a reconception of the
techniques for creating love poetry dramatised in the
form of a sequence of love poems which simultaneously
redefines a poetic love convention: Sidney's fictional
lovers are not helpless figures who struggle to give
expression to their suffering but rhetoricians adept at
assimilating and then, on this basis, creating, emotive
expression.
(ii) Pyrocles
In emphasising the importance of a charming, or
moving, delivery, and its attainment through the
concealment of art, Astrophil can be seen to adopt what
is often seen to be a rather feminine art, a notion
reinforced by my suggestion that he learns these
techniques from Stella herself. Such an art runs counter
to the masculine rhetoric of the Renaissance, identified
most recently by Lorna Hutson as a skill in the invention
of probable arguments.24 In this section, in which I
consider Pyrocles's use of the Ciceronian art, I will
consider the gendering of poetic discourse in the
sixteenth century, and Sidney's attempt to defend his own
poetics from the accusation of effeminacy. Rather like
the courtier, who proves in Book IV of Castiglione's
treatise that his seemingly effeminate skills endow him
with considerable political influence, or the reader of A
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Defence of Poetry/ who learns from being affected by the
text he reads how to create persuasive poetic expression,
so the male protagonists of Sidney's fiction prove
themselves to be most influential when seemingly most
weak.
Our introduction to the protagonists of the old
Arcadia begins in Book I with a description of their
pedigree and a brief account of their education.
Pyrocles, the son of Euarchus prince of Macedon, is sent
to Thessalia so that he can be educated with his older
cousin Musidorus while his own country is under attack by
hostile neighbours (0A9).25 The two young princes grow up
in 'sweet emulation' of one another, 'accompanying the
increase of their years with the increase of all good
inward and outward qualities'; since they understand that
'the divine part of man was not enclosed in this body for
nothing' they give themselves 'to those knowledges which
might in the course of their life be ministers to well
doing' (OAIO). When they are shipwrecked on a sea voyage
to Macedon many years later, they are given the
opportunity to 'exercise their virtues and increase their
experience' by engaging in the internal affairs of a
number of states; in doing so they show their commitment
to the humanist ideal of the active life, the importance
of which to their early education is once again made
clear in the position taken by Musidorus in the debate on
love in Book I (OA12-26). However, these adventures do
not lie within the scope of the story; 'how many ladies
they defended from wrongs, and disinherited persons
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restored to their rights', the narrator explains, 'is a
work for a higher style than mine' (OAIO). Having
achieved success in their military and political
adventures and proved themselves worthy of the title
'prince', Pyrocles and Musidorus encounter in Arcadia a
very different kind of education.
Arcadia, like most of the countries through which
Musidorus and Pyrocles journey, has its own internal
political problems; in this case the country is not ruled
by a cruel tyrant or held to ransom by giants but left
ungoverned by its king Dasilius. Having received an
oracle from Delphi which appeared to prophesy his
downfall, Basilius has relinquished his kingly
responsibilities and moved himself and his family into a
pastoral retreat. Musidorus and Pyrocles hear an account
of the situation from their host Kerxenus, in whose house
they first see a portrait of the Arcadian royal family.
It is at this point that the princes' withdrawal from
public life could be said to begin, at the moment when
Pyrocles's eyes fall on a picture of Basilius's daughter
Philoclea, whose beauty has been drawn with as great a
skill as is possible (0A11). The combination of the
picture and Kerxenus's story of her 'strange kind of
captivity' awakens Pyrocles's compassion - a dangerous
feeling for him to entertain since, as the narrator
observes, 'when with pity once his heart was made tender,
according to the aptness of the humour, it received
straight a cruel impression of that wonderful passion
[...] called love' (0A11). It is not immediately clear
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whether Pyrocles has succumbed to the charms of
Philoclea's represented beauty and the tragedy of the
events of her life or whether he has been moved by the
skill of the painter and the story-teller; what is
manifest, however, is that his emotional response to the
picture and story have left him vulnerable to the
powerful effects of love. Pyrocles becomes a 'lover' who
takes up his newly acquired position of servitude in
Petrarchan fashion, like the 'spaniel' who 'gnaw[s] upon
the chain that ties him, but [ . . . ] should sooner mar his
teeth than procure liberty' (OAll). The old Arcadia thus
begins with what appears to be Pyrocles's unexpected loss
of self-mastery.
Pyrocles's falling in love works an immediate and
visible change in him; he decides to renounce his
identity and disguise himself as the Amazonian
'Cleophila'. The reasons for his choice of disguise are
unclear: Pyrocles claims on the one hand that the
disguise and the name change constitute a ploy designed
to fulfil his desire for Philoclea and, on the other
hand, that it is the outward expression of his love for
Philoclea - 'as for my name, it shall be Cleophila,
turning Philoclea to myself, as my mind is wholly turned
and transformed into her' (OA17). There is not much
evidence here to suggest that Pyrocles sees himself as
the disempowered servant of his beloved. However, the
contradictions implicit in Pyrocles's self-portrayal may
lead the reader to assume that his clarity of mind has
been affected by his impassioned state. Indeed, Pyrocles
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not only defends his disguise in a confused way, but he
employs similarly contradictory arguments in the defence
of love itself, presenting himself as a lover inspired
both by spiritual ambition and by sexual desire. In
response to Musidorus's claim that heavenly love should
not be accompanied by any unquiet emotions, Pyrocles
retorts that 'even that heavenly love [...] is
accompanied in some hearts with hopes, griefs, longings,
and despairs' (OA20). Pyrocles makes a distinction
between Musidorus's rather ascetic conception of heavenly
love (which excludes the love of human beauty) and the
Neoplatonic notion of love, which allows the lover to
start his spiritual ascent with the recognition of the
form of beauty in earthly bodies. Although Pyrocles
recognises his lack of experience in the field of love,
that is, his inability 'at the first leap to frame both
[parts of heavenly love] in myself', he assures Musidorus
that he is a 'diligent workman' who is preparing himself
for heavenly love through his experience of a more
earthly love: 'when I have a while practised in this
sort, then shall you see me turn it to greater matters'
(OA20). Like the Neoplatonic lover Pyrocles will use the
physical 'form' of his beloved as a catalyst for the kind
of spiritual ascent that is the defining feature of
'heavenly' love. At least this is what he implies. For
Pyrocles then goes on to reveal that his real aim is not
so much to transcend the earthly realm as to assert his
manhood: 'neither doubt you', he warns Musidorus, that
'because I wear a woman's apparel, I will be the more
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womanish; since, I assure you, for all my apparel, there
is nothing I desire more than fully to prove myself a man
in this enterprise' (0A21). Pyrocles's admission that he
desires to 'prove [himself] a man' does not fit easily
into the contemplative mission he has assigned himself;
moreover, the sexual innuendo implicit in his words is at
odds with his earlier depiction of himself as a
Neoplatonic lover. Pyrocles's disingenuousness, or his
ignorance, is revealed; one of the 'greater matters' to
which he has referred turns out to be no other than the
satisfaction of his sexual desire for Philoclea. The
question that remains is whether Pyrocles is unconscious
of these contradictions in his self-presentation or
whether he is their ironic author; it is only by
resolving this question that we can determine whether, as
a lover, Pyrocles really has lost his intellectual vigour
and independence.
The reader's perception of Pyrocles depends as much on
Pyrocles's depiction by the narrator as on his own self-
presentation. indeed, the narrator can be said to play a
crucial role in directing the reader's sympathy and
judgement. It is through the narrator, for example, that
we receive our first picture of the love-stricken
Pyrocles as the restless 'spaniel' that 'gnaws'
unwillingly at the fetters of love, and it is also
through the narrator that we perceive how Pyrocles then
appears to Musidorus:
his eyes sometimes even great with tears, the oft
changing of his colour, with a kind of shaking
unstaidness over all his body, [so that Musidorus]
might see in his countenance some great
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determination mixed with fear, and might perceive in
him store of thoughts rather stirred than digested,
his words interrupted continually with sighs which
served as a burden to each sentence, and the tenor
of his speech (though of his wonted phrase) not knit
together to one constant end but rather dissolved in
itself, as the vehemency of the inward passion
prevailed (OA14-15).
The accumulation of adjectives and nouns which connote
instability ('oft changing', 'shaking unstaidness',
'stirred' thoughts') gives an impression of Pyrocles's
loss of emotional control while the juxtaposed picture of
Pyrocles struggling to defend himself shows how far his
emotional state has affected his ability to argue
cogently. Such a depiction precedes the debate on love
itself and so forms in advance the reader's expectations
of Pyrocles's intellectual waywardness.
Through the narrator, then, we receive an early
portrait of Pyrocles as a rather helpless and distracted
lover. It is important to point out, however, that the
narrator does not judge Pyrocles harshly or offer him to
the reader as an example of the negative effects of love.
If anything the narrator sets out to stir the reader's
compassion and, hence, our tolerance of Pyrocles's
unconventional practices. One of the narrator's motives
for encouraging such a response is that he himself has
been 'moved' by the plight of Pyrocles; the narrator
indulges Pyrocles in his choice of disguise and name
because, as he explains, 'I myself feel such compassion
of his passion that I find even part of his fear lest his
name should be uttered before fit time were for it'
(0A25). The narrator's response to Pyrocles is similar
to the sympathetic reaction of Musidorus, who is finally
234
moved by the sight of Pyrocles's tears to help him change
into his disguise (despite the fact that he is grieved to
•see so worthy a mind thus infected' (OA25)). This kind
of narratorial indulgence is nowhere more evident than in
the scene in which Pyrocles (disguised as 'Cleophila')
meets Philoclea for the first time. It is when
'Cleophila' eventually sees Philoclea in the flesh, the
narrator tells us, that the 'clouds' of 'her' thoughts
disappear and 'her brain [is] fixed withal that her sight
seemed more forcible and clear than ever before or since
she found it' (OA34). Pyrocles appears like a
well wrought image with show of life, but without
all exercise of life, so forcibly had love
transferred all her spirits into the present
contemplation of the lovely Philoclea (OA34).
Though the narrator's adoption of the language of
spiritual enlightenment reinforces Pyrocles's self-
presentation as a Neoplatonic lover, the picture of
Philoclea which he has already given quietly contradicts
this perception. For Philoclea appears before Pyrocles,
the narrator tells us, in her 'nymphlike apparel, so near
nakedness as one might well discern part of her
perfections' and dressed 'in a light taffeta garment, so
cut as the wrought smock came through it in many places
(enough to have made a very restrained imagination have
thought what was under it)' (OA34). The apparent clarity
of Cleophila's mind is juxtaposed with the frank
sensuality of the narrator; Cleophila may feel that 'she'
is spiritually enlightened but the narrator broadly hints
that there may be other explanations for 'her'
fascination. The narrator's teasing reminder to his
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'fair' female readers of Pyrocles's gender ('you remember
that I use the she-title to Pyrocles, since so he would
have it') implies that Pyrocles too is 'man enough' to
appreciate the erotic appeal of Philoclea's appearance.
And yet Pyrocles is not here exposed as a 'peeping Tom';
Pyrocles's supposedly spiritual perception of Philoclea
is allowed to stand alongside the narrator's more
explicitly voyeuristic gaze.
On the evidence of Pyrocles's apparently naive and
contradictory explanation of the nature of his love and
his reasons for adopting a disguise we might be forgiven
for thinking that his intellectual and rhetorical
faculties have indeed been weakened as a result of his
falling in love and, following the example of the
narrator, for treating such weaknesses with indulgence.
However, this is not the only possible response we are
presented with. In contrast to the narrator, Musidorus
initially interprets Pyrocles's 'transformation' as a
matter of concern, openly ascribing to him the weakness
which the narrator only implies. Musidorus has already
noted a change in Pyrocles since their sojourn in
Arcadia, 'a relenting [...] and slacking of the main
career [he] had so notably begun and almost performed'
(0A12), and Pyrocles's disclosure of his love for
Philoclea and his plan to dress as an Amazon only serve,
as he sees it, to confirm the worst of his fears. Unlike
the narrator Musidorus initially has no wish to indulge
Pyrocles in such a dangerous passion. For Musidorus
there is nothing worse than the prospect of his heroic
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friend falling in love with a woman, and he makes this
clear to Pyrocles in no uncertain terms: 'it utterly
subverts the course of nature', he warns Pyrocles, 'in
making reason give place to sense, and man to woman'
(0A18). Pyrocles's indulgence of his love suggests to
Musidorus that his friend has turned away from the ideals
of masculine virtue, that he has succumbed to the
seductive influence of the appetitive part of the soul
and forsaken the active life which they were pursuing.
At first Musidorus refuses to recognise the love-stricken
Pyrocles, then he exhorts him not to lose himself to his
new identity. 'Remember', he cautions Pyrocles, 'that,
if we will be men, the reasonable part of our soul is to
have absolute commandment' (0A17). Musidorus's reference
to Hercules, the classical strong man who was transformed
by his love for Iole literally into a 'distaff spinner',
succinctly conveys the danger in which he feels Pyrocles
has placed himself:
this effeminate love of a woman doth so womanize a
man that, if you yield to it, it will not only make
you a famous Amazon, but a launder, a distaff-
spinner, or whatsoever other vile occupation their
idle heads can imagine and their weak hands perform
(OA18-9).
Like Hercules, Pyrocles has forsaken his 'manhood' not
only by falling in love with a woman but by dressing up
as a woman. For Musidorus, Pyrocles's disguise is both a
sign of his moral vulnerability and a danger to his
masculine (rational) identity: for, to play the part of a
woman convincingly, Pyrocles must first 'soften' his
heart (0A18). Musidorus is afraid that in his present
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state Pyrocles could become as genuinely 'weak' as the
object he imitates.
To Sidney's contemporary readers Musidorus's position
would have struck a familiar chord, for his arguments are
reminiscent of the attacks of Protestant moralists such
as Stephen Gosson and Philip Stubbes on the theatre. For
example, Musidorus's anxiety that Pyrocles's moral
integrity will not only be compromised, but substantially
affected, by his adoption of a feminine disguise, echoes
the fear of Stubbes in The Anatomie of Abuses, and Gosson
in Playes Confuted in Five Actions, of the dangers of
cross-dressing and cross-acting in the theatre: if a man
plays the part of a woman, Gosson warns, he 'must learne
to trippe it like a Lady in the finest fashion' (178),26
But the position of Musidorus is given authority not only
by sixteenth-century Protestant moralists but by
seemingly mature male characters within the fiction.
Indeed, Musidorus's criticism of Pyrocles's passion
reappears in other scenes in the Arcadia and in the
mouths of other characters, suggesting that he propounds
values which are important to the text as a whole. Thus,
we find that the associations made by Musidorus in the
debate between rational masculinity and passionate
femininity resurface in the poetic debates of the
eclogues. For instance, in the song sung in the first
eclogues by Geron, Philisides and Histor, the love-
stricken and youthful Philisides is reprimanded by the
elderly Geron for his 'wandering reasons' induced by his
emasculating love for a woman: 'He water ploughs, and
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soweth in the sand/ [...]/Who hath his hopes laid up in
woman's hand./What man is he that hath his freedom sold?'
(OA65); while in the eclogues appended to Book II the
lamenting lover Plangus is told by Boulon to use his
reason to put his woes in 'proportion' and not to give
himself up to 'female lamentations' (OA132). Moreover,
the 'fair ladies' of the text, the imagined female
readers addressed by the narrator, provide an example,
like their counterparts in other Elizabethan prose
fictions, of the dangers of a credulous female reading:
the compassionate response which is solicited from them
by the narrator makes them eventually party to the
sexually transgressive behaviour of the princes in Books
III and IV.27 The prevalence and appeal of these examples
have proved irresistible to a number of critics who,
perhaps in an attempt to avoid the fate of the gullible
'fair ladies', have chosen to understand the differences
between Pyrocles and Musidorus in the terms offered by
the older or 'wiser' male characters, with the just king
Euarchus often being taken to be the moral centre of the
story. For Mark Rose, Pyrocles's disguise symbolises his
'subjection to passionate love';28 it is a 'criticism of
his failings', not a celebration of his intellectual
liberation.29 Similarly, P. Albert Duhamel finds
Musidorus's prose, like that of Sidney himself,
straightforward and direct, and his arguments closely
reasoned,30 while Forrest G. Robinson finds Musidorus's
'clear, well organised' arguments 'the verbal image of
keen rational vision' and Pyrocles's 'errant logic and
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impassioned language' the 'emblem of his inner
disorder'.31 For such critics who are sensitive to the
importance of these dichotomies in the old Arcadia the
scales of judgement are not tipped in Pyrocles's favour.
Pyrocles thus appears to many of his readers as a
character hopelessly in love, a character whose whims are
either to be pitied (as the narrator suggests) or
abhorred (as Musidorus initially insists). However, this
depiction of Pyrocles as a character lacking in self-
knowledge cannot always be so plausibly maintained; the
narrator's description of Pyrocles's 'sharpened wits' and
Pyrocles's own description of his disguise as one of the
'secret helps' that will abet his desire suggest that he
is much more in control of his destiny than might appear
at first sight to be the case (0A17). Indeed, although
Pyrocles's revelation of his real interests contradicts
his interpretation of his transformation into Cleophila
as a spiritual sublimation, it does not necessarily
entail his spiritual descent into a sensual and
irrational enslavement; unlike the Pyrochles in Book II
of Spenser's The Faerie Queene who, true to the etymology
of his name, is burned by the apparently unquenchable
fire of his passion and reduced to desperation,32 Sidney's
Pyrocles retains enough judgement to determine how best
to fulfil his desire. The contradictions inherent in
Pyrocles's arguments, interpreted by some critics as a
sign of his intellectual weakness, are misleading: rather
than revealing to the reader the confused state of
Pyrocles's mind they, first, conceal from the reader the
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extent to which he is manipulating his destiny (in much
the same way that Antonius's mask of naivety in De
Oratore disguises his masterful rhetorical control) and,
secondly, by drawing attention to the discrepancy between
his declared and his actual methods and aims, help to
unmask his attempt to create credible fiction (in much
the same way that the exposure of Antonius's real
artfulness, juxtaposed with his mask of assumed
ignorance, suggests a rhetorical strategy of persuasion).
Moreover, the narrator, I suggest, is actually party to
Pyrocles's manipulative rhetoric. When the narrator
later describes Pyrocles's response to Musidorus's long
tirade against 'love', he represents Pyrocles both as a
victim of his affections and in control of his 'destiny':
Pyrocles, the narrator notes, has 'no more attentively
marked [Musidorus's] discourse than the child that hath
leave to play marks the last part of his lesson, or the
diligent pilot in a dangerous tempest doth attend to the
unskilful words of the passenger' (OA19). How can
Pyrocles be both an unruly novice and an expert? The one
expression implies that Pyrocles has immaturely abandoned
his responsibilities, the other, that he is much more in
control of his fortunes than is immediately obvious. The
narrator's apparent naivety is, I suggest, Sidney's own
mask, which he uses to disorientate the reader. Sidney's
consistent use of the feminine pronoun in reference to
Pyrocles is not just born 'out of [his] compassion', as
he suggests, it is also a means whereby he can be
complicit in disguising the sexual nature of Pyrocles's
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desire and invoke the reader's compassion. Sidney does
not so much indulge a naive Pyrocles as help to fashion
such a mask of naivety for him, leading the readers to
pity his supposed helplessness.
Pyrocles's actions suggest that, rather than simply
being the object of another's influence, he has used his
new experience of being 'influenced' opportunistically,
and thus, has turned a position of potential weakness
into a position of strength, or influence. What Pyrocles
has done, in fact, is to convert his helplessness into a
persuasive strategy, with the intention of influencing
his audience, that is, of moving them to compassion. In
this respect Pyrocles can be seen, as he indeed claims,
to be proving his 'manhood', for he proves that he is
still actively engaged in pursuing and completing
difficult quests, although his is a rather unconventional
understanding of masculinity, one which runs contrary to
the martial and rational values supported by the
character Musidorus and the likes of the Protestant
moralist Stephen Gosson. In a study of male fictions of
the sixteenth century, Lorna Hutson notes that the
objections of Stephen Gosson to the theatre are bound up
with a 'moral opposition to Italian prose fiction',
prompted, she explains, 'by a formal appreciation of
their redefinition of heroic masculinity as skill in
strategic re-emplotment', that is, in the invention and
disposition of rhetorical resources, rather than as
martial prowess.33 It has long been recognised that
humanism effected a shift in masculine values to meet the
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demands of male employment in the Tudor state: the skills
of hunting and hawking which were essential to the young
nobleman in the medieval household were replaced by a
knowledge of classical languages, and skills in reading
and writing, skills which fashioned a gentleman capable
of serving the new bureaucracy of the 'commonweal1.34
Hutson has two important contributions to make to this
debate: first, the considerable importance she attaches
to the rhetorical skills of argumentation in defining the
new masculinity (one of the main influences she cites on
the Renaissance intellectual tradition is the section in
Book V of the Institutio Oratoria in which Quintilian
discusses the types of artificial proofs (arguments)
designed to 'produce belief')/ secondly, the place she
gives to Elizabethan prose fictions in the dissemination
of the new male values and skills.35 For Hutson discovers
in the fictions of such writers as George Pettie, John
Lyly and George Gascoigne an interest in promoting skills
for a male readership quite distinct from those advocated
in the chivalric literature of their predecessors: the
prose fiction writers of the 1560s and 1570s use print as
a medium for displaying 'the cerebral equivalent of
chivalric prowess, in virtuoso deployments of their skill
in probable argument'.36 Hutson argues that in
Gascoigne's Master F.J, the narrative provides a context
for the verse which is intended 'to enable the reader to
judge each poem's decorum of fitness for particular
contingency'; while, in John Lyly's Euphues, we find 'a
compendium of the exemplary resources of probable
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argument', as well as a demonstration of the way in which
such resources can be misused or wasted. Although
Sidney, in contrast to these writers, never intended his
fictions for publication, and, thus, does not use his
writings to advertise his skills to prospective
employers, he still reveals, according to Hutson, a
similar interest in displaying the skills of the new
masculinity. In the old Arcadia 'Pyrocles and Musidorus
are journeying as unknown knights toward Greece, not
because they are questing for proof of their identity',
as is the case with the heroes of chivalric romance, 'but
because they wish, in good prudential fashion, to
organise its codes of conduct into resources of whatever
contingency should arise'.37 Even though the revised
Arcadia seems to subscribe more willingly to the ethos of
chivalric romance, the success of its protagonists still
depends on their inventive, rather than their martial,
skills: 'the knight Palladius [Pyrocles] improves the
success of the Helots' rebellion because he "by some
experience, but specially by reading of histories, was
acquainted with stratagems"'.38
But does the old Arcadia actually reaffirm the
masculine values of the earlier Elizabethan prose
fictions, as Hutson argues? I suggest that the old
Arcadia actually offers an alternative not only to the
militaristic values of chivalric romance, or of the
Protestant militants such as Stephen Gosson, but to the
intellectual masculinism of the so-called 'prodigal
writers' of the 1560s and 1570s. When juxtaposed with
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the anti-heroes of the fictions of Gascoigne, Pettie and
Lyly, Sidney's Pyrocles appears to be a rather inept
debater. In Pettie's stories, for example, the narrator
is an extremely competent disputant, able not only to
muster convincing proofs for both sides of an argument,
but to shift his position almost imperceptibly, with the
result that he simultaneously champions and abuses his
imagined female readership.39 John Lyly's Euphues is
similarly skilful in inductive argument, revealing his
ability to invent a series of proofs to support whatever
position he chooses to champion.40 In the old Arcadia,
however, it is Musidorus rather than Pyrocles who
conforms to this ideal of the successful disputant; for,
although Pyrocles reveals his capacity to invent the
arguments necessary to support his case, his love-lorn
state appears to have rendered him incapable of arranging
them effectively. And yet, it is Pyrocles who wins the
debate, and he does so by employing very different
techniques from those used by the heroes of early
Elizabethan prose fictions: he wins Musidorus's support
by appealing to his pity rather than by persuading him of
the rightness of his decision. Responding to Musidorus's
'well-reasoned' attack, Pyrocles simply asserts that he
is a slave, and, 'gushing out abundance of tears and
crossing his arms over his woeful heart' he sinks 'to the
ground' (OA22). It is at this point when, moved to
compassion, Musidorus changes his mind: Pyrocles's
'sudden trance went so to the heart of Musidorus that,
falling down beside him, and kissing the weeping eyes of
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his friend' he seeks to make amends for his 'over
vehement' speech (OA22). In this respect, Pyrocles thus
proves, as does Astrophil in sonnet 58, the validity of
Cicero's preference for techniques of sympathetic
incitement over those of deliberative skill (II xlii
178) .
Whereas Lyly's Euphues and Pettie's narrator appear to
replace the martial prowess typical of chivalric romance
with 'skill in probable argument', that is, with skills
drawn from Book V of Quintilian's Institutio, Sidney's
Pyrocles offers instead, I suggest, a technique of
emotional manipulation, namely, the technique of
enargeia, which is drawn from Book VI of this rhetorical
treatise. (Of course, in the fiction of the old Arcadia
Pyrocles already experiences the emotion of love; he is
first persuaded by Philoclea, not by himself. But he
uses his emotions in much the same way as does the orator
in Institutio, turning a state of emotional
susceptibility into a state of rhetorical agency.)
Pyrocles thus includes in his definition of masculinity a
skill which imitates a state which was considered to be a
female weakness: that is, susceptibility to rhetorical
manipulation.41 The supposed susceptibility of the female
mind to male rhetoric is clearly exploited in George
Pettie's A Petite Pallace of Pettie His Pleasure: the
credulous female readers depicted in his stories are
encouraged to condone the narrator's misogynist morality.
Like Pettie's narrator, the narrator of the old Arcadia
also addresses gullible fictional female readers, and
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brings them ultimately to condone the sexually
transgressive behaviour of the two princes: at the end of
Book III the still unmarried Pyrocles consummates his
relationship with Philoclea, and in Book IV Musidorus
attempts to rape Pamela. What is different in the old
Arcadia is that Pyrocles seems initially to share with
the imagined female readers of the text a similar
susceptibility. And yet there is an important difference
between Pyrocles's experience of emotion and that of the
narrator's 'fair ladies', a difference which throws light
on the role of these characters in the text. The
gullible 'fair ladies' in the old Arcadia act as a foil
not only to the narrator's rhetorical virtuosity, as is
the case in Pettie's narratives, but to Pyrocles's own
emotional vulnerability; in contrast to Pyrocles, who
actively uses his suffering as a rhetorical strategy,
they simply suffer. Sidney creates in the figure of
Pyrocles not a man who experiences emotions in the way
that a woman supposedly does, but a man who knows how to
use his emotions prudently.
One of Sidney's aims in the old Arcadia and A Defence
of Poetry, I suggest, is to produce a masculine poetics,
a poetics which turns a supposedly feminine weakness into
a masculine virtue, or source of strength. Although at
the beginning of the Defence Sidney presents poetry as a
female figure, referring to it as 'the first nurse' of
knowledge, 'whose milk by little and little' allows us
'to feed afterwards of tougher knowledges' (18), it is
important to recognise that this is a rhetorical
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strategy; he is here reprimanding the anti-poets for
their ungratefulness to, and lack of respect for, poetry.
Indeed, the personification of poetry as a female figure
is attributed by Sidney in the Defence to the anti-poets
themselves. Sidney tells us that they call poetry 'the
mother of lies', and 'the nurse of abuse', and complain
that 'before poets did soften us, we were full of
courage, given to martial exercises, the pillars of
manlike liberty' (51). Sidney responds to their attacks
by asserting that poetry is the 'companion' of military
generals (56), and that it is an art 'not of
effeminateness, but of notable stirring of man's courage'
(61). When Sidney considers that poetry, as opposed to
history or philosophy, is in danger of being abused, he
concludes that 'it can do more harm than any other army
of words'. Almost immediately, however, he adds that its
emotive power also means that it is morally more
effective than the other genres: 'truly, a needle cannot
do much hurt, and as truly (with leave of ladies be it
spoken) it cannot do much good: with a sword thou mayst
kill thy father, and with a sword thou mayst defend thy
prince and country' (55). The point here is that the
poetic art is not the toy of ladies, but a weapon used by
men in the battlefield of words. It is interesting that
when Sidney describes the technique of enargeia, the act
of vivid imagining which leads to sympathetic expression,
the act which renders the orator as seemingly susceptible
as the credulous 'fair ladies' in Elizabethan prose
fiction, he calls it energia, 'forcibleness', thus
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confusing it with energeia (the Greek root of our word
energy), which means for Aristotle in The Art of Rhetoric
the vividness produced by metaphors which denote action
(Aristotle's illustrations are drawn notably from the
battlefield) .42
Sidney's attempt to make a supposedly feminine aspect
of the poetic art seem more masculine is not original
with him, but derives, in large part, from the treatises
of the Roman rhetoricians. Quintilian's sensitivity to
attacks on the effeminateness of the rhetorical art is
made clear in the Institutio Oratoria. For example, in
Book IX, in which he discusses the orator's use of
figures, he counters the claim made by some that
unadorned speech is more 'manly' than ornamental speech;
Quintilian responds to this by calling attention to the
trained skill of athletes and soldiers, claiming that
their art is little different from that of the orator:
'Why then should it be thought that polish is inevitably
prejudicial to vigour', he concludes, "when truth is that
nothing can attain its full strength without the
assistance of art ' (IX iv 3-8). In his discussions of
tropes in Book VIII Quintilian again reveals a
sensitivity to the dangers of effeminate speech; he
clearly sees his task as one of reforming the decadent
Atticism typical of the rhetoric in his era, and insists
repeatedly that the orator's stylistic techniques should
be more like sinewy athletic muscle than cosmetics: it is
not that the orator should refuse to use tropes to adorn
his speech but that when he does use them they should
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seem 'natural and unaffected', and not seem to be like
the 'effeminate use of depilatories and cosmetics' (VIII
Pr 18-20).43 Quintilian's martial and athletic imagery,
and his concern to reform the effeminate rhetoric of his
contemporaries, are nowhere more obvious, however, than
in his discussion of argumentation in Book V. The
declamations 'which we used to employ as foils wherewith
to practise for the duels of the forum', he complains,
are no longer as powerful as they once were, and have
become 'flaccid and nerveless', 'owing to the fact that
they are composed solely with the design of giving
pleasure'. Quintilian compares the orators who
concentrate more on creating a 'delicate complexion of
style', rather than on producing convincing proofs, with
'slave-dealers who castrate boys in order to increase the
attractions of their beauty'; he wants the orator to
imitate not the eunuchs Bagoas and Megabyzus, but the
spearbearer Doryphorus, the man 'equally adapted for the
fields of war or for the wrestling school (V xii 18-21) .
But while Quintilian praises argumentation as being the
essence of manly oratory, and persists in depicting the
forum as a place of battle, he is also forced to
acknowledge the importance of style, the supposedly
effeminate face of the oratorical art. Thus, at the end
of his discussion of proofs in Book V Quintilian
acknowledges that,
the more unattractive the natural appearance of
anything, the more does it require to be seasoned by
charm of style: moreover, an argument is often
less suspect when thus disguised, and the charm with
which it is expressed makes it all the more
convincing to our audience (V xiv 35).
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A similar point is made at the beginning of Book IX:
'although it may seem that proof is infinitesimally
affected by the figures employed, none the less those
same figures lend credibility to our arguments and steal
their way secretly into the minds of the judges' (IX i
19). It is this form of eloquence which Sidney defends
so forcefully in the Arcadia.
Eventually even Musidorus adopts the same rhetorical
tactics as Pyrocles, in order to win him the love of the
princess Pamela. Although Musidorus is moved by the
sight of Pyrocles's tears to give in to his friend's
wishes, and actually to participate in his disguising, he
still remains, to some extent, rationally unconvinced,
pitying his foolishness at the same time that he pities
his suffering: thus, Musidorus agrees to hide himself in
order to see the Arcadian royal family, as Pyrocles has
requested, though he does so with 'extreme grief' at the
sight of 'so worthy a mind thus infected' (0A25).
However, the very fact that Musidorus is moved to pity
Pyrocles seems to make him susceptible to the effects of
Pamela's beauty in much the same way that the
compassionate tale that Kerxenus tells to Pyrocles makes
Pyrocles vulnerable to Philoclea's painted features.
Within a short time Musidorus is bewailing, and
celebrating, his state of enslavement as passionately as
did Pyrocles in their prior debate. Like Pyrocles,
however, he has also learnt from his experience of being
emotionally influenced, in his case by Pyrocles, how to
win favour by evoking pity rather than by proving his
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case. In response to Dicus's request in the eclogues
appended to Book II that he explain how Love 'gets so
strange possession' of an individual and how he
'strengthens his invasion' (0A121), Musidorus offers him
instead a description of the effects that Love has on the
lover: 'carefulness' in his appearance, fastidiousness in
his food, and the awakening of 'invention' (OA122).
Musidorus is here speaking from experience: his 'love'
for Pamela has driven him to invent the means to seduce
her. Musidorus first borrows a shepherd's apparel in
order to gain access to the pastoral retreat, and then,
when the disguise proves to be an obstacle to his
courting of Pamela, he discovers a way of communicating
to her his true princely status. Musidorus chooses to
disclose himself to Pamela with the help of a story
ostensibly designed for Mopsa, with whom he pretends to
be in love, but covertly directed at Pamela in whose
presence it is told. Fortunately for Musidorus, Pamela
is sharp-witted enough to perceive the double meaning of
his tale. But Musidorus realises that he cannot rely on
Pamela's intelligence alone if he is to win her love.
Musidorus's claim in the second eclogues that he does not
know whether it is 'by might or by persuasion' that the
lover 'conquer[s]' the beloved is disingenuous, for in
his attempt to 'gain possession' of Pamela in Book II he
has revealed his awareness of the usefulness of emotional
persuasion. If he is to persuade Pamela to fall in love
with him, Musidorus must first move her to pity his
plight so that he can make her susceptible to the
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experience of love (just as Pyrocles fell in love with
Philoclea after his compassion had been stirred) :
but alas, what can saying make them believe whom
seeing can persuade? Those pains must be felt
before they are understood; no outward utterance can
command a conceit (OA92).
Musidorus chooses to move Pamela with the help of music,
the emotive efficacy of which he has learnt from Pyrocles
himself. For Musidorus is finally fully converted to
Pyrocles's side when he hears Pyrocles's song,
'Transformed in show, but more transformed in mind':
'Musidorus', the narrator tells us 'was yet more moved to
pity by the manner of Cleophila's singing than with
anything he had ever seen - so lively an action doth the
mind, truly touched, bring forth' (OA26). Accordingly,
Musidorus uses a similar technique in his attempt to move
Pamela to compassion. Initially Pamela is divided in her
response to Musidorus's description of his adventures; on
the one hand, Musidorus's story works a powerful effect
on her ('no music could with righter accords possess her
senses than every passion he expressed had his mutual
working in her' (OA93)), on the other hand, her natural
wisdom recalls to her the importance of weighing
carefully the words he uses, and impresses on her that it
is wise to be 'hard of belief'. Realising that 'his
speeches had given alarum to her imaginations' Musidorus
prepares to keep her in these thoughts in order to bring
'her to a dull yielding-over her forces' (OA93); he takes
up a harp and sings a song which skilfully reinforces the
import of his tale ('my sheep are thoughts, which I both
guide and serve' (OA94)). The song achieves its intended
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effect: 'the music added to the tale, and both fitted to
such motions in her as now began again to be awaked, did
steal out of the fair eyes of Pamela some drops of tears'
(OA94). Behind the 'enslaved' persona adopted by
Musidorus there exists a rhetorician adept at moving his
audience - Pamela - to compassion.
Musidorus understands how important it is to move
Pamela to compassion if he is to gain access to her
affections. Yet it is Pyrocles who, as we have noticed,
best understands the importance of the emotions to the
art of persuasion, and who is most like the 'reader'
envisaged in the Defence, for he is enabled by his
'reading' of Philoclea's image to conceive of the
character which he later creates for himself. Musidorus
commands his disguise only to 'yield outward show', and
once inside the pastoral retreat Musidorus expends his
energy trying to communicate to Pamela his real 'self'
beneath his adopted appearance: in contrast, Pyrocles not
only insists that his disguise represents his new state
of mind ('Transformed in show, but more transformed in
mind' (OA26)) but that his transformation is
unconsciously inspired by his contemplation of Philoclea:
he explains that he takes 'a woman's hue' because 'what I
see, think, know, is all but [Philoclea]' (OA26).
Pyrocles makes clear that his disguise is the outward
expression of his inwardly felt love; thus, when
Musidorus compliments Pyrocles on the beauty of his new
appearance he is sharply reminded by Pyrocles of its
source: 'if I have any beauty, it is the beauty which the
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imagination of [Philoclea] strikes into my fancies, which
in part shines through my face into your eyes' (0A25).
Like the Neoplatonic lover who derives his created
'beauty' from his contemplation of the beloved, so
Pyrocles's appearance and character are supposedly
influenced by his love for Philoclea. And yet Pyrocles's
self-characterisation is obviously deceptive: Pyrocles is
not a genuine Neoplatonic lover but a parody of the
Neoplatonic lover. When the constructed nature of his
disguise and the use to which it is to be put are taken
into consideration it becomes increasingly clear that
Pyrocles is imitating not the beauty of Philoclea herself
but the skill of the artist who represented her beauty.
Pyrocles's disguise is literally a disguise, not a
'transformation', and it is a prop which he intends to
use to realise his imagined desire. Indeed, just before
Pyrocles advertises the spiritually ambitious nature of
his love for Philoclea he confesses that his beauty is
the means that will bring him 'to some part of [his]
desires'; 'otherwise', he declares, 'I am no more to set
by it than the orator by his eloquence that persuades
nobody' (OA25). Pyrocles has not 'softened his heart' as
Musidorus feared, and thereby become an emasculated
version of his former self. Rather, Pyrocles follows in
the footsteps of Quintilian's orator and the reader
depicted in the Defence's digression: his susceptibility
to the emotional appeal of Philoclea's picture and story
has given him an insight into the art of persuasion. As
we know from the final stage in Musidorus's persuasion,
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it is the 'manner' of Pyrocles's expression which is most
persuasive: 'so lively an action does the mind, truly
touched, bring forth'.
The extent to which Pyrocles is skilled in the
manipulation of visual imagery and the emotions is
evident in the scene in which he reveals his true
identity to Philoclea, for it is in this scene that
Pyrocles, with the help of the narrator, most
successfully conceals the traces of his artfulness, and
the self-interested nature of his love, presenting
himself to Philoclea as a helpless lover who sues for her
mercy. Until this point in the story, Cleophila
(Pyrocles) has had little opportunity to discover to
Philoclea 'her' true, male identity; it is only when
Basilius decides to use Philoclea to represent to
Cleophila his own love interests that the privacy
necessary for Pyrocles's revelation is secured.
Cleophila prepares Philoclea for the disclosure by
describing herself as 'a living image and a present story
of the best pattern love hath ever showed of his
workmanship' (OA105). Such words immediately absolve
Cleophila from any conscious trickery; what Philoclea
sees is the 'living image' of love, not a man dressed up
in woman's clothes. Although the sinister and sexually
complicated implications of the scene are registered in
Philoclea's transient discomfort when she finds herself
alone with a man (OA106), they never intrude into the
scene in such a way as to divert us from the narrative
itself, which is, after all, an account of Pyrocles's
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revelation and expression of love. Similarly, although
the scene has the appearance of being carefully crafted,
it is never really clear whether Pyrocles is actually
implicated in its stage-management: the scene presents
itself as nothing more than an unexpected occasion for
the meeting of two lovers. Despite the fact that
Cleophila engineers their private meeting by telling
Basilius that she will not hear his suit to her from
anyone but Philoclea, she seems to forget the imminence
of Philoclea's approach and gives herself up to grief.
As Philoclea approaches the arbour in which Cleophila is
resting she discovers a 'fair lady whose face was so bent
over the river that her flowing tears continually fell
into the water' (OA102); the narrator's added comment
that this lady looks 'much like' the 'costly images
[which] are set for fountains' in gardens could suggest
that the scene has been self-consciously set up by
Pyrocles, and yet any sense of artificiality is soon
dispelled by the apparently genuine surprise expressed at
their meeting. The 'mutual astonishment' (OA104) of
Cleophila and Philoclea when they discover that they are
in the presence of one another suggests rather that
Cleophila's pose is unconscious, and that the song which
she has written in the banks of the river to express her
woes is meant to ease her mind, not to create a moving
picture to soften Philoclea's heart. The absence of any
artfulness is further reinforced by Cleophila's
explanation to Philoclea of her disguise in the terms she
used in the earlier debate with Musidorus: 'behold here
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before your eyes', Cleophila declares, 'Pyrocles, prince
of Macedon, whom you only have brought to this fall of
fortune and unused metamorphosis; whom you only have made
neglect his country, forget his father, and lastly
forsake himself!' (OA105). Such a declaration, with its
emphasis first on Pyrocles's social status and then on
his social irresponsibility, conveys to Philoclea the
power of the love she has inspired in him and the
strength of his devotion to her, reinforced by his
ensuing admission: 'my suit is to serve you, and my end
to do you honour' (OA105). At the same time, Pyrocles
shifts the blame for his compromising behaviour from
himself to Philoclea; Philoclea sees before her a 'living
image' of the powerful transformative effects of her
beauty.44 Pyrocles's interpretation of his
'metamorphosis' is further supported by the comments of
the narrator who draws an analogy between Philoclea and
Pygmalion (with the intention of conveying her joy at
seeing her secret wishes realised), and thus
'unwittingly' implies her responsibility for the original
disguise. Not surprisingly, Pyrocles's revelation is a
success, and the apparently all-powerful Philoclea is
conquered: 'thou hast the victory', Philoclea declares to
Pyrocles; 'use it now with virtue' (OA107). And yet the
portrayal of the relationship in terms of an inversion of
influence is misleading. As we know from our study of
the debate, Philoclea is not really responsible for
Pyrocles's 'transformation'. Pyrocles and the narrator
have successfully concealed the fact that the real
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'Pygmalions' of the scene include Musidorus (who while
dressing Pyrocles in his disguise teasingly made such an
identification: 'I were like enough while I dressed you
to become a young Pygmalion' (OA25)), and Pyrocles
himself, who has realised his desires with the aid of his
successfully hidden rhetorical skills.
What Pyrocles shares with Astrophil is that, like him,
he is both a lover seeking a sexual relationship with his
beloved, and an orator seeking a method for creating
credible, and thus persuasive, love poetry. In Astrophil
and Stella and the first four books of the old Arcadia,
we watch the protagonists, both in the act of courting
their mistresses and practising a persuasive technique
which enables them to appear to be inspired by the virtue
of these women. Thus, these texts are simultaneously
stories in the conventional sense, engaging us in the
unravelling of their plots, and pedagogic treatises,
teaching us in the ironic style of Cicero's Dj5 Oratore.
For, in a similar fashion to Cicero's Antonius, Pyrocles
and Astrophil display their eloquence, suggesting that it
is naturally acquired, while simultaneously indicating a
strategy for concealing the rhetorical method of its
attainment. In the concluding section of this chapter I
shall explore Sidney's use of the same Ciceronian
strategy for the creation of credible political fictions,
and for the unmasking of such fictions, an employment
which recalls the political motivation, as well as the
method, of Castiglione's Octavian and Bembo in The Book
of the Courtier.
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3b. Philip Sidney's 'fiery speeches' to the Queen
Though the skills acquired by Castiglione's courtier
initially appear to be intended merely for the amusement
of the prince, it becomes clear in the last book of the
treatise that they also prepare the courtier for his role
as royal adviser and educator, and so endow him with a
degree of political influence. The extent of this
influence depends, of course, on the kind of education he
offers the prince; although it first appears as if it is
his role merely to help the prince discover his natural
virtue, the emphasis in the treatise on the skill of
fiction-making, and the implicit ambiguity concerning the
real source of the prince's virtue, suggest that the
courtier also has the power to create the virtuous
character which, through practice, is to become natural
to the prince. Castiglione's vision is obviously
relevant to the actual practices of courtiership in
Elizabethan England. As Louis Montrose suggests,
Elizabethan courtiers were employed by the Queen 'to
create illusions of royal power', illusions which would
help to establish 'the reality of [monarchical] power'
while at the same time allowing them to advance their own
sphere of influence at court.45 One of the more
successful courtier-poets of the Elizabethan court, and
an example of this kind of courtiership, was Sir Henry
Lee, the 'moving-spirit', as Frances Yates describes him,
of the Accession Day Tilts.46 His entertainment of the
Queen at Woodstock in 1575, in which he adapted the
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persona of the hermit-knight from Ramon Lull's Book of
the Ordre of Chyvalry, was influential not only in
shaping the cult of the Fairy Queen but in determining
the nature of service of the Queen's knights.47 (The
Platonist Ramon Lull is an important figure in the
courtierly tradition, for he succeeds in putting chivalry
'into a cosmological context',48 and so successfully
combines the preeminent position of the courtly beloved
with the cosmological significance of the Neoplatonic
beloved, a coalescence which is exploited by later
courtiers (among them Castiglione) for the purpose of
expressing devotion to a monarch.) Yet there is a more
ambiguous side to Castiglione's courtier, a side which
prevents us from seeing him as the mere servant or
educator of his prince. The quirkiness of the treatise's
style, the way in which it tends to undermine its
established positions, can leave the reader with the
impression of the tenuousness of power holding, and of
the courtier's sensitivity to this fact. The Platonism
of Castiglione's Bembo in Book IV need not be seen, as it
so often is, as reaffirming the autocracy of Italian
princes, which the courtier is committed to maintaining,
but as a rhetorical mask which both conceals, and is the
source of, his political influence. Sidney's adopted
Platonism is similar, I suggest, to that of Castiglione's
Bembo: he uses Platonic imagery in the tournament of 'The
Four Foster Children of Desire' in 1581 seemingly to
reinforce the powerful interests of Elizabeth when in
fact he is reflecting the political desires of the
261
Protestant peers to influence Elizabeth; and in his
masque, the posthumously titled 'The Lady of May', and in
the letter he wrote to the Queen concerning her marriage
negotiations with Alengon, the extent to which he aims at
Protestant influence on the Queen through an ironic use
of such imagery becomes clear.
The court entertainment, 'The Four Foster Children of
Desire', performed in 1581 on the occasion of the visit
of Elizabeth's prospective husband, the Duke of Alenpon,
is of particular interest to Sidney scholars not only
because Sidney is known to have participated in its
performance as one of the rebellious four foster children
but because he is thought to have contributed to its
composition.49 On the 16th of April, 1581, a messenger
dressed in red and white accosted the Queen as she was
leaving church and read out a challenge (addressed to the
'Fortress of Beauty') on the behalf of Desire's four
'foster children': 'these foure [...] doe will you by
me, even in the name of Justice, that you will no longer
exclude vertuous Desire from perfect Beautie'.50 The
tilting took place on the 8th of May, after the second
challenge had been read out and the walls of the Fortress
assaulted with cannons full of sweet water and powder.
The fighting continued for two days and was interspersed
with speeches by the defenders of the Fortress of Beauty.
One of the more interesting speeches is that of Sir
Thomas Parrot and Anthony Cooke, delivered by an angelic
messenger, which explains how the foster children have
mistaken the Fortress for a natural rather than a divine
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creation.51 Although Desire's children are convinced of
the justness of their cause, in the light of the angel's
revelation their attack is shown to be both blasphemous
and futile. 'Know ye proud Knights', he reprimands them,
that
there are that have hearts as big as mountaines, and
as far above you in proewesse, as ye are above
all in presumption, yet not so vaine (whiche ye
terme valiant) to assault the sunne, and why,
because it is impregnible, wee content to enjoy the
light, ye to eclipse it, we to rest under the feete,
ye to run over the head, we to yeeld to that which
nothing can conquer, you to conquer that which
maketh all men Captives.52
The unnatural desire of the foster children to conquer
rather than serve the Fortress of Beauty (unnatural
because it is impossible) is contrasted with the proper
love of her true subjects - 'for the majestie of that
sunne which now pearcing our eyes hath fully subdued our
hearts'.53 When the children are eventually forced to
recognise the futility of their exploits through defeat
in the tilting they appropriately commend themselves to
the Queen as her 'slaves', a gesture which tokens not
only their defeat but their recognition, and acceptance,
of the natural order of things. The allegorical meaning
of this narrative, Jean Wilson suggests, would have been
obvious to all, and especially to Alengon and his
ambassadors who were also present at the display:
'Alengon is a foster child of Desire, and he will never
attain the Fortress of Perfect Beauty [the Queen] to
which he is laying siege, for it is impregnable'.54 The
tournament successfully expresses its political objective
without obviously undermining Elizabeth's power.55
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Sidney's tournament reminds Alengon that Elizabeth is
unattainable and it does so by recruiting the language of
Neoplatonic love, the language which figures Elizabeth as
being above sexual love. But this tournament was
intended not only for Alengon but for Elizabeth herself,
conveying to her a rather different message: that she has
no choice in matters of human love. In this respect, the
tournament communicates to Elizabeth a change in the
domestic and foreign policy of her Protestant peers. As
David Norbrook has observed, most of the pageants and
masques of the early 1570s, at least until Kenilworth in
1575, had 'presented debates between marriage and
virginity which suggested that the life of Diana, the
virgin goddess, was not the best model for the Queen to
follow'. (The Protestant faction had hoped that
Elizabeth would choose a Protestant husband, for which
role Sidney's uncle, Robert Dudley, the Earl of
Leicester, had been a keen contender.) What is different
about the late 1570s is Elizabeth's courtship of a French
Catholic, with the result that the 'political rhetoric of
Leicester and his allies changed: virginity, the life of
Diana, became much more attractive'.56 Edmund Spenser's
representation of Elizabeth as Eliza, the virgin queen of
shepherds, in the 'Aprill Eclogue' of the Shepheardes
Calender (1579) is among the more influential
contributions to the myth. As Norbrook notes, Spenser
transfers to Elizabeth the imagery which is usually
associated with the Virgin Mary (Eliza is depicted as
'"flowre of Virgins"', '"without spotte"', and without
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'"mortal blemishe"'),57 thus creating an alternative cult
which had both political advantages and personal
disadvantages for Elizabeth.
Sidney's own contribution to the creation of this myth
is made in his masque 'The Lady of May', which was
commissioned by Leicester and performed at Wanstead. The
exact date of the masque is unclear: most critics suggest
1578 as the date of its performance, but it is also
possible that it was performed in 1579. One of the
arguments in favour of the latter date is that the masque
was intended to assuage the Queen's anger over
Leicester's marriage to Lettice Knollys in 1578, which he
had kept secret from her until 1579.58 Before looking at
the closing speech of the masque, which supports this
reading, it needs to be pointed out that 'The Lady of
May' usually attracts critical attention for quite a
different reason. At the beginning of the masque the
Queen is asked by the Lady of May to choose between her
two suitors, the shepherd Espilus and the forester
Therion, and the rest of the performance focuses on their
individual defences of their rights to the lady. What is
interesting about the masque is that Sidney's preferred
suitor is not the Queen's. The attractiveness of the
forester Therion to Sidney seems to be clear not only
from the nature of his active lifestyle (we must remember
that at this time Sidney is seeking employment from
Elizabeth) but from the concluding song, in which the
victory is claimed by Silvanus, a woodland, not a
pastoral, figure. Elizabeth, however, chose Espilus as
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the better husband for the May lady, and the masque
consequently ends with the happy shepherd singing the
victory song of Silvanus. Sidney has clearly failed to
influence the Queen's judgement, and for critics like
Louis Montrose, who draw an analogy between Therion and
Sidney, this must be seen as a personal failure for
Sidney.59 And yet, though Elizabeth may, in rejecting
Espilus, also have rejected Sidney's own suit, putting
down a seemingly rather audacious and ambitious courtier,
there is a sense in which Sidney maintains the upper hand
at the end of the masque, presenting Elizabeth in its
last section with a fictional version of herself which,
while appearing to augment her power, simultaneously
defines the limits of her personal choice in matters of
love. In this last section, 'Master Robert of Wanstead'
(the Earl of Leicester) is depicted by a character called
Rhombus as being 'an honest man' but one who, he
confides, 'is foully commaculated with the papistical
enormity': in short, he explains, 'the bonus vir is a
huge catholicam'. As Rhombus continues, giving evidence
against the Earl, the nature of his crime is clarified:
Rhombus declares that he has found the Earl using
'Papistian beads' with which he daily 'saith "and
Elizabeth", as many lines as there be beads on this
string'. The Earl, as it becomes clear (though not to
Rhombus), is guilty of saying, not his Ave Maria, but his
Ave Elizabeth; his devotion is directed, not at the
Virgin Mary, but at the Virgin Elizabeth.60 If 'The Lady
of May' is intended in part as an apology to Elizabeth on
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the behalf of Leicester for his marriage to Lettice, then
it makes its point quite sharply: Sidney's depiction of
Leicester worshipping the Virgin Elizabeth not only
reminds her that he is her true and loving subject,
figuring Elizabeth as a superior beloved to the earthly
Lettice, but suggests the inappropriateness of sexual,
and hence, marital, relations between Leicester and
Elizabeth: Elizabeth is reminded that she is above sexual
love, and that her anger at Leicester for this marriage
is consequently out of place.
The examples of 'The Four Foster Children of Desire'
and 'The Lady of May' reveal, first, that Sidney is among
the Protestant contributors to the creation of the cult
of Elizabeth, and, secondly, that the creation of this
cult is intended to promote the political interests of
the Leicester faction as well as to augment Elizabeth's
power. But Sidney does not only remind Elizabeth of the
restrictions placed on her personal freedom through
invocations of the imagery of Neoplatonic love; in the
letter he wrote to Elizabeth in 1579, denouncing
Alenpon's courtship, Sidney sets out to remind Elizabeth
of her dependence on the goodwill of her people, and,
thus, of the rhetorical nature of her status as
Neoplatonic beloved, and he does so in a comparably
ambiguous style to that of Octavian in Book IV of the
Courtier.
Commenting on the letter Sidney wrote to the Queen to
dissuade her from marrying Alenpon, Fulke Greville asks
'whether it were not an error, and a dangerous one, for
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Sir Philip Sidney being neither Magistrate nor
Counsellor, to oppose himself against his Soveraigns
pleasure in things indifferent?'.61 Exactly why Sidney
decided to risk Elizabeth's displeasure is unclear; most
biographers assume that the anti-Alengon faction, which
included Sidney's uncle, the Earl of Leicester, Francis
Walsingham and Sir Christopher Hatton, wanted to make use
of Sidney's excellent writing skills. Greville, of
course, has his own explanation: Sidney, he argues, was
prompted by his 'worth, truth, favour and sincerity of
heart'.62 To support this characterisation of Sidney,
Greville offers the Oxford quarrel, which happened in the
same year, as another example of his forthright honesty.
Reprimanded by the Queen for having challenged the Earl
of Oxford on the tennis courts, and reminded by her of
'the respect inferiors ought to their superiors',63 Sidney
calls her attention to a law instituted by her father,
Henry VIII, which gave 'the Gentry free, and safe appeal
to his feet, against the oppression of the Grandees'.64
Such a law, he supposedly reminds Elizabeth, was
established in case 'the over-grown might be tempted, by
still coveting more, to fall (as Angells did) by
affecting equality with their Maker'. Greville chooses
to conclude his treatment of Sidney's transgression with
the observation that although tyrants will not tolerate
dissent, 'with Princes there is a latitude for subjects
to reserve native, and legall freedom, by paying humble
tribute in manner, though not in matter, to them'.65 It
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is the natural and legal right of a gentleman, Greville
insists, to disagree with their monarch.
Greville's distinction between 'manner' and 'matter'
can indeed be appropriately applied to Sidney's letter to
the Queen, which combines the expression of sincere
devotion with a frank objection to her feared marriage
plans. The letter begins with an attempt to mitigate the
'boldnes' of the undertaking by offering the Queen the
'true vowed sacrifice of unfeined love'. Sidney offers
nothing more than this, he explains, since Elizabeth has
so sound a judgement that she is 'able lively to discerne
into the nature of the thing done' so that 'it wer folly
to hope with laying on better colours to make it more
acceptable'. Because Sidney cannot deceive the Queen, he
offers 'simple and direct termes', words which come from
the 'cleere well-spring of most loyall affection' and
from the 'over flowing of [his] mind'.66 Such expressions
of devoted, honest love are merely a preamble, however,
to the main point of the letter which Sidney shortly
introduces: 'herein I will now but onely declare what be
the reasons that make me thinke the mariage of Monsieur
[Alenpon] unprofitable for you'.67 Sidney then launches
into a description of the effects that marriage with a
'frenchman and a papist' will have on the realm and on
Elizabeth's relationship with her subjects. The
Protestant faction, the main body of the people of
England (Elizabeth's 'chefe, if not sole, strenght'),
have benefited most under her rule; it is consequently
they who will feel most abandoned by the marriage.68
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'Their hartes', he warns her, 'will be galed, if not
aliened'.69 Just as in the Defence, where Sidney's
apparent commitment to a particular line of thought is
undermined or modified by a subsequent observation, so
here, the effusive, devoted love with which he began the
letter is revealed to be conditional. Elizabeth can only
command the absolute devotion of her people, Sidney
implies, if she devotes herself to their interests.
As Sidney again explains in a later part of the
letter, Elizabeth has sent 'Love [...] by divers meanes
[...] into the deapth of their soules', so that nothing
can 'staine so true a forme' - unless it be 'by bringing
your selfe not in your owne likeness, but in new colours
unto them'.70 Sidney's suggestion that the Queen is
dependent on the love of her subjects hardly accords with
her subsequent representation in 'The Four Foster
Children of Desire' as the 'impregnible' sun which makes
'all men Captives'. Indeed, what is interesting about
the letter is the way in which Sidney undermines
conventional Neoplatonic imagery as if to drive home to
Elizabeth the real nature of her relationship with her
people. For example, although Sidney invokes the sun
image as a symbol of strong government, in contrast to
the instability which he envisages as the result of
factional rule ('a devided companie of starres'), he
simultaneously reminds Elizabeth of the need to minister
to her people in order to maintain her power. For the
second time in the letter Sidney refers to Elizabeth's
'speeche of the rising Sunne', a speech which, he points
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out, was first used by Sulla, the leader who was awarded
dictatorial power at a time when the Roman republic (the
'popular estate') was torn apart by the 'fickell breath
of a many headed confusion'.71 Although Sulla stands here
as a reminder to Elizabeth of the advantages of single
rule against 'many headed confusion', the reference to
republican Rome simultaneously recalls the importance of
public opinion. For although, as Sidney argues, the
people are content 'to sucke the love of their rightfull
(hereditary) prince', 'vertu and justice are', in fact,
'the onely bondes of the peoples love: and as for that
point, many Princes have lost their Crownes, whose owne
children were manifest successours'.72 Sidney's warning
is effective because he has already mentioned two popular
uprisings: one of which, the Northern rebellion of 1569,
took place during Elizabeth's reign, when recusants
(among them her own cousin the Earl of Norfolk) attempted
to place Mary, Queen of Scots on the throne, and the
other during the reign of Henry III (1216-1272), when the
eastern part of England was taken over by rebel barons
led by the French Prince Louis. Although the French
prince, Sidney pointedly observes, had 'no shew of title
here, yet did half the Nobility & more sweare direct
fealty and wassalage, & delivred the strongest holdes
unto him'.73 Elizabeth's strength lies, therefore, not in
her claim to hereditary right but in her virtue, and that
'true inward strenght', as Sidney has already suggested
early in the letter, is synonymous with her Protestant
people.74
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At the beginning of the letter Sidney recognised the
Queen's insightfulness ('it wer folly to hope with laying
on better colours to make [his objections] more
acceptable'), and he has accordingly promised to speak
plainly to her. Yet Sidney's offer of advice turns out
to be predicated on his recognition of Elizabeth's blind-
spots: as he explains to her, while the English people
are 'joyed with the experience of your inward vertues'
and 'delighted in the sight of you [...] your owne eyes
cannot see your self'.75 What Sidney offers the Queen,
however, is not a picture of her 'inward vertues' but an
interpretation of the character and motives of Alengon,
and a reminder of her already established relationship
with her subjects. When representing Alengon, Sidney is
careful to contrast him with Elizabeth; in doing so he
not only underlines the unsuitability of the match but
reminds Elizabeth of the restrictions imposed on her
'judgement' both by her people and by her own blind spot.
Thus, Sidney contrasts Alengon's misguided ambition
('both by his owne fancie & by his youthful Governours
imbracing all ambitious hopes, having Alexanders image in
his head, but perchaunce, evill painted') with the
Queen's 'excellent vertu' which has 'taught what [she]
should hope & by no lesse wisdome what [she] may hope'.76
In contrast to Alengon, Sidney implies, Elizabeth
understands the limits upon her power. Sidney's
interpretation of the situation implies the skill of his
judgement. For him Alengon's painted knowledge fails to
conceal the illegitimacy of his ambitions; Alengon
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reveals his affinity to the bumbling imitators of the
Defence who 'will be sure to be fine' and yet fail to be
so because they do not understand the art of decorum
(70). Sidney's unveiling of Alengon succeeds in
suggesting the sagacity of both himself and Elizabeth's
other subjects; for, as he makes clear in the same
passage, the Queen's true lovers can see through the
'painted excuses' invented by 'fine witts' and recognise
that Alengon is 'the sonne of that Jezebel of our age'.77
Elizabeth may be the 'onely Sunne that dazeleth' the eyes
of her subjects but they are still keen sighted enough to
recognise where their interests and power lie.78
In the first part of this chapter I explored how
Astrophil and Pyrocles use the language of Neoplatonic
love to conceal both the sexual nature of their desire
and the rhetorical nature of their own love discourses.
In the second part of this chapter, I considered how
Sidney uses the Neoplatonic love discourse to gain
influence over Elizabeth, in an attempt to make unwelcome
counsel more palatable to her. At the same time, as the
letter of 1579 suggests, Sidney is also eager to reveal
to the Queen the rhetorical source of her own political
influence, so as to remind her that she must take into
consideration the expectations of her Protestant
audience. Although Sidney depicts Elizabeth as the
Neoplatonic beloved in his court entertainments,
suggesting that her lovers are dazzled by her supposedly
divine virtue, in the letter itself it becomes clear that
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her status is not divinely authored, but is contingent on
her words and actions. Sidney thus reminds the Queen of
the importance not only of being but of appearing to be
virtuous in the eyes of her people.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Revised 'Arcadia' and the Trial Scene:
Philip Sidney's Praise of Folly
The revision of the Arcadia was probably begun in
1582, shortly after the completion of the original
version, and was left incomplete at Sidney's death in
1586. Exactly why the Arcadia was revised is unclear.
The extensive nature of the revisions and the seemingly
reformed character of the princes have suggested to
several critics that Sidney was in some way dissatisfied
with the ethics of the original text, abandoned it and
began writing afresh, transforming what was a pastoral
romance into '"an absolute heroical poem"'.1 Two
editions of the new Arcadia were printed subsequent to
Sidney's death, one in 1590, the other in 1593.2 The
1590 edition, edited by his close friend Fulke Greville,
breaks off at the point at which Sidney discontinued his
revisions, halfway through Book III, while the 1593
edition, edited by the Countess of Pembroke and Hugh
Sanford, contains Books I, II and III of the 1590 edition
(with some variants), and Books IV and V of the old
Arcadia (again with some variants). The Countess of
Pembroke's edition also includes the second half of the
old Arcadia's Book III, with some important changes: in
the Countess's version, Musidorus's attempted rape of
Pamela and the sexual consummation of the unmarried
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Pyrocles and Philoclea are removed from the text. Partly
because of the nature of the change, and partly because
of Hugh Sanford's claim in the editorial preface to the
text that the Countess of Pembroke was moved by the
'disfigured face' of the work 'to take in hand the wiping
away those spots wherewith the beauties thereof were
unworthily blemished' (NA59),3 some critics have assumed
that the revisions of the last few books to the new
Arcadia were made by a rather prudish and editorially
bold Countess of Pembroke.4 However, in recent years the
tide has turned; it is now generally accepted that the
'spots' described by Hugh Sanford in the preface refer
not to the sexual transgressions of the princes in the
old Arcadia but to the editorial shortcomings of the 1590
text, and that the revisions in the final books were made
either by Sidney himself or with his authority.5 The
Countess of Pembroke, it seems, printed the second
edition so soon after the appearance of the 1590 edition
because she was in possession of either a better
manuscript or fuller instructions. Not only does John
Florio suggest as much in the dedication to his
translation of Montaigne,6 but in the preface to the 1593
edition itself Hugh Sanford explains that the reader will
find the text of the concluded new Arcadia altered 'no
further than the author's own writings or known
determinations could direct' (NA59). (Moreover, Victor
Skretkowicz finds authorisation in several of the
revisions in Books I and II of the foul papers of the new
Arcadia for the emendations in Books III and IV.7) The
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textual history of the new Arcadia is important to
unravel, for it is in the ascription of the most
substantial revisions of Books III, IV and V as printed
in the 1593 edition to Philip Sidney that we find
justification for a reading of the new Arcadia which
includes the important trial scene of Book V.
For those critics interested in the relationship
between the original and revised Arcadias, Sidney's
poetic treatise, A Defence of Poetry (which
chronologically separates the two versions), is a
critical clue to an elusive puzzle. The perceived
emphasis in the Defence on the ennobling, educational
role of poetry suggests to many critics either Sidney's
change of heart in his attitude towards poetry -
supporting an interpretation of the revised Arcadia as an
attempt to reform a rather risqu<§ story8 - or his
continuing concern with the moral effects of poetry,
reinforcing the alternative view that the old Arcadia is
a failed attempt at the creation of images of virtue
which is set right by the revision.9 In this chapter I
will argue that the new Arcadia is indeed a continuation
rather than a transformation of the themes explored in
the old Arcadia. However, the basis for this claim lies
in a very different interpretation of A Defence of
Poetry, which I offered in chapter two: the emphasis
placed in the Defence on the educational efficacy of the
'lofty image[s]' of poetry is misleading, I suggested,
since the treatise explores the theme of poetic education
in the broadest sense, concerning itself as much with
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strategies of persuasion (through the creation of
convincing personae), as with the instilling of virtue in
the reader. The former theme, as we have seen, is
integral to my interpretation both of the actions of
Pyrocles and Musidorus in the old Arcadia, and of the
poetic expression of Astrophil in Astrophil and Stella.
It is also integral, I shall argue, to the interpretation
of the actions of the princes in Books I and II of the
new Arcadia: although the princes appear to be reformed
versions of the old Arcadia figures (and are meant to be
interpreted as such), it is in fact more accurate to say
that they are better rhetoricians, that is, that they are
more able to persuade us that they are virtuous. This
change, however, does not mean that the princes of the
new Arcadia are more duplicitous characters; rather it
suggests that Sidney is primarily interested in the new
Arcadia, as in the old, in the 'why and how' of the
creation of 'lofty image[s]': that is, not in teaching us
to be virtuous but in teaching us how to appear virtuous
- a talent which is required, as we will discover in the
trial scene of the new Arcadia, even by the genuinely
virtuous.
The new Arcadia is not simply a longer and more
sophisticated version of the old Arcadia. Indeed, it
differs from the original text in one important respect.
Sidney's old Arcadia serves a similar pedagogic purpose
to A Defence of Poetry, demonstrating a method for the
creation of credible fictions. In this respect, the old
Arcadia is both a good story and a literary manual in
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much the same way that Castiglione's The Book of the
Courtier is both a treatise about the courtierly virtues
and a text in which a rhetorical method for their
apparent acquisition is indicated. Although Books I and
II of the new Arcadia appear to conform, to some extent,
to this plan, there are changes in the revised text which
seem to suggest Sidney's unease with the art of rhetoric.
In Book III Sidney appears to launch an iconoclastic
attack on the kind of rhetorical posturing adopted by the
princes in the earlier books, and to promote in the
characters of Pamela and Philoclea a heroism of quiet
resignation which replaces the rhetorical self-
sufficiency of the male characters in the earlier books.
Thus, in the new Arcadia it seems that Sidney does not
simply disclose to us the rhetorical strategies used by
the princes to create virtuous self-images, but to expose
the vanity of the techniques themselves. And yet it is
important to recognise that the portrayal of the
princesses in Book III of the revised text is itself a
credible image of virtue, and that it elicits from us an
appropriately admiring response. As their example
suggests Sidney is critical of the use to which
rhetorical skills can be put, not critical of the skills
themselves. Indeed, in the trial scene in Book V the
same skills used by the princes in the early books to
seduce the princesses are the only means available to
them of proving their innocence. Rather like Erasmus in
The Praise of Folly, who recognises that the foolish
wisdom of the rhetoricians has a role to play in this
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foolish world, Sidney will demonstrate to us in this
final book that the emotions aroused by rhetorical means
have a part to play not only in the creation of credible
fictions but in the process of judgement-making itself.
In the first part of this chapter I shall offer a
reading of the first two books of the 1593 Arcadia which
emphasises the apparently reformed character of the two
princes, followed by a reading which emphasises that what
seems at first sight to be a genuine moral reformation is
in fact the product of their increased skill in self-
portrayal, and, finally, an examination of the
alternative virtue represented by the princesses, and the
role attributed to the emotions for the appreciation of
this virtue, in Book III. In the second part of this
chapter I shall consider the trial scene in the context,
first, of the old Arcadia, and, secondly, of the new
Arcadia, exploring Sidney's attempt in both versions to
present the art of rhetoric as an instrument essential to
the defence of 'virtue'.
4a. The revised 'Arcadia': Icon-making and Iconoclasm
i. Books I and II: 'lofty images' in a reformed text
One of the most noticeable changes in the new Arcadia,
a change which contributes greatly to its ethical tone,
is the increased respect for Neoplatonism in the text, an
increased respect which encourages us to take seriously
the possibility that the examples of the revised text are
designed to move us to desire and practise virtue.10
Moreover, the apparent influence of Neoplatonism in the
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text endows its virtuous characters with an interiority,
an inner virtue, which was lacking in the earlier text.
In the previous chapter we noted how in the old Arcadia
Neoplatonic imagery was used by Pyrocles in his attempts
to disguise the sexual nature of his desire for
Philoclea. In the revised Arcadia, however, the
Neoplatonic philosophising is no longer restricted to the
self-conscious, defensive arguments of Pyrocles but
exists in an allusive form in some of the more peripheral
love stories, many of which are used to provide more
virtuous portrayals of love and character than are found
in the earlier text. One such story is that of the
shepherds Strephon and Claius, characters whose presence
was confined in the old Arcadia to the eclogues, and
whose thematic importance in the new Arcadia is indicated
by their early appearance in the story. For the new
Arcadia begins not with a description of the education of
its two protagonists, Musidorus and Pyrocles (as did the
old Arcadia), but with the lamentations of Strephon and
Claius for the loss of their beloved Urania. Strephon
and Claius have travelled to the place of Urania's
departure from Laconia to the island of Cithera, in order
to revive their memory of her. For Strephon, the younger
of the two shepherds, their return to this place reminds
him painfully of what he has lost; for Claius, however,
their return has a potentially conciliatory effect,
prompting in him the recollection of Urania's virtues:
'truly no more but as this place served us to think of
those things, so those things serve as places to call to
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memory more excellent matters' (NA63). In his attempt to
assuage Strephon's grief and reconcile him to his loss,
Claius invests Urania with a mystical and Neoplatonic
significance, arguing that Urania's beauty will be better
appreciated by them when it is viewed indirectly: just as
the sun's beauty is better appreciated when it is looked
at askance, so, in the case of Urania, their 'conceits
(not able to bear her sun-staining excellency) will
better weigh it by her works upon some meaner subject
employed' (NA63). Many critics have noticed this
spiritual element in the conception of love that opens
the new text. For Katherine Duncan-Jones Urania is 'not
woman at all but Venus Urania, a type of Heavenly Beauty
which inspires Heavenly love',11 while Alastair Fowler
finds it tempting to think of Strephon and Claius as
figures who demonstrate a Neoplatonic love which
'"raise[s] up our thoughts" by progressive stages'.12 And
yet Strephon and Claius are not, strictly speaking,
Neoplatonic lovers; as Fowler notes, their desire for a
'woman of "sweetest favours", in whom nevertheless "the
least thing that may be praised ... is her beauty"
implies a not quite platonic yearning for the integrated
love of the "whole man"',13 while their contentedness to
recognise and remain within the limitations of their
restricted vision suggests a lack of true Platonic
ambition. Yet no matter how limiting their yearnings for
the absent physical Urania are found to be, there is a
sense in which Strephon and Claius provide both a
positive image of love against which other characters may
288
be judged, and a rehabilitation of the improvised
Neoplatonism of the old Arcadia, albeit in a modified
form. 'Hath not the only love of [Urania]', Claius asks
Strephon, 'made us, being silly ignorant shepherds, raise
up our thoughts beyond the ordinary level of the world,
so as great clerks do not disdain our conference? [...].
Hath not she thrown reason upon our desires and, as it
were, given eyes unto Cupid?* (NA63-64). Strephon and
Claius come close to achieving the kind of 'rational
passion' which was impossible in the old Arcadia, that
is, the love of an individual that is inspired as much by
his or her intrinsic virtue as it is by his or her
physical appearance.
Urania's admirers, Strephon and Claius, are not the
only lovers who provide the positive example of love that
was conspicuously lacking in the old Arcadia. For many
critics, the prime example of virtuous love in the new
Arcadia is the story of Argalus and Parthenia, not that
of Strephon and Claius.14 It is clear from the beginning
of their story, early in Book I, that Argalus and
Parthenia are to be taken as figures of masculine and
feminine virtue respectively; while Argalus is depicted
as a Herculean hero, manifesting in his actions the
knowledge he has cultivated at the Arcadian court,
Parthenia is presented as the epitome of womanly virtue,
possessing 'a wit which delighted more to judge itself
than to shew itself', a 'rare' and 'precious' way of
speaking, 'silence without sullenness' and 'modesty
without affectation' (NA88),15 Betrothed by her mother to
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the prince of the Helots, Demogorus, Parthenia is content
to accept her lot until she meets Argalus, with whom she
falls in love, 'and out of passion began to take
authority of judgement' (NA89), openly rebelling against
the commands of her mother. Parthenia's mother sends
Argalus on a number of dangerous quests, 'as ever the
evil stepmother Juno recommended to the famous Hercules'
(NA89), with the hope that he might thus be removed as an
obstacle to the more advantageous marriage. In the
meantime Demagorus learns of the change in Parthenia's
allegiance and revenges himself on her by rubbing a
poisonous potion over her face, 'the effect whereof was
such that never leper looked more ugly than she did'
(NA90). On his return to Arcadia, having successfully
completed the trials that were set him, Argalus reacts to
the sight of the disfigured Parthenia first with shock
and, then, with unconcern. As he attempts to explain to
Parthenia, her physical beauty was but 'as a marshal to
lodge the love of her in his mind, which now was so well
placed as it needed no further help of any outward
harbinger' (NA91). Like Strephon and Claius Argalus is
attached less to the physical form of beauty than to the
'idea' of beauty, which Parthenia's virtues still
represent to him. However, Parthenia refuses to be
married to Argalus in such a state of physical ugliness
and she disappears from Arcadia. When she eventually
returns, her beauty having been miraculously restored by
a physician at the court of Helen of Corinth, she
presents herself to Argalus not as Parthenia, whom she
290
insists is dead, but as a friend whose resemblance to
Parthenia makes her a possible substitute. Argalus's
response is important, for it offers an insight into the
serious point of this fairy-tale story, and an indication
of the extent to which the idea of love has been revised
in the new Arcadia. Argalus explains that he loves
Parthenia not for any superficial manifestation of beauty
but for her virtue, which is identifiable with an
interior self: 'it was Parthenia's self I loved and love,
which no likeness can make one, no commandment dissolve,
no foulness defile, nor no death finish' (NA105). Like
Strephon and Claius Argalus reverses the emphasis placed
on physical beauty in the old Arcadia: he associates an
individual's worth with an interior rather than an
exterior identity, suggesting the influence on the new
Arcadia revisions of both the Protestant belief in a God-
given, intrinsic 'self',16 and the Neoplatonism of Pico
della Mirandola, which largely divorces physical beauty
from the beauty of the soul.17 Such an emphasis
necessarily bestows on the characters of the text an
interiority that was absent in the earlier text.
The description of Parthenia as a character who
possesses an inner being that is impervious to any
external change would seem to render redundant the
rhetorical arts that were used so successfully in the old
Arcadia by the two princes to persuade Philoclea and
Pamela to fall in love. For an individual whose inner
being is fixed can resist the rhetorical techniques which
aim at creating an insecurity, followed by a change, in
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his or her identity and allegiances. It is not
surprising therefore that the story of Argalus and
Parthenia should also offer a revised notion of the
relationship between the lover and the beloved; Argalus
and Parthenia show that this relationship need not be
conceived as a power struggle, and that the culmination
of love does not always depend on an act of persuasion.
Argalus and Parthenia fall in love at first sight, and
their relationship is an expression of harmonious
reciprocity and mutual understanding. This is nowhere
more evident than in the depiction of their marital bliss
in Book III. A messenger sent by Basilius to recruit
Argalus's services in his war against Amphialus intrudes
upon their domestic scene to discover Argalus reading the
stories of Hercules to Parthenia:
A happy couple: he joying in her, she joying in
herself, but in herself, because she enjoyed him:
both increasing their riches by giving to each
other; each making one life double, because they
made a double life one; where desire never wanted
satisfaction, nor satisfaction ever bred satiety: he
ruling, because she would obey, or rather because
she would obey, she therein ruling (NA501).
Argalus and Parthenia have succeeded in achieving a unity
based on a reciprocity that does not deny hierarchy. The
claim that he rules and she obeys but 'because she would
obey, she therein rul[es]', suggests that their
relationship is based on subordination rather than
subjugation, from which its harmony arises. Argalus and
Parthenia are Protestant versions of Neoplatonic lovers;
the paradoxical description of their endless fulfilment
suggests the Platonic vision of the soul's banquet at the
heavenly table described by Marsilio Ficino in his
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Commentary on Plato's Symposium, a banquet where 'souls
enjoy the same feasts eternally without satiety',18 while
the emphasis on their harmonious coexistence recalls the
Protestant ideal of married love.19 The picture of their
marital happiness also suggests their superiority to
Strephon and Claius, who must learn to content themselves
with the absence of their beloved (whose face is 'too
glorious for our weak eyes') (NA63). Argalus and
Parthenia are the example of virtuous love in the new
Arcadia. And yet they are also more than this. As
Maurice Evans remarks, it is appropriate that Argalus is
telling Parthenia about the exploits of Hercules 'whose
heroic deeds, described in poetry, will move him to a
like heroism' (NA25).20 Argalus and Parthenia are also
examples of the ideal reader depicted in the early pages
of the Defence, the reader who is inspired to act
virtuously by the 'lofty image' of poetry.
The stories of Argalus and Parthenia, and of Strephon,
Claius and Urania preface the love adventures of Pyrocles
and Musidorus, and therefore influence the way in which
we initially perceive their love adventures. Moreover,
there are changes to the way in which the princes are
introduced as lovers which suggest that they come within
the reforming sweep of the new text. For example, in the
old Arcadia Pyrocles is moved by the beauty of Philoclea
and the tragedy of her story to fall in love with her,
and he dresses in a female disguise which he intends to
use both to gain access to Philoclea in the retreat and
to capture her affections and trust. By the time that
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Pyrocles has actually donned the disguise the reader is
fully informed of these intentions. In the new Arcadia,
however, Pyrocles disappears while Kalander and his party
are hunting and we hear no further news of him until
Musidorus accidently stumbles across him in an arbour
already dressed in his Amazonian disguise. In this way
we receive the full effect and significance of Pyrocles1s
metamorphosis; Pyrocles appears before us as a Diana-like
figure dressed in a 'doublet of sky-colour satin, covered
with plates of gold and, as it were, nailed with precious
stones' (NA130). Not only does Pyrocles adopt the
Neoplatonic colours of the sky and the sun (as he did in
the earlier text), suggesting the heavenly nature of his
thoughts, but the new name he chooses for himself,
'Zelmane', is indicative both of the zealous nature of
his love and the honourable nature of his intentions; for
Pyrocles has named himself after Zelmane, a character who
resembles Parthenia both in her virtue and in her
willingness to die for love.21 Moreover, the suddenness
with which Pyrocles's transformation takes place suggests
its spontaneity rather than its cunning contrivance; it
allows us to take at face value Pyrocles's claim both in
his debate with Musidorus and in the later scene in which
he reveals his male identity to Philoclea, to have been
transformed by love.22 Pyrocles no longer appears as a
manipulative rhetorician; he is more akin to the artist
who has sculpted the statues in Kalander's garden, the
artist who is so inspired by the beauty he sees in his
subject that in his recreation of that beauty it seems
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not that his skill 'bestowed on the other new beauty, but
that the beauty of her bestowed new skill' on him (NA74).
In short, Pyrocles's falling in love in the new Arcadia
seems to make him more virtuous, not simply more
rhetorically proficient.
One of the important new details of the disguise is
the insignia Pyrocles adopts. In the old Arcadia the
device chosen by Pyrocles to adorn his disguise is 'an
eagle covered with the feathers of a dove' set beneath
'another dove' so that 'it seemed the dove preyed upon
the eagle, the eagle casting up such a look as though the
state he was in liked him, though the pain grieved him'
(OA24). The device represents the Petrarchan inversion
of the traditional male/female hierarchy in the
relationship between lover and beloved, an inversion
which is criticised by Musidorus in the debate. In the
new Arcadia, however, Pyrocles chooses 'a Hercules made
in little form, but set with a distaff in his hand, as he
once was by Omphale's commandment' (NA131). Pyrocles can
thus be identified with the hero we have come to
associate with Argalus. However, as several critics have
noted, the reference to Omphale recalls not the legends
of Hercules's superhuman adventures, but the less
flattering stories of his effeminisation. For these
critics Pyrocles's device thus reinforces the
shamefulness of his transformation.23 Yet both the
epigram which accompanies the device, 'Never more
valiant', and the emphasis Pyrocles places on the active
nature of his undertaking (NA136) suggest that he still
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sees his exploits in heroic terms, and that we are meant
to associate him with Herculean virtue, highlighted by
the fact that he heroically defends the royal retreat
from Arcadian rebels while still dressed in his Amazonian
disguise at the end of Book II.
Pyrocles's adoption of the Hercules insignia invites a
comparison with the hero with whom Argalus is already
associated, and therefore, indirectly, a comparison with
Argalus himself. Pyrocles's closeness to Argalus is
suggested in other parts of the revised text. For
example, not only does Pyrocles first fall in love with a
Parthenia-like figure, Zelmane, but the 'fair face' of
Parthenia later becomes 'a lecture to [him] of
Philoclea's imagined beauty' which itself recalls to him
the virtue of Zelmane (NA141). (Like Argalus, Pyrocles
appears to be in love with virtue itself, of which the
physical beauty of Philoclea, and later of Parthenia,
merely reminds him.) The Neoplatonic stance assumed by
Pyrocles in the debate with Musidorus is thus reinforced
in the love plot itself. We should not be surprised to
find that the relationship between Pyrocles and Philoclea
is described in the feasting terms that are later so
important to the representation of Argalus's and
Parthenia's 'Platonic' love. Not only is Philoclea's
picture described as a 'table' (NA74), but when Pyrocles
enters the retreat he is seated opposite Philoclea at a
circular banqueting table which turns on its axis. 'What
pleasure did it to me to make divers times the full
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circle round about', Pyrocles tells Musidorus, recounting
to him this first adventure,
since Philoclea, being also set, was carried still
in equal distance from me, and that only my eyes did
overtake her, which (when the table was stayed and
we began to feed) drank much more eagerly of her
beauty than my mouth did of any other liquor
(NA148).
Pyrocles feasts endlessly on the sight of Philoclea in
much the same way that Argalus feasts 'without satiety'
upon the sight of Parthenia in Book III.
There is a third respect, however, in which both
princes resemble Argalus. Argalus and Parthenia are not
just images of virtuous love; they are also, Maurice
Evans claims, examples of the reader depicted in the
early part of the Defence, the reader who is moved by the
'lofty image' of the noble actions he encounters in
literature to perform similarly noble acts in real life.
In the account Musidorus gives of his and Pyrocles's
princely education in Book II he suggests that their own
virtues have been developed in such a way, through their
reading of heroic histories. Even before the princes
could speak, he explains, they were presented with
'excellent devices':
images of battles and fortifications being then
delivered to their memory, which after, their
stronger judgements might dispense; the delight of
tales being converted to the knowledge of all the
stories of worthy princes, both to move them to do
nobly and teach them how to do nobly; the beauty of
virtue still being set before their eyes, and that
taught them with far more diligent care than
grammatical rules (NA258).
The description Musidorus gives of their education
recalls the account Sidney gives in A Defence of Poetry
of how the 'lofty image' of poetic heroes 'inflameth the
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mind with desire to be worthy' (47). Musidorus's
representation of their education suggests that there is
an emphasis in the revised text on the ethical efficacy
of poetic images, an emphasis reinforced by the new role
given to the author-narrator of the text. Whereas the
ironic narrator of the old Arcadia draws the attention of
the reader to the danger of rhetorical manipulation, the
absence of such an intrusive voice in the new Arcadia
suggests Sidney's greater confidence both in the
potential of his images to inspire in the reader a desire
to act virtuously, and in the reader to receive those
images rightly. Although the emphasis in the old Arcadia
is on the 'infected will' of the princes and the reader,
in the new Arcadia it appears to lie instead on the
'erected wit' of characters and readers alike.24 The new
Arcadia thus appears to reflect Sidney's increased faith
in human nature. Significantly, in the account Musidorus
gives of his and Pyrocles•s education he makes it clear
that the reading of history did not create virtue in them
but cultivated what was already latent within them: 'a
habit of commanding was naturalized to them' as a result
of their studies, Musidorus explains, but 'Nature' had
already made them 'lords of truth, whereon all the other
goods were builded' (NA259).
ii. The characters of Pyrocles and Musidorus reconsidered
At the beginning of this chapter I suggested that
Books I and II of the new Arcadia are less a revision
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than a continuation of the earlier text and its principal
interest in the creation of credible images. The
revisions in the text which I have so far described,
however, suggest that the new text has indeed departed
from the concerns of the old Arcadia by offering a
revised notion of love as something which is inspired by
the virtue intrinsic in a character rather than by his or
her physical beauty. The reformed tone of the new
Arcadia touches the princes Pyrocles and Musidorus, for
not only do their pre-Arcadian actions earn them both the
title of 'hero' but their adventures inside the Arcadian
retreat seem to demonstrate their greater integrity. I
would suggest, however, that although this new ethical
emphasis in the revised Arcadia does rub off on the
princes, so that they do indeed seem to be genuinely more
virtuous, what we actually perceive is not so much their
greater heroism (or, at least, not just this) but their
increased ability to portray themselves as heroes.
Indeed, in some respects the princes' actual behaviour in
the Arcadian retreat seems to have changed very little.
In the old Arcadia Pyrocles's name 'Cleophila' and the
Amazonian disguise he adopts are both a sign of his
transformed state and a ploy that will gain him access to
Philoclea's affection; similarly, in the new Arcadia,
Pyrocles chooses the name 'Zelmane' and the Amazonian
disguise both for the honour of the virtuous Zelmane 'to
whose memory [he is] so much bound' (NA142) and because
it is 'the only hope of [his] advancement' in this new
love affair (NA151). In short, the disguise which he
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adopts in the new Arcadia is also 'a secret help' which
enables him to pursue his self-interests. Pyrocles is no
less an opportunist or strategist in the revised text
than he was in the old Arcadia/ nor is his love more
spiritually ambitious: in the account Pyrocles gives to
Musidorus of the banquet in Basilius's retreat he
describes both how he feasts on the sight of Philoclea
(in terms that recall the depiction of perfect, fulfilled
love by Marsilio Ficino) and how his senses eventually
gain the upperhand over his reasoning ability, so that he
is forced to 'loose the reins unto them' and take full
advantage of the voyeuristic opportunity that his female
disguise has afforded him (NA149). A more serious
indictment of Pyrocles is found in the Ladon scene of
Book II, the scene in which he uses his disguise to gain
access to the princesses' private bathing resort, 'a
place upon pain of death as nobody durst presume to come
thither' (NA285). Sexually aroused by the sight of the
naked Philoclea, Pyrocles takes up his lute and begins to
compose a song as if 'with a divine fury inspired'. 'So
together went the utterance and the invention', the
narrator remarks, 'that one might judge it was
Philoclea's beauty which did speedily write it in her
[i.e. Pyrocles's] eyes, or the sense thereof which did
word by word indite it in her mind, whereto she (but as
an organ) did only lend utterance' (italics mine)
(NA287). The ironic voice of the author-narrator
unexpectedly creeps into the narrative, undermining the
Platonism of Pyrocles's supposed inspiration. Such
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examples of Pyrocles's sexual motivation should be seen
as a sign not of the incomplete nature of the new Arcadia
revisions (the banquet scene is a new addition to the
revised text) but of the continued ethical ambiguity of
Pyrocles, and, at least by association, of Musidorus.
As the examples of his sexual passion suggest,
Pyrocles has changed very little in the new Arcadia
although, interestingly, few critics have drawn attention
to this fact. The emphasis placed in the new Arcadia on
the efficacy of poetic images and the seemingly more
objective mode of narration contribute greatly to the new
image of the princes, encouraging the reader to take at
face value the ethical pretensions of the text. And yet
as the Ladon scene demonstrates, the ironic narration of
the old Arcadia still survives in the new text, although
the occasions of its occurrence are less frequent. More
important, however, is the shift in narratorial
responsibility occasioned by the introduction of a more
unobtrusive author-narrator: many of the author-
narrator's speeches of the old Arcadia, rather than
disappearing from the new text, have simply been taken
over by the princes.25 The effect of this change is to
give the princes more control over the presentation of
their own characters. For example, in the scene in which
Pyrocles first meets Philoclea in the old Arcadia, the
narrator represents Pyrocles at one moment as a
spiritually ravished Neoplatonic lover and at another as
a sneaking voyeur; the reader receives the impression
that the narrator is actually more far-sighted and
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realistic than Pyrocles, who, it appears, has naively
idealised a sensual passion. In the new Arcadia,
however, it is Pyrocles who describes both the semi-naked
appearance of Philoclea and the more spiritual response
the sight supposedly provokes in him. Not only has
Pyrocles taken control of his characterisation in this
scene, but the absence of the ironic voice of the
narrator makes it easy for a careless reader to overlook
the discrepancies in his self-presentation. This example
raises the important question of the nature of
narratorial influence in the revised text. In the old
Arcadia, the ironic asides of the narrator draw the
attention of the reader to the dangers of a reading which
is susceptible to the rhetorical intentions of a text;
the seemingly more objective tone of the new Arcadia,
however, can make us forget this important point,
inspiring an unwarranted confidence in the narratorial
integrity of both the author-narrator and the princes,
who themselves participate in the narration of their past
actions. (In the old Arcadia, in contrast, it is Histor
who recounts their past adventures (OA139).) Indeed, the
unobtrusiveness of narratorial influence in the new
Arcadia encourages us to see the princes' relation of
their own adventures as a part of the straightforward
narration of the plot. Thus, when reading the revised
text it is necessary that we remind ourselves of what was
obvious in the old Arcadia: that the princes relate their
adventures to the princesses not to inspire them to act
virtuously (as Argalus's story-telling is claimed by
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Maurice Evans to do) but to persuade Pamela and Philoclea
to fall in love.26
Nor is the princes' concern with their self-
presentation a feature solely of the love situation;
indeed, in the account Musidorus gives in Book II of his
and Pyrocles's education he indicates that the 'lofty
image[s]' of history have inspired in them a desire both
to emulate the historical actions they have read about
and to become 'lofty image[s]' themselves, something
which they set out to achieve both in their pursuit of
adventures and in their relation of those adventures.
Although Pyrocles and Musidorus begin their continental
tour with the intention of putting into practice the
precepts they have learnt in the classroom, and of
fulfilling the political ideals of the humanists, their
public actions soon give way to their private concern to
develop their reputation: 'not content with those public
actions of princely and, as it were, governing virtue'
Pyrocles and Musidorus begin to look for trials which
will make them 'more famous because more perilous'
(NA273). The degree to which the princes compromise
humanist values is nowhere more evident than in
Pyrocles's rescue of Zelmane's tyrannical father
Plexirtus; although Pyrocles tells Philoclea that he
undertakes the dangerous and unethical quest because his
'word was passed', he also adds that 'the hardness of the
enterprise' attracted him, 'knowing well that the journey
of high honour lies not in plain ways' (NA369). And he
concludes his tale of the fight (an adventure 'which
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hundreds durst not attempt') with the observation that
the onlookers were so full of admiration for his feats
that 'there was order given to have the fight, both by
sculpture and picture, celebrated in most parts of Asia'
(NA369). As this example demonstrates, the princes are
concerned as much with the development of their heroic
fame as they are with the fulfilment of their public
duty, and they are actively engaged in creating the
opportunities for such display. Although Musidorus tells
Pamela that they decided to continue their travels rather
than return to Macedon in order to 'employ [their] gifts'
'to the good of mankind', he immediately adds that they
also went 'privately to seek exercises of their virtue,
thinking it not so worthy to be brought to heroical
effects by fortune or necessity, like Ulysses and Aeneas,
as by one's own choice and working' (NA275). In their
attempt to create situations in which they can exercise
their virtue and establish their reputation, Pyrocles and
Musidorus resemble Machiavelli's ideal prince, a figure
who not only understands the importance for the success
of future government of acquiring good reputation but who
possesses as well the creative skill which will ensure
its attainment.27
Many of the stories concerning the princes' pre-
Arcadian adventures are new additions to the revised
text. One such story is Musidorus's rescue of Argalus
and Clitophon. For this adventure Musidorus 'invent[s]'
a plan in which the Arcadian nobility disguise themselves
as poor men in order to gain access to the city of the
304
republican Helots. The inspiration for this deceitful
ruse, the narrator comments, is history, the reading of
which has provided Musidorus with examples of such
'stratagems' (NA95). A similar adventure, in which
Pyrocles undertakes to save Musidorus from the revenge of
the tyrannical king of Phrygia, is related in Book II.
Realising that he cannot muster sufficient forces to
invade Phrygia, Pyrocles disguises himself in the clothes
of a poor man and poses as the executioner's servant
(NA268). In this disguise Pyrocles gains access to the
scaffold on which Musidorus is meant to lose his life
and, inspired by 'just rage' and 'desperate virtue',
performs such deeds that he wins both the liberty of
Musidorus and the admiration of his beholders, who
believe his feats are 'beyond mortal power' (NA269). As
the inventiveness of the princes in these adventures
suggests, and as the comments of the narrator on the
benefits derived by Musidorus from the reading of history
imply, the actions of Musidorus and Pyrocles are informed
by a Machiavellian reading of history and not just, as
Musidorus insists in his account of their education, by
the inspirational effect of heroic images. What these
examples also make clear is the fact that the princes use
'disguise' as a military strategy as well as a rhetorical
resource in the love plot, thus revealing that the
distinction between military adventures and the pursuit
of love is more blurred than Musidorus allows in the
debate in Book I. The additional stories in the new
Arcadia make it clear that the princes do not in fact
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digress from the ideals of their education; they actually
continue to practice in the love-plot the essentially
military skills they have learnt from history books and
from military experience.
The importance of dress to the establishment of
reputation is exploited by the princes in the new Arcadia
as much as it was by the princes in the old Arcadia. For
example, when we first meet Pyrocles in the new Arcadia,
he is already dressed in the sky-blue and gold colours of
his later disguise, waving a sword above his head and
sitting astride a fallen mast in the sea; the fishermen
who behold this spectacle respond with superstitious
'amazement', and are thrown into inaction. Musidorus's
reply that Pyrocles is 'but a man although of most divine
excellencies' (NA67), while critical of the naive
response of the fishermen, reinforces the heroic status
of Pyrocles; at the same time it suggests to the reader
the representative nature of his dress: Pyrocles is as
'good' as he looks. It is only in a later episode in
Book V that it is suggested that the clothes worn by the
princes are chosen carefully by them, and are calculated
to capture the sympathy or admiration of their audience
(NA808-9),28 This sensitivity to audience expectation is
characteristic also of their story-telling which, like
the clothes they assume, is part of the play-acting or
rhetorical posturing so important to their romantic
success. The scene in which Musidorus uses his lyre to
reinforce the import of his tale and solicit Pamela's
compassion has been related in an earlier discussion of
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the old Arcadia; another example of such sensitivity, and
one specific to the revised text, is the tale Pyrocles
tells Philoclea of his first love, Zelmane. In this
story Pyrocles reveals his kinship to the slippery and
articulate Pamphialus, whose success in the art of
seduction depends on his ability to stir the 'passions'
of his mistresses, 'making [them] now jealous, now
envious, now proud' of their lover (NA336). 'Pardon me,
only dear lady', Pyrocles tells Philoclea at the
beginning of his tale, 'that I use many words, for
[Zelmane's] affection to me deserves of me an
affectionate speech' (NA360). Pyrocles's claim that
Philoclea is his 'only dear lady' seems destined to
dispel any jealousy that may arise, while in his
conclusion to the tale he carefully avoids admitting that
he has already loved: 'I must confess for true that if my
stars had not wholly reserved me for you, there else
perhaps I might have loved' (NA367).29 And yet at the
same time Pyrocles poignantly reminds Philoclea of the
fact that he has been loved before, and in doing so he
indicates to her his worthiness; the story of Zelmane is,
among other things, further evidence of the dazzling
effect Pyrocles has on his beholders.30
In one respect the suggested comparison between
Pyrocles and the rhetorically proficient Pamphialus made
above is unfair, for it is from this false Petrarchan
orator that Pyrocles rescues Dido. And yet, in another
respect, the comparison is helpful, for of all the
stories Pyrocles tells, the tale of Dido and Pamphialus
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is perhaps the most complex: it puts in question not only
his motivation for telling stories but the sincerity of
the roles he plays. Pyrocles introduces the story as a
digression which 'though in itself of small importance'
he decides to include because 'thereof [he] was brought
to as great a cumber and danger as lightly any might
escape' (NA334). The story is of small account because,
unlike the other stories he tells, it does not involve
intrigues of a political nature, and it takes place while
he is en route to a more important adventure, a duel with
Anaxius. Alerted by the sound of cries, Pyrocles
ventures into a copse where he discovers a man being
whipped by nine women. Moved to compassion by the sight
of this man's plight, Pyrocles rushes to his rescue,
driving away all the women except one, 'who was so
fleshed in malice that neither during nor after the fight
she gave any truce to her cruelty, but still used the
little instrument of her great spite, to the well-
witnessed pain of the impatient patient' (NA335). The
'impatient patient' turns out to be Pamphialus, a false
Petrarchan lover who seems to deserve the beating he
gets, while the woman 'fleshed with malice', is revealed
to be the dishonoured Dido. Having settled the dispute,
Pyrocles then goes on his way with the intention of
fulfilling his promise to fight with Anaxius. This
important fight, however, is once again disturbed by Dido
and Pamphialus. For the released Pamphialus, having
captured the vulnerable Dido and tied her up, drives her
in front of him, beating her 'with most unmanlike
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cruelty' (NA340). At the sight of Dido's suffering,
Pyrocles's compassion is once again stirred, and he begs
Anaxius to defer the fight. Anaxius's uncourteous reply
forces Pyrocles to take his leave regardless of the
attack on his valour which inevitably follows. Pyrocles
is forced to choose between protecting either the honour
of Dido or his own valorous reputation. The choice is
not an easy one: Pyrocles admits that as he rushed to
rescue Dido he was 'ashamed to see a number of country
folks who happened to pass thereby, who halloed and
hooted after me as at the arrantest coward that ever
showed his shoulders to his enemy' (NA340). What this
episode importantly seems to reveal to Philoclea,
i
however, is not Pyrocles's cowardice but his willingness
to dedicate himself to the service of a lady; Pyrocles
follows the example set by Chretien de Troyes's Lancelot,
the model of chivalric excellence who willingly played
the 'coward's part' at the command of Guinevere.31
The Dido and Pamphialus story is unusual because it is
the only story Pyrocles tells in which he seems to be
willing to compromise his reputation. And yet the
ultimate effect of his action is not to diminish his
standing in others' eyes; as D.M. Anderson notes, the
fact that Pyrocles risks being called 'a coward for the
sake of a maiden (if she can be so named) whose
disposition is not notably virtuous' shows him to be
'unremittingly noble and generous',32 while his rejection
of the misogynist Anaxius establishes him as a hero in
the alternative mould of the chivalric knight. What is
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interesting about this story, however, is its moral
complexity. Pyrocles sets out to save the honour of a
woman who cannot 'deny but she was driven [...] to
receive more than decent favours' (NA342) from her lover,
and the justness of whose revenge is never fully
established; Dido avenges herself on Pamphialus not only
because of his unfaithfulness but because he has
dismissed her beauty (NA338). In his defence of Dido
Pyrocles thus risks being compared to Phalantus, whose
half-hearted chivalric indulgence of Artesia's vanity was
mocked in Book I (NA161-8). Moreover, Pyrocles's
motivation for the rescue of Dido is unclear. Pyrocles
first rescues Pamphialus because he is moved to
compassion by the sight of his suffering; Pyrocles's
allegiance soon changes, however, when he hears Dido's
side of the story, a change reinforced when he later sees
her being beaten by Pamphialus. And yet Pyrocles finally
admits that he is glad to have 'done so good a deed for a
gentlewoman not unhandsome', suggesting a possible sexual
motive for this adventure (NA341),33 Pyrocles's
motivation in telling the story to Philoclea is similarly
unclear. Although he claims that he tells Philoclea the
story because it forms part of his biographical
narrative, he simultaneously establishes himself as a
'lady's man', reinforcing the version he gave of himself
in the debate with Musidorus as a defender of women. Yet
what we will discover in Book III of the new Arcadia is
the partiality of Pyrocles's respect for women.
Believing that Philoclea and Pamela are dead, and
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criticised by a gentlewoman (Philoclea in disguise) for
his effeminate lamentations, Pyrocles responds with an
attack on women that recalls the misogyny both of
Musidorus in the debate in Book I and of Anaxius in Book
III;34 for Pyrocles concludes that without the princesses
there is nothing 'left in that sex, but babbling and
busyness', and when the disguised Philoclea offers
further to console him he attempts to strike her (NA567).
Pyrocles, I suggest, is not a defender of women by
'nature' or by conviction; it is a position which he
recognises is part of the role of 'lover', and which he
takes up along with this role. The success of his
'acting' is perhaps nowhere better revealed than in his
telling of the Dido and Pamphialus story; Pyrocles's
ability to move his audience to share his compassion
first for Pamphialus and then for the ambiguous Dido, and
his ability to present as further evidence of his own
heroism his involvement in a morally ambiguous and even
petty squabble, proves above all else his virtuosity as a
story-teller.
iii) Iconoclasm, iconography: idealism versus scepticism
in Book III
The incident in Book III in which Pyrocles fails to
recognise the disguised Philoclea and launches into a
misogynist tirade is important not only because it shows
the tenuousness of Pyrocles's earlier claim to be a
defender of women but because it shows his unwillingness
to accept what many critics see as the central, feminine
virtue of this book, the virtue of patience.35 For
Pyrocles rejects the attempt of the disguised Philoclea
311
to assuage his grief, denouncing her words as 'woman's
philosophy, childish folly' (NA567), when Philoclea is in
fact offering him a conventional form of Christian
consolation. Like the figure 'Philosophy' who consoles
the imprisoned Boethius by reminding him of the
transience of the physical world,36 Philoclea attempts to
abate the grief of Pyrocles by reminding him of the
inevitability of decay (NA566). In one respect Pyrocles
is right to refer to this doctrine of resignation as
'women's philosophy'; patience is a virtue traditionally
possessed by women and exercised in Book III of the new
Arcadia only by the heroines Pamela and Philoclea. (It
is not until the trial scene in Book V when, faced with
death, Pyrocles and Musidorus learn to resign themselves
to their fate and to refer to a divine organising power
(NA803-5).) In contrast to the male characters of this
book, who engage in increasingly futile and dangerous
displays of private valour in the name of chivalry,
Pamela and Philoclea stand out as figures who retain a
degree of dignity, and it is Pamela's quiet resistance in
the face of adversity which calls for particular
attention. Indeed, Sidney's description of her suffering
is particularly notable: 'if ever virtue took a body to
show his else-unconceivable beauty, it was in Pamela',
for though she is initially stirred to resist Cecropia's
'divers torment', she finally resigns herself to suffer
instead 'with so heavenly a quietness and so graceful a
calmness [...] that while they vexed her fair body, it
seemed that she rather directed than obeyed the vexation'
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(553). Pamela demonstrates here the 'new heroism' of the
sixteenth century, the heroism in which 'the highest form
of action is the apparent inaction of enduring, with
patience and composure, any physical or spiritual torment
that may be imposed': Pamela's kindred characters are the
Protestant martyrs whose stories are told so movingly by
John Foxe in Acts and Monuments .37
An analogy between Pamela and Christian martyrs is
further encouraged by her apparent allegiance to monism.
In the famous debate with Cecropia, a debate referred to
by Mark Rose as 'the philosophical core' of the new
Arcadia,38 Pamela offers a Platonic understanding of
earthly mutability which anticipates Philoclea's later
consolatory remarks to Pyrocles and which comes
remarkably close to Christian doctrine. In an attempt to
persuade Pamela to become the mistress of Amphialus,
Cecropia attacks her moral scruples, arguing that the
ruling principle of the universe is chance, not a divine
Godhead, and that social customs, like superstitions, are
invented to keep ambitious individuals in their place
(NA487-8). Pamela scornfully responds with an attack on
Cecropia's atheism, asserting the existence of a divine
organising principle: 'if nothing but chance had glued
those pieces of this All', she reasons, 'the heavy parts
would have gone infinitely downward, the light infinitely
upward' (NA489). For Pamela, the fact that the world is
governed by 'a superior power and wisdom' is proved by
the visible 'unity' which derives from the
'contrarieties' of the universe (NA489). It is at this
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point in the new Arcadia that a character comes close to
enunciating the kind of theology embraced by Sidney and
his Christian audience;39 not surprisingly later audiences
have found this an attractive and significant moment in
the revised text. Book III is the most extensively
revised book in the new Arcadia and the philosophical
element which it introduces suggests that the
distinctiveness of the revised text lies in its implicit
critique of the scepticism so predominant in Sidney's
earlier works and of the rhetorical cunning of the
princes in particular.
It is important to recognise that the princes play a
much diminished role in the captivity episode. The fact
that Basilius lays siege to Amphialus's castle means that
Musidorus is prevented from initiating the kind of clever
strategies which were so successful on earlier occasions,
while Pyrocles, imprisoned both in the castle and in his
female disguise, is forced to sit tight until help
arrives. The fact that the princes are shown to be
powerless in this book suggests a critical glance at
their claim to self-sufficiency and their rhetorical
resourcefulness; at the same time, their reduced role
means that the attack on their use of rhetoric in this
book is never levelled directly at them. A more central
male figure in Book III is Amphialus, and it is through
this morally ambiguous character that the rhetorical
manoeuvres of the princes are implicitly criticized. The
connection between Pyrocles and Amphialus is particularly
strong and is established early in Book II: Amphialus,
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like Pyrocles, is in love with Philoclea, and he shares
with him a willingness to indulge this desire by adopting
the role of a peeping Tom (NA292); moreover, Amphialus's
identity as a lover, like that of Pyrocles, is explored
through Petrarchan conceits, and the obedient and fawning
spaniel becomes a fitting emblem for his emotional state
too.40 The terms in which Amphialus offers his love to
the captured Philoclea recall those used by Pyrocles in
an earlier book; like Pyrocles, Amphialus refuses to
accept responsibility for his actions, claiming that it
is Philoclea herself who has effectively captured him:
'it is you yourself that imprison yourself: it is your
beauty which makes these castle-walls embrace you: it is
your own eyes which reflect upon themselves this injury1
(NA451). What is different in Book III, however, is that
the paradox of his position is rather ruthlessly revealed
by the fact of Philoclea's real imprisonment ('You
entitle yourself my slave', she rebukes him; 'but I am
sure I am yours' (NA449)). Moreover, despite being 'a
prisoner to his prisoner' (NA451), Amphialus, like
Pyrocles, is revealed to be a masterful rhetorician. For
example, once he recognises the need to wage war on
Basilius if he is to keep Philoclea in the castle,
Amphialus decides to rally his forces around him and
discover among the Arcadians possible supporters;
understanding 'how violently rumours do blow the sails of
popular judgements, and how few there can be that discern
between truth and truth-likeness, between shows and
substance' Amphialus sends to the Arcadian nobility 'a
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justification of this his action1 which might 'hide
indeed the foulness of his treason' (NA452), while at the
same time 'sow[ing] abroad' many 'discourses' 'painted
with rhetorical colours' with the hope that this would
'breed' among his potential enemies 'a coolness to deal
violently with him, and a false-minded neutrality to
expect the issue' (NA454). A slave to his beloved
Philoclea Amphialus may be, but he is also a capable
Machiavellian strategist.
It is not only the Petrarchan role that is questioned
in this text through its adoption by Amphialus; the role
of chivalric knight is also undermined by his assuming
it. This may be seen, for example, by his behaviour in
the episode in which he fights with Phalantus. Bored by
the tiresome nature of the siege, Phalantus takes it upon
himself to offer a challenge of single combat to
Amphialus. Phalantus's motive for doing so is not a
desire to resolve the dispute between Amphialus and
Basilius but a wish 'to keep his valour in knowledge' so
that 'his old mistress Artesia might see whom she had so
lightly forsaken' (NA494). In the challenge he addresses
to Amphialus Phalantus reveals that it is 'the liking of
matters martial' rather than 'any mislike' for Amphialus
that brings him to the battlefield, and his motivation is
further emphasised by his choosing as the place for their
meeting an island close to the castle so 'that the ladies
may have the pleasure of seeing the combat' (NA495).
Amphialus's reception of the challenge is telling - he
reads it with 'a cheerful countenance', thinks 'a little
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with himself' and then pens a reply: 'prepare [...] your
arms to fight, but not your heart to malice, since true
valour needs no other whetstone than desire of honour'
(NA495). Amphialus agrees to the battle as if it were a
light-hearted tournament designed to display his own
martial qualities for the entertainment of Philoclea:
rather like Pyrocles in Book II, Amphialus uses such
moments of martial combat as part of his love rhetoric.
The difference between this theatrical combat, however,
and the stories related by Pyrocles is that here the tone
of the narration is implicitly critical; for it is
Amphialus's pursuit of a chivalric ideal that leads to
the destruction of the marital ideal of the new Arcadia
as represented by Argalus and Parthenia.
It seems that in Book III of the new Arcadia Sidney
launches an attack on the kinds of actions performed by
the princes in the earlier books, replacing the examples
of their rhetorical virtuosity with a more recognisably
Christian or Stoic kind of virtue, one in which the
material world is rejected for a spiritual or
transcendent plane of being. But are we meant, in our
reading of the new Arcadia, to imitate the stoicism of
Pamela and Philoclea, to see, as Philoclea urges
Pyrocles, 'the folly of [our] passion' (NA566)? In the
same Book in which the heroines are depicted as glorious
martyrs, we, the readers, are encouraged to respond
sympathetically, or emotionally, to their plight, and
thus to distinguish ourselves from the cruel Cecropia
who, in her response to Pamela's impassioned discussion
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of the ruling principle of the universe, is 'like a bat
which, though it have eyes to discern that there is a
sun, yet hath so evil eyes that it cannot delight in the
sun' (NA492). Indeed, more than in any other book Sidney
here verbally paints 'pictures' of his heroes, the
vividness of which is clearly intended to invoke in us a
sympathetic response. In one instance we see Pamela
reaching up her 'naked hands' to heaven in a supplicatory
gesture, 'as if the right had been the picture of Zeal,
and the left of Humbleness'/ even the 'hardhearted'
Cecropia is not unmoved at this sight, although she is
unable to love the virtue she sees in Pamela (NA464-5).
In another instance, Sidney presents the death wound of
Parthenia as a virtuoso piece of theatre ('a neck indeed
of alabaster, displaying the wound, which with most
dainty blood laboured to drown his own beauties'): the
emotive vividness of this description is reinforced by
the account Sidney also gives us of the reaction of the
onlookers, and, especially, of the reaction of Amphialus,
who is 'astonished with grief, compassion and shame' when
he realises that the knight he has killed is Parthenia
herself (NA528). In the context of this episode
Amphialus's grief has a salutary effect, helping him to
see the vanity and selfishness of his chivalric, passion-
driven exploits; moreover, his ability to feel for
Parthenia becomes an indication of the nobility of his
heart, so that, while we may never feel sympathy for the
motives and actions of his mother Cecropia, we will ever
afterwards feel some goodwill towards Amphialus himself.
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In the new Arcadia Sidney appears to encourage, rather
than discourage, the reader's rhetorical vulnerability,
and not, then, (as the example of the stoic princesses
might suggest), simply to reject the emotive aspects of
the rhetorical art. In our reading of the new Arcadia, I
suggest, we are never really able to transcend the
fictional world of particular stories; we are forced to
engage with this rhetorically constructed world, forced
to be moved by the stories that are related, no matter
how dubious or questionable the motives of its characters
may sometimes seem. And this, I suggest, is how we are
meant to respond to the Arcadian world. As we will learn
from our reading of the trial scene, there are times when
the 'folly of passion' is a very wise response, and the
seemingly duplicitous art of rhetoric essential to the
true representation of 'virtue'.
4b. Rhetoric Recovered: Emotion and The Art of Judgement
i. The old Arcadia; Books III, IV and V
The old Arcadia is notorious for the errant behaviour
of the princes in its later books. What began for
Pyrocles and Musidorus as a harmless pursuit of love in
Books I and II becomes, by the end of Book III, an
adventure that is transgressive and shocking for many
readers. Although Pyrocles invents the cave plot partly
to ensure that Basilius unwittingly commits 'adultery'
with his wife (and not, as Basilius hopes, with his
beloved Cleophila), he also uses it to give himself the
opportunity to be alone with Philoclea in her bedroom,
where they consummate their relationship (0A211).
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Shortly after this event we learn that Musidorus, having
promised the self-exiled Pamela that he will protect her
honour, is tempted to rape her while she is asleep in his
arms (OA265). Both Musidorus, Pyrocles and the narrator
have betrayed the expectations of their readers, as we
are acutely reminded through the example of the fictional
female readers to whom the narrator addresses himself;
the 'fair ladies' have been encouraged by the narrator to
give support to a character whose real intention, it
turns out, was to bed his mistress, and to another whose
pledge of honour cannot be respected. Both the actual
reader and the 'fair ladies' are forced to regard the
princes in a new light, however, as a result not only of
their actions but of the way in which they portray their
conduct in the subsequent trial scene. Pyrocles insists
to Philanax that Philoclea's virtue 'hath been a
sufficient resistance' to his sexual advances (OA261),
converting what was a love scene of mutual consent into
an attempted rape, while Musidorus, apologising to Pamela
for his failure to defeat the rabble who have accosted
them (and interrupted his intended rape), invokes 'that
universal and only wisdom' as a witness to the honourable
nature of his intentions: 'my desire, though in extremest
vehemency, yet did not so overgo my remembrance but that,
as far as man's wit might be extended, I sought to
prevent all things that might fall to your hurt' (OA269).
Pamela's reply that she cannot 'want comfort' while she
has 'the true and living comfort of [her] unblemished
virtue' and the protection of Musidorus strongly
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reinforces our awareness of his lack of integrity
(OA270). The way in which the princes misrepresent their
actions, whether out of a desire to protect themselves or
the princesses, adds force to Philanax's attack on the
underhand means they have used to gain their ends.41
Although the princes are on trial for their 'adultery' it
is our perception of the means they have used that will
ultimately affect our judgement. We are to judge not
only their moral character but their use of rhetoric to
create the credible images of themsleves in the earlier
books.
The reference to 'everlasting justice' which opens
Book IV heralds the harsher moral tone of the last two
books (OA230), a tone reinforced by the sudden
disappearance of the compassionate 'fair ladies' from the
text. The new lack of tolerance for the emotions is
marked in the trial scene by the fact that Euarchus
refuses to countenance the excuse Musidorus offers for
their behaviour that they were prompted to act as they
did by 'love' (OA351-2). However, despite the
disappearance of the 'fair ladies' and the introduction
of a character exemplary of rational fair-mindedness, the
text still invites an emotionally complex response, the
absence of the 'fair ladies' demonstrating only the
ubiquity of this kind of reaction. When Philanax, for
example, thinks about how Pyrocles saved Basilius from
the rebels he experiences a 'kind of relenting mind
towards him', but when he remembers the death of Basilius
(for which he believes Pyrocles is partly responsible)
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his 'compassion' turns into 'a hateful passion', leaving
him in a strange 'medley betwixt revenge and pity'
(OA261-2). Since Philanax acts as the prosecutor of the
princes the potential for injustice is clear. Indeed,
Philanax's desire for revenge means that he is
particularly ill-equipped to judge the situation. In an
attempt to convince Euarchus of the guilt of the princes
he calls to his attention Basilius's corpse which is laid
out before him - as if the grotesqueness of the sight
were evidence enough to convict Pyrocles and Musidorus of
murder and subterfuge (OA334) - while he actively
suppresses important character evidence (the letters
written by the princesses) for fear that Pamela and
Philoclea would be incriminated and the case against the
princes weakened. From our position as readers external
to the narrative action we can perceive Philanax's
manipulation of the available evidence; however, this
does not mean that we are more able than Euarchus fairly
to judge the princes or Gynecia. While we may be acutely
aware of the flaws in Philanax's arguments we are
simultaneously susceptible to the rhetorical appeals and
the representational bias of the princes and the
narrator. Thus, for example, although Pyrocles and
Philoclea are criminals according to the strict Arcadian
laws, the narrator makes it clear with the repetition of
adjectives which denote virtue that they are 'innocent'
in a more general sense (0A251), with the result that he
draws our attention to the 'injustice' of the Arcadian
laws themselves. The fact that neither Pyrocles nor
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Philoclea repent of their actions also affects the way in
which we judge them; their belief and confidence in their
innocence again encourages us to be more critical of the
Arcadian laws than of their own actions. When Pyrocles
realises that he and Philoclea have been discovered he
immediately calls to mind the 'cruelty of the Arcadian
laws which, without exception, did condemn all to death
who were found in act of marriage without solemnity of
marriage' (OA251). 'He saw the weak judgement of man
would condemn that as death-deserving vice in her which
had in truth never broken the bands of a true living
virtue', and he considers how unfortunate it is for a
young woman of 'so unripe years, so faultless a beauty,
the mansion of so pure goodness' to 'have her youth so
untimely cut off, her natural perfections unnaturally
consumed, her virtue rewarded with shame' (0A252). As
such arguments suggest, the 'trial' has, in effect,
already started. Because the narrator and the princes
are such persuasive and partial speakers it is important
for us to bear in mind that they are as manipulative as
Philanax; no matter how much pity we feel for her plight
Philoclea is not, strictly speaking, 'innocent' any
longer. When reading the last two books of the old
Arcadia we thus need to determine whether we should
listen sympathetically to the appeals of the princes, or
whether, in doing so, we are in danger of conniving at
the perversion of justice.
Euarchus's entrance in Book V promises to present a
turning point in the narration of these confused events.
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For it is from Euarchus that we hope to receive a
satisfactory resolution to this complex series of events,
and an example of how these characters should be 'heard1.
Famous throughout Greece for his just rulership and his
'equity' (OA307, 312), Euarchus resembles the ideal ruler
outlined by Plato in the Republic, and later by Erasmus
in The Education of a Christian Prince, the ruler who is
supposedly able to make a righteous judgement based on a
knowledge of intelligible truth. Just as the ideal ruler
in this tradition is unmoved by the 'low concerns and
sordid emotions of the common people', so Euarchus, the
narrator tells us, is never 'beguiled with the painted
gloss of pleasure nor dazzled with the false light of
ambition' (OA309), and just as the ideal ruler acts in
accordance with the dictates of reason rather than the
senses, so Euarchus refuses to be swayed by his own
emotions.42 Euarchus's cool-headedness and rationality is
reflected both in his own speech, and in his response to
the speeches of his interlocutors: thus, his words are
characterised by an absence of rhetorical ornament and a
frequent use of 'logical connectives', suggesting to
Lorna Challis his 'intention to establish truth by
logical exposition rather than to persuade his hearers to
a pre-conceived point of view',43 while in his response to
the trial proceedings, he proves himself to be singularly
resistant to the emotional appeals (and rhetorical
proficiency) of the princes, Philanax and the crowd at
the trial scene. When Philanax tries to persuade
Euarchus to act as a judge at the trial, he describes the
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state of affairs in Arcadia with a vividness designed to
move Euarchus ('imagine, vouchsafe to imagine, most wise
and good king, that here is before your eyes the pitiful
spectacle of a most dolorously ending tragedy' (0A311));
Euarchus, however, refuses to respond to this appeal, and
chooses, instead, to weigh carefully the arguments
offered him (OA312). When Euarchus finally agrees to act
as a judge he does so, the narrator tells us, 'with that
well appeased gesture unpassionate nature bestoweth upon
mankind' (OA313).
Such emotional control both characterises Euarchus's
bearing throughout the trial and influences the
judgements he makes. When weighing up the evidence
against Philoclea he disregards the 'prisoner's
passionate prayer' and refuses to give 'over-plausible
ears to a many-headed motion'/ as a result he is able to
perceive that Philoclea is not entirely innocent and with
quiet determination sentences her to a life of enforced
chastity (OA329). When Gynecia is brought into court her
'passionate confession' so deeply affects the crowd that
they are unable to judge 'whether they should be more
sorry for her fault or her misery, for the loss of her
estate or loss of her virtue'/ Euarchus, in contrast,
refuses to be influenced by 'those tragical phrases of
hers' (which he considers are apt only 'to stir a vulgar
pity'), and attends only to the 'manifest proof of so
horrible a trespass' to which she has confessed (OA331).
During the impassioned speeches of Pyrocles and Musidorus
Euarchus remains similarly unmoved. In contrast to the
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noblemen Sympathus and Kerxenus, both of whom publicly
display their compassion, Euarchus's face reveals 'no
motions either at the one's or other's speech'/ he lets
pass 'the flowers of rhetoric', the narrator explains,
and pays attention only to 'whither their reasons tended'
(OA348). Because the two princes cannot fully deny the
charges against them, Euarchus finds them guilty and they
are sentenced accordingly. Even when it is revealed to
him that the two men he has condemned to death are his
son and nephew, Euarchus refuses to be moved to
compassion, preferring both to remain within the letter
of the law which, he believes, guarantees justice, and to
demonstrate the genuine impartiality of his judgement:
'If rightly I have judged, then rightly have I judged
mine own children, unless the name of a child should have
force to change the never-changing justice' (OA356). For
the crowd, who have 'examin[ed] the matter by their own
passions', Euarchus appears to be an 'obstinate-hearted
man', one whose rule 'must needs be insupportable', but
for the narrator, who understands the sorrow felt by the
unflinching Euarchus, he appears more akin to Cato, the
Renaissance model of 'stoical determination' (OA358).44
In the light of his demonstrated impartiality it
would seem that Euarchus fully deserves the praise he
receives early in Book V for his 'equity'. And yet few
critics of the old Arcadia have been forthcoming with
this praise.45 Among many critics there is a feeling that
the punishments delivered in some of the cases are
disproportionate to the crime committed, while in other
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cases, for example that of Gynecia, who wildly
exaggerates her culpability, there is an awareness that
the sentencing itself is wrong. Moreover, it becomes
increasingly apparent to the reader of the trial scene
that Euarchus's judgement is impaired by the
unavailability to him of many important details: unlike
the actual reader of the old Arcadia, Euarchus does not
have the incidents of the plot to hand, nor does he have
access to the letters contributed by the princesses to
the defence of Musidorus and Pyrocles. With the
exception of Elizabeth Dipple,46 however, there are also
few critics who feel confident enough to condemn
Euarchus's judgements outright; most critics of the old
Arcadia appear to agree that while the justice
administered by Euarchus is not, strictly speaking,
'just', it does contain at least an element of justice.
(The princes are not strictly innocent of the crimes of
which they are accused.) For Andrew Weiner, who reads
the old Arcadia in the light of Sidney's Protestant
faith, Euarchus is right to find the princes guilty; the
fact that he does so despite the fallibility of his own
reasoning powers suggests to him Sidney's endorsement of
the Calvinist belief in the corruption of human nature
and the 'strange and secret workings of [divine]
justice'.47 In an attempt to support his providential
theory, Weiner calls attention to a poem in the second
eclogues, the 'skirmish betwixt Reason and Passion', in
which the struggle between the two groups of shepherds,
representing Passion and Reason, is only reconciled when
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each side finally recognises their dependence on a
superior guiding force: 'then let us both to heav'nly
rules give place,/Which passions kill, and Reason do
deface' (OA120). Likewise Margaret Dana, in her essay on
the 'providential plot' of the old Arcadia, recognises
the weakness of human reason; 'even the wisdom of
Euarchus', she notes, 'proves unable to untie the knot.
Only divine providence can bring release'.48 More
recently Catherine Lucas has argued that 'the claims of
reason and passion cannot be reconciled without recourse
to a '"higher" sort of love', a love that is 'divinely
virtuous'.49 For these critics, Sidney has little
confidence in the integrity of human judgement. For him,
they suggest, a satisfactory resolution can only come
through the transcendence rather than the reconciliation
of the opposites so earnestly debated by Pyrocles and
Musidorus in Book I, and by the shepherds in the
eclogues. In the last book of the old Arcadia Sidney
appears thus to affirm his commitment to the Protestant
belief in an 'everlasting justice', the workings of which
remain hidden from human reason in its weakened,
postlapsarian condition.
It is possible to understand otherwise the way in
which Euarchus is both 'just' and 'unjust', however, if
we read his judgements in the light of the meaning
attributed to the word 'equity' by J.H. Baker in his
introduction to the law reports of John Spelman. For the
purposes of Renaissance law, the term 'equity' had two
acknowledged meanings: it could mean either 'reason',
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that is 'the collected wisdom of generations', or
'private reasoning', that is, a 'kind of equity' which
'gave the judges the same kind of freedom in legislation
as they enjoyed when declaring the common law'. In the
sense that Euarchus strictly obeys the customs of
Arcadia, he can be said to be just according to the first
meaning of 'equity'. However, as Baker notes, there is a
different 'classical English notion of equity', according
to which 'equity' is the equivalent of 'conscience'.
This kind of equity, Baker explains, was exercised in the
Court of Chancery in an attempt to compensate for the
narrow concerns of the common-law; it 'involved the
relaxation of human but unwritten rules to meet the
exigencies of justice in particular cases'.50 In an essay
on 'equity' in Shakespeare's Measure for Measure, John
Dickinson points out that the roots of this concept lie
less in traditional Christian mercy (which is distributed
to all men and women, regardless of the crime committed)
than in Aristotle's notion of 'epikeia', described in
Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics as 'a correction of the
law where it is defective owing to its universality');51
he also points out that the Renaissance notion of
'equity' was greatly influenced by Seneca's concept of
dementia, which Seneca defines in the Moral Essays as 'a
rational restraint of the kind which has regard for the
cause of an action', and which he distinguishes from
misericordia, 'a mental defect common to old women'.52
(As Dickinson notes, the distinction between dementia
and misericordia reappears in Sir Thomas Elyot's The Book
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of the Governor, when he compares mercy, '"a temperaunce
of the mynde of hym that hath power to be avenged ...
[which] is always ioyned with reason", with what he calls
"vaine pity", based on emotion, not reason').53)
What is significant about the third concept of
'equity' is that it is based on a different kind of
reasoning process from the one employed by Euarchus, a
process which requires a more detailed consideration of
the circumstances of a particular case. Indeed, Euarchus
openly refuses to judge in accordance with a 'free
discourse of reason and skill of philosophy', fearing
that this method leaves 'to every man a scope of his own
interpretation', and he bases his judgement instead on
the harsh Arcadian laws, which 'fold us within assured
bounds' and prevent us from 'infinitely rang[ing]'
(OA350). He chooses to ignore both extenuating evidence,
such as character appraisals or the narration of past
public service, and the appeals to pity made by the
defence; he attends only to the facts that are proven by
confession. Euarchus thus performs his role rather in
the fashion of the English common-law judges who, Baker
explains, 'sought refuge from the evils of mankind and
the agonies of indecision by umpiring the ancient game
strictly according to the rules, and by refusing to
meddle with questions of fact'.54 In this respect
Euarchus is out of tune with developments in the English
legal system; as Baker remarks, sixteenth-century
procedural cases show that litigants no longer merely
wanted 'their disputes settled: they wanted them settled
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with reasons, and they wanted the judges to elaborate the
law' .55
Euarchus, however, is reminiscent not only of the
cautious common-law judges. The justice which he
administers is reminiscent of a different tradition of
legal practice, one which is equally resistant to a
sensitive 'reinterpretation' of the law in particular
cases: Euarchus's recognition of the potential for 'human
error' in the making of judgements is used by Weiner to
support his claim that Sidney promotes in the old Arcadia
the Calvinist doctrine of human dependence on divine
justice; but it is Euarchus's decision to follow closely
the harsh Arcadian laws, laws which pronounce the death
sentence on 'adulterers', that really establishes him as
a type of Protestant judge insistent on following the
letter of Old Testament law. In a study of the tradition
of seventeenth-century casuistry Camille Wells Slights
observes that the medieval skills of moral deliberation
found little acceptance among English Protestants after
the Reformation; they were associated both with the Roman
Catholic confessional and with the Jesuits, 'who
continued to be feared in England as actively subversive
national enemies'.56 For many Protestants, she notes,
there was no need to indulge in complicated moral
reasoning since the '"wayes of Truth"' were already
clearly offered in Scripture.57 Indeed, in the sixteenth
century there were vocal demands by many Protestants for
the enforcement of Old Testament law in the English
state. Among such petitioners was Henry Finch, later a
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sergeant-at-law under James I, who urges in his undated
legal treatise Nomotexnia, first dedicated to Philip
Sidney, that the English common law be reformed in
accordance with Mosaic law.58 Even though the general
application of the harsh Mosaic law and its punishments
was not seen as practicable by most Protestants in the
Elizabethan period, it could still be appealed to in
moments of national crisis. In the Parliamentary session
of 1572, for example, the bishops attempted to motivate a
reluctant Elizabeth to execute Mary Queen of Scots for
her involvement in the Ridolfi plot by appealing to Old
Testament law; in their speeches to Elizabeth not only do
they draw attention to a list of sins committed by the
Scottish queen which are punishable with death under
Mosaic law (idolatry, adultery, and blasphemy) but they
remind Elizabeth of her duty to apply this law as a
'minester of God': 'every good prince ought by God's
comaundement to punishe even by death all such as doe
seeke to seduce the people of God from his true worshippe
unto supersticion and idoletre, for that offence God hath
alwais most greevously punished as committed against the
first table. Deuteronomy 13'.59 But the bishops appeal to
Mosaic law not only to remind Elizabeth of her duty but
to assure her that it is legitimate to execute a crowned
queen: 'wherefore whether the late Queene of Scottes be
queene or subiecte, be stranger or cittizen, be kinne or
not kinne', the bishops insist, 'by Gode's word for soe
great offences she should have the iuste deserved
punishment and that in the highest degree'.60 These
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arguments are reinforced by the Parliamentary laymen in
the subsequent speech, who claim that Mary has
relinquished her right to be judged as a royal person
since she is resident in a 'host' country, and that the
safety of the realm is to be put 'before the affection of
kindred' .61
Sidney is clearly interested in the problem of Mary,
Queen of Scots. In the trial scene in the old Arcadia,
the position taken by Pyrocles and Musidorus resembles
that taken by Mary Queen of Scots in her own defence,
while the position taken by Euarchus recalls that of the
bishops and the lay men in the 1572 Parliamentary
session.62 Although Pyrocles and Musidorus attempt to
defend their right to legal exclusion on the grounds that
they possess the 'sacred name' of princes, Euarchus makes
it clear that by venturing into Arcadia they have entered
into 'Arcadian orders' and that by putting themselves
into 'domestical services' they have relinquished their
right to their original status (OA349): 'these young men
cannot in justice avoid judgement, but like private men
must have their doings either cleared, excused or
condemned' (OA350). Moreover, Euarchus also shares with
his Protestant counterparts a determination to put the
concerns of the state above the interests of individuals
and the consideration of the law above the ties of
kinship (OA352). Like the bishops who refuse to take
into consideration the social and familial status of Mary
Stuart in accordance with the dictates of Mosaic law, so
Euarchus refuses to be affected by the social and
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familial status of Pyrocles and Musidorus in accordance
with the harsh Arcadian laws and his own notion of
justice.
One prominent Protestant who was interested in the
problem of Mary Stuart, and who was influential on
Sidney, is George Buchanan. In De Jure Regni apud Scotos
of 1578, Buchanan attempts to legitimate the deposition
of Mary, Queen of Scots by proving that monarchs are
subject to the laws of the realm, and that this accords
with the law of nature. Though, at the beginning of De
Jure, Buchanan cites the example of Roman law to support
his argument for the subjection of monarchs to the law
('what I admire is not so much their different system of
political administration as their fairness in holding all
men equal in the eyes of the law'),63 he simultaneously
argues that Roman law represents the principles of a
universal Justice: God has 'created in [people] an inner
light by which he should distinguish between good and
evil. Some call this faculty Nature, others call it the
Law of Nature'.64 Though Buchanan does not champion
Mosaic law explicitly, he perceives the secular law of
the Romans to be inspired by the same principles which
underpin Judeo-Christian moral laws. Buchanan's source
for this conception of natural law is John Calvin himself
(though his response to the problem of tyranny is his
own) ,65 In The Institutes of the Christian Religion,
Calvin draws a distinction between spiritual and temporal
laws ('there are in man, so to speak, two worlds, over
which different kings and different laws have
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authority'))/66 with the result that he rejects the
ceremonial and judicial aspects of Mosaic law; however,
he insists that the laws of the secular realm 'must be in
conformity to that perpetual rule of love, so that they
indeed vary in form but have the same purpose' - in other
words, that they should conform to the moral law of the
old Testament, which is 'engraved upon men's hearts'.67
Though some Protestants wanted to see the reinstitution
of the Mosaic law in full, including the death penalty
for adultery, most Protestants were willing to accept the
practice of the Mosaic moral law: in the 39 articles
appended to the conservative English Book of Common
Prayer it is explained that while contemporary Christians
are exempt from the observation of Mosaic ceremonial and
judicial law, they are expected to follow the moral law
of the old Testment ('the true eternal rule of
righteousness, prescribed for all men of all nations and
times') .68 Thus, while Euarchus may seem to be a bad
judge in the light of the common law, in the light of the
Protestant respect for the moral branch of the Mosaic
law, his alleged commitment to 'the laws of nature and
nations' ('all mankind being as it were coinhabiters or
world citizens together' (OA350)), suggests that he is
indeed a paragon of judges in Protestant terms.
But to what extent does the Protestant Sidney side
with Euarchus? While Buchanan may argue for the
righteousness of populist revolution against a tyrannical
prince, Sidney's promotion of the 'laws of nature and
nations' in the trial scene is more ambiguous, and has
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left critics divided in their response. While William
Dinsmore Briggs and H.R. Woudhuysen argue that Sidney
stands in the trial scene of the old Arcadia on 'the same
sort of ground [as] Buchanan does in De Jure Regni apud
Scotos1 (and, indeed, argue convincingly that this is the
kind of interest we should expect from a member of the
Leicester faction), David Norbrook argues, in contrast,
for Sidney's interest in promoting the practice of equity
among the aristocracy.69 The complications of the trial
scene suggest to me that Sidney is not simply promoting a
harsh Protestant judgement but that he is encouraging us
to question the art of judging itself. Indeed, the
arbitrariness of the Arcadian laws is never fully
overcome: while Euarchus appeals to 'the laws of nature
and nations' to justify the trial proceedings against
Pyrocles and Musidorus, the two princes are to be judged
according to the 'the laws of Greece and municipal
statutes of this dukedom' (OA350), laws whose cruelty
Pyrocles has already noted, so that it is never really
clear whether Euarchus is an instrument of divine justice
or whether he is simply an unquestioning upholder of a
particularly harsh set of social customs. Furthermore,
Sidney himself seems to support a more sceptical
conception of the function of the law: in the Defence he
shows little respect for law because it 'seeketh to make
men good rather formidine poenae than virtutis amore; or,
to say righter, doth not endeavour to make men good, but
that their evil hurt not others; having no care, so he be
a good citizen, how bad a man he be (31)'; and in the old
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Arcadia Musidorus seems to represent Sidney's view when
he reminds Euarchus that
laws are not made like lime twigs or nets to catch
everything that toucheth them, but rather like sea
marks to avoid the shipwrack of ignorant passengers,
since that our doing in the extremest interpretation
is but a human error (OA348).
Euarchus chooses to ignore Musidorus's advice, and to
administer a more impartial justice, but in so doing he
is not proven to be a better judge. Indeed, although
Euarchus's impartiality in the trial scene and his
rigorous application of Arcadian law are made to seem
admirable, they do not prevent him either from making
judgemental mistakes or from passing judgements that do
not make emotional sense. Not only does he sentence to
death an individual (Gynecia) who is actually innocent of
the crime of which she is accused, but he endorses the
brutality of the Arcadian punishments (Gynecia is to be
buried alive, Pyrocles is to be thrown from a tower,
while Musidorus, less inventively perhaps, is to lose his
head). Thus, although Euarchus attempts to limit the
possibility of 'human error' he inadvertently contributes
to his own blindness by refusing to engage in a more
detailed consideration of the case. By suggesting that
Euarchus's refusal to engage in 'a free discourse of
reason' actually leads to 'human error', Sidney is not
encouraging the reader, I believe, to hope for the
resolution of complex problems through 'divine'
intervention (in fact a deus ex machina is necessary in
the old Arcadia, I suggest, because the human solution is
so unsatisfying), but rather to do exactly what Euarchus
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fails to do: that is, to engage in a 'free discourse of
reason'. Indeed, this is a process in which the reader
of Book V, who has access to more information than
Euarchus and who, therefore, is possibly more sympathetic
to the defendants, is already engaged.
The judge who practises 'equity' in its sense of
'conscience' bases his decisions on a rational
consideration of the details before him, and not on an
emotional whim, as Elyot was concerned to convey. Yet
even Elyot, sensitive though he is to the misleading
nature of emotional judgments, does not exclude the
emotions entirely from the court room. In a chapter
dedicated to a description of the benefits to be derived
from a study of the law, Elyot draws attention to the
interdependence of rhetoric and legal skills: 'it is to
be remembered that in the learning of the laws of this
realm, there is at this day an exercise wherein is a
manner, a shadow, or figure of the ancient rhetoric'.70
Elyot notes, however, that while lawyers make use of some
parts of classical rhetoric, namely invention,
disposition and memory, they have lost the use of the two
other parts of the art: elocution and pronunciation.
Because of the barbarousness of the language, Elyot
explains, 'the stirring of the affections of the mind in
this realm was never used' so that the lawyer is a rather
imperfect orator.71 Although Elyot did not believe that
it was impossible or inappropriate to introduce these
parts of rhetoric into the practice of English law
(indeed his introduction of many ink-horn terms into his
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own writing suggests that he was engaged in an attempt to
develop the English language and so expand its expressive
capacity), it was not until 1560, when Thomas Wilson
included in Arte of Rhetorique a discussion of the skills
of elocution and pronunciation, that a real attempt was
made to correct this deficiency.72
Sidney's model for argumentation, like that of Elyot
and Wilson, was Roman rhetoric, and it is Quintilian's
Institutio Oratoria in particular, with its focus in Book
VI on the skills of elocution and pronunciation, which
appealed to him. But Quintilian provides in the
Institutio Oratoria not just practical advice concerning
the delivery of legal arguments; he also offers a
justification of the use of emotion in the defence or
prosecution of a case. While in Book V of the Institutio
Oratoria Quintilian outlines the number and types of
proof available to an orator to defend or prosecute a
court case, in Book VI he later argues that there is a
need to exploit the emotions of an audience if a case is
to be won. There are two types of peroration, he argues:
in the one the orator simply summarises the arguments
which he has already put forward, while in the other he
appeals instead to the emotions of his audience.
Quintilian notes that in the Athenian court the orator
was expressly forbidden to rouse pity or anger in his
audience, since the Athenians, influenced by their
philosophical tradition, 'regard susceptibility to
emotion as a vice, and think it is immoral that the judge
should be distracted from the truth by an appeal to his
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emotions' (VI i 7). For Quintilian, however, appeals to
the emotions are necessary to ensure both the orator's
success and, importantly, the proper course of justice in
a world in which 'truth' is sometimes difficult to
discern: 'appeals to emotion are necessary', Quintilian
concludes, 'if there are no other means for securing the
victory of truth, justice and the public interest' (VI i
7). Quintilian's pragmatism is echoed in The Praise of
Folly, where Erasmus obliquely suggests that the art of
rhetoric is the best intellectual tool, and compassion
the best response, in a world in which the truth is
veiled from human sight. What Sidney defends in Book V
of the old Arcadia is not the Roman law (as does Buchanan
in the De Jure) but the Roman art of rhetoric; like
Erasmus's Folly, or Quintilian himself, Sidney attacks
the Stoics who 'segregate all passions from the wise
man': as Folly herself pragmatically argues, 'these
emotions act as guides to those hastening towards the
haven of wisdom, but also wherever virtue is put into
practice they are always present to act like spurs and
goads as incentives to good deeds' (106) .
Sidney's interest in classical oratory, and in the
role played by emotion in the formation of 'character',
is apparent both in the Defence of Poetry, and in the
trial speeches of the old Arcadia; while Philanax follows
the advice given by Quintilian on the use of 'pathos*
('the more violent emotions') to affect the audience's
perception of the moral character of the princes,
Pyrocles and Musidorus follow Quintilian's advice on the
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use of 'ethos1 (the emotions which are 'calm and gentle')
to convince the audience of their 'good' character.73
However, Sidney's interest in the kind of rhetoric
outlined by Quintilian extends beyond a concern with the
creation of character; Sidney recognises the importance
of rhetorical skill to ensure the practice of genuine
justice. Euarchus's concern to play by the book means
that he is particularly resistant both to the carefully
worded appeals of Philanax and Gynecia, and the princes,
and to their 'appearance' at the trial scene; yet rather
than improving his judgement, his refusal to respond to
their appeals often leads him astray - as is clear in the
case of Gynecia. For Euarchus interprets Gynecia's
confession to have 'traitorously empoisoned' Basilius
(OA331) as evidence of her guilt when, as the narrator
points out, her psychological condition is so unstable
that her confession cannot be trusted: although Gynecia
has never 'spotted her soul with any wilful vice but her
inordinate love of Cleophila', believing that she is
eternally damned she decides 'purposely to overthrow
herself, and confirm by a wrong confession that
abominable shame which, with her wisdom joined to truth,
perhaps she might have refelled' (OA332). In contrast to
Euarchus's dispassionate condemnation of the character of
Gynecia, which is based on his hatred of evil 'in what
colours soever he found it' (OA331), is the more
sympathetic response of her initially hard-hearted
jailors, who are impressed enough by the resolution with
which she accepts her death sentence to suspect that she
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'might [once] have been notably well-deserving' (OA332).
In this instance the paradox of Euarchus's impartial
justice is clear: if he had been more susceptible to the
pitiful spectacle before him justice might have been more
completely administered.
In recognising that an individual's character and
actions are also arguments which should be included in
the process of judging Sidney is not flying in the face
of a more hard line Protestantism; indeed, Sidney can be
seen to derive his conception of legal defence from
another Protestant tradition represented in John Foxe's
Acts and Monuments. For a full appreciation of the
relevance of this text to Sidney's characters we will
need, however, to return our attention to the revised
Arcadia, the text in which the princes are more clearly
innocent of the crimes of which they are accused,
ii. The new Arcadia: Books IV and V
When Sidney revised the new Arcadia he was not simply
trying to reform a risque story in accordance with the
tastes or expectations of his audience; rather, he was
both exploring techniques for the creation of credible
images of virtue and setting out to demonstrate the
importance of emotive rhetoric to the representation, and
the appreciation, of virtuous character. Although Sidney
appears to cast a critical eye in Book III at the
seemingly vain posturing of the male protagonists, who
have used their rhetorical skills to create heroic
versions of themselves, in Book III he also teaches us
about the importance of emotive rhetoric to the self-
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portrayal of a genuinely virtuous character: our
compassionate response to the separate plights of Pamela,
Philoclea and Parthenia is distinct from 'the hard¬
hearted' response of Cecropia, who is unable to love
virtue in any form. In Book V the princes once again
employ their rhetorical skills, only this time in the
service not of their sexual quests but the defence of
their own, and the princesses', innocence. Book III,
with its portrayal of the princesses' heroic suffering,
provides an important prelude to the trial, preparing us
to respond positively to the princes' willingness to face
death; our compassionate response to the princes in this
book is in marked contrast to the rational restraint
shown by Euarchus. The important difference, in the
revised text, between Euarchus and ourselves is that our
emotional response recognises the innocence of the
princes whereas Euarchus's seemingly more wise or
rational judgement does not.
An important source for Sidney's use of rhetoric in
the trial scene is, I suggest, John Foxe. In Acts and
Monuments, John Foxe sets out to describe how the
Protestant Church has returned to the precepts of the
original Christian Church, and one of the ways in which
he does this is by drawing an analogy between the
suffering of the early Christian martyrs at the hands of
the Romans and the suffering of the Protestant martyrs at
the hands of the Roman Catholics. In the later volumes
of Acts Foxe deals specifically with the suffering of the
Protestant men and women during the reign of Mary Tudor.
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Although Foxe gives detailed accounts of the gruesome
nature of their sufferings, he devotes most of his
attention to the examinations, in which the Protestant
faithful are questioned by, and shown to outface, their
persecutors. In the case of Richard Woodman, for
example, the examination establishes his thorough
knowledge of the Bible, which enables him, though an
'ignorant' man, to dispute with and correct the learned
divines who interrogate him. On the question of the
sacraments Woodman is able to prove with reference to the
Bible that they number only two ('one the sacrament of
baptism, and the other the supper of the Lord'),74 while
his examiner, the Bishop of Chichester, fumbles to prove
that they number seven. The bishop argues, for example,
that marriage is a sacrament since a man and his wife are
the visible sign of this mystery in the same way that
hose hanging outside the shop of a hosier is a sign of
what is sold within; Woodman exclaims at his 'sophistry':
'I talked of the scriptures that be written, and it is
God's word, to prove my matter true by; and you will
prove your matter true by a pair of hose'.75 As the
example of Woodman suggests, the Protestant faithful
establish their 'innocence' with the authority of the
Bible. But this is not the only way in which their
truthfulness is defended. Indeed, the account Foxe gives
of their character, and their suffering, itself becomes
an equally powerful argument of their truthfulness. A
good example of the efficacy of this type of argument is
provided by the story of Cutbert Symson. At the
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beginning of this story Foxe cites the testimony of
Bishop Bonner, noting that after he had 'commended
[Symson's] person' he expresses astonishment at the
patience of his victim:
'concerning his patience, I say unto you, that if he
were not a heretic, he is a man of the greatest
patience that ever came before me: for I tell you,
he hath been thrice racked upon one day in the
Tower. Also in my house he hath felt some sorrow,
and yet I never saw his patience broken'.76
Symson's behaviour becomes, in the eyes of Foxe's
readers, testimony of his faithfulness, and even of the
truthfulness of the faith he follows. The sympathy Foxe
elicits from his readers plays an important part in his
retrial of the men and women condemned by the Marian
persecutors as heretics: our sympathetic response marks
'our' approval of their actions and beliefs, and incites
in us a desire to prove 'our' own faithfulness.
At first sight there may appear to be little
resemblance between Foxe's martyrs and Sidney's
characters Pyrocles and Musidorus, especially in the form
in which they appear in the old Arcadia. Not only are
the latter guilty of sexual transgression in the
unrevised text but they are pagans, not Christians. Even
so, they are clearly meant to be recognised as martyrs.
In the prison scene in Book V Pyrocles and Musidorus
dispute the existence and nature of an afterlife, and
they come impressively close to recognising the Christian
truth that 'Our life is but a step in dusty way'
(OA323;NA805). Moreover, the willingness of the two
princes to suffer death, especially if this sacrifice can
help preserve the lives of those whom they love, lends
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them a nobility similar to that displayed by the
Christian martyrs depicted in Foxe's Acts. For A.C.
Hamilton the nobleness of Pyrocles and Musidorus in the
last book of the Arcadia is indisputable, and he surmises
that it prompted Sidney's decision to revise the Arcadia
as a whole: 'even Sidney must have been surprised at how
the characters developed in prison and during the trial
scene', he declares, 'until, when they appear as
themselves with their outer appearance signifying their
inner worth, they strike beholders with "the more
violence of magnanimity"'.77 However, it seems that in
the old Arcadia Sidney was already intent on reforming
our perception of the princes and the art of rhetoric
itself: when Musidorus discards his disguise he adopts a
purple robe much like the 'apostle's mantle', robes which
serve an equally theatrical function (OA326/NA808).
Sidney's reason for revising the Arcadia is not that he
wanted the earlier actions of the narrative to fit the
nobleness of their later actions, but because he wanted
to demonstrate more persuasively the importance of
rhetoric in the making of just judgements. Our response
at the end of the old Arcadia is complicated not only by
the fact of the princes' genuine sexual transgressions,
making them strictly more guilty than innocent, but by
the presence in the first three books of the fictional
female readers, whose sole purpose seems to be to teach
us about the dangers of compassionate reading. In the
new Arcadia Sidney not only removes these characters from
the text but demonstrates to us in Book III the virtue of
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a compassionate response, so that we can recognise that
the art of rhetoric is essential to the defence of
innocence. And, most importantly of all, he alters the
plot in such a way that the princes are not guilty of the
crimes for which they are sentenced, thereby removing the
ambivalence we feel regarding Euarchus1s judgement in the
old Arcadia and allowing us to see his sentences as
wholly undeserved.
In one of Sidney's sources for the trial scene in the
Arcadia, Heliodorus's An Ethiopian Romance, the
protagonists, Theagones and Chariclea, prove their
chastity by 'trial by fire', walking on burning coals as
if they were walking on a cool marble floor.78 And when
they are then condemned to be sacrificed to the Ethiopian
gods on account of their chastity, Chariclea reveals
herself to be the long-lost daughter of the presiding
king and queen with 'written affidavits and the oral
testimony of witness' (a blue ribbon given her as a child
with her story inscribed on it, and the confession of the
judge Sistmithres, who played a hand in her exposure).79
In the Arcadia the princes can prove their innocence in
no such manner; though Pyrocles offers to fight Philanax
in single combat to prove his innocence Euarchus sensibly
remarks that 'it were very barbarous and preposterous
that force should be made judge over reason' (NA829).
Instead, Philanax and the princes employ the arts of the
Roman lawyer to prove their separate cases, and it is
only when Euarchus passes judgement in accordance with
the facts proven by confession, without taking into
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consideration the causes of the princes' actions or their
characters, that Sidney rouses Basilius from his slumber
and supplies the just ending which Euarchus could not.
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In my study of Philip Sidney's writings I have argued
that the contradictions which riddle his texts, far from
being the unconscious mark of an age, or authorial
intention, in transition, constitute a self-conscious
strategy on the part of Sidney which is designed to
conceal from the sight of the reader his artfulness,
making us believe that his expression is the product of
divine inspiration, natural (that is, inborn and
uncultivated) talent, or a genuine sympathy with the
position from which he speaks. In chapters two and three
I examined Sidney's interest in the creation of credible
personae with the aid of techniques including enargeia,
or vivid imagining, a technique which enables a poet or
orator to express convincingly emotions which he may not
have actually experienced, except in so far as he has
induced them in himself for the furthering of his
rhetorical purpose. Sidney appears to draw inspiration
for this technique of naturalising the artificial, I
suggested, from Ciceronian rhetoric as mediated through
Castiglione. I also considered why these rhetorical
techniques might be of interest to a committed
Protestant: the interest which Sidney expresses in A
Defence of Poetry in creating credible and forceful
fictions coincides, I argued, with a wider Protestant
interest in creating truthlike and emotive histories.
Sidney's interest in Ciceronian rhetoric, however, is
mediated not only through the influence of Castiglione
357
but also through the influence of Erasmus. In chapter
four I argued that, in Book V of both the old and new
Arcadia, Sidney defends the rhetorical arts used by the
princes Pyrocles and Musidorus for their own self-
interests on the grounds that they are essential for the
proper administration of human justice. The revisions to
the new Arcadia, which render the princes entirely
innocent of the crimes of which they are accused at the
trial, allow this point to be made all the more
forcefully: Euarchus1s refusal to respond to the emotive
self-defence of the princes, and his determination to
take into consideration only the facts proven by
confession, ultimately leads him to condemn to death
three innocent characters. In the trial scene, I
suggested, Sidney's demonstration of the importance of
emotive rhetoric in legal oratory is reminiscent of the
position taken by Quintilian in Institutio Oratoria that,
contrary to the beliefs of the Athenians, 'appeals to the
emotions are necessary if there are no other means for
securing the victory of truth, justice, and the public
interest' (VI i 7), and reminiscent, too, of the
recognition by Erasmus's Folly that seemingly foolish
pragmatic wisdom is more useful to humans in their fallen
state than is the dispassionate reasoning of the Stoics.
In chapter four I also considered why emotive rhetoric
might be of interest to a Protestant writer, and cited
the example of John Foxe, who uses similar techniques in
his Acts and Monuments to persuade readers of the
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innocence of the men and women condemned as heretics in
the Marian persecutions.
In Sidney's writing, then, the art of rhetoric has two
roles: it helps to create credible fictions, thereby
enabling an individual to gain the power and influence he
needs to secure his self-interests, and it helps to
defend the 'truth'. Stated thus baldly, it would seem
that, rather than resolving the contradictions in
Sidney's works, we have actually uncovered an even
greater and more fundamental contradiction: Sidney is
interested both in naturalising fictions and in
uncovering the truth.
However, Sidney's attitude need not be seen to be
self-contradictory. Cicero's Crassus, in his defence of
the art of rhetoric, argued that even philosophers need a
knowledge of this art if they are to convey to the world
their true knowledge of its principles, a point
recognised and supported by humanists such as Erasmus.
Sidney also shares this view. Sidney's abrupt dismissal
of the Platonic notion of divine possession in A Defence
of Poetry suggests that he refuses to acknowledge a
causal link between being genuinely virtuous and seeming
to be virtuous: even those who are virtuous, or who know
what it is to be virtuous, need skill in the art of
rhetoric if they are to convey this fact. Sidney's
awareness of the difficulties both of representing and of
perceiving virtue, is, as I have already mentioned, a
theme which he explores in the new Arcadia in the
characters of Pyrocles and Musidorus, Pamela and
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Philoclea, and is both inspired by his reading of
educationalists who belong to the sceptical rhetorical
tradition, and the product of his Protestant sympathies.
After all, Protestant actions, though claiming to be
based on an understanding of biblical truths, were
themselves often subject to misinterpretation, and in
need, thus, of reinterpretation. Not only did John Foxe
attempt in Acts and Monuments to reinterpret the actions
and words of the Protestants sentenced to death in the
reign of Mary Tudor as heretics, but he felt the need to
defend the truthfulness of his own work from the attacks
of his Catholic detractors. Sidney's own actions were
also subject to misinterpretation, both during his own
lifetime and posthumously. Sidney's zealous support for
the Protestant Cause seems to have been interpreted by
Elizabeth as evidence of his political ambition, and to
have led to the curtailment of a promising career, while
Sidney's death, which led to his representation as a
Protestant martyr by his friends and supporters, was
vulnerable to reinterpretation in the seventeenth century
by gossipy biographers such as John Aubrey, who drew
attention instead to Sidney's supposed sexual
voraciousness. At the same time, as the example of the
heroes of the revised Arcadia and Sidney's own heroic
image suggest, Protestant writers were interested in the
contribution rhetorical skill could make to the creation
of a reputation for virtue for individuals, whether real
or imaginary, whose actions may be genuinely morally
ambiguous. Philip Sidney, for example, was no doubt a
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more complex figure than his posthumous representation
suggests, and the conflicting account we receive of his
character indicates that the image we receive of Sidney
from his Protestant biographers is as 'fictional' as the
characters in his literary works. But before we berate
these writers for using the rhetorical art perversely, we
need to remember that, in their eyes, such fabrication
was perhaps justified by their general purpose, which was
to ensure the institution of a doctrine which claimed to
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